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Cityscapes - reflections on the urban environments that we all know and how the current generation of writers relates to them

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Cityscapes, Jacob Steinberg, ed.

Read/download it here


altlitcityscapes.tumblr.com/

         Jacob Steinberg is putting out this anthology called "Cityscapes" and I was given the chance to review it ahead of release. The collection ostensibly centers around the writer's cities and the experiences the environments form. It has a November 9th release date and will be available for free. Info can be found hereabouts. In a community that seems to has major international centers in New York, New York and New York the chance to get a sense of what people are doing in Chicago, Miami, Wellington, Dubai and the rest of the world is absolutely refreshing. Steinberg has done a nice job gathering pieces from the well known (Noah Cicero, Frank Hinton, Sam Pink) and the currently less well known (at least to me), as well as writers with a range of experience. As with any themed anthology the adherence to the theme varies considerably between pieces and ultimately has little correlation to the quality of the piece. The quality of the pieces does vary, though the majority are at the very least engaging, and a decent number are of high quality. I'll focus the review on the latter.  I will admit that my attention to the poetry was sparse, certainly not because I found the verse lacking quality but simply because I do not feel as adequately equipped to judge poetry.
        One of my few complaints with the anthology (and this isn't with the anthology so much as with the writers themselves) is that some of the pieces are woefully short. Some of these writers are the sort where a short piece can be a bad thing. Some of these are teases, leaving the reader (me) wanting more, wanting the thought to go on, develop, become something great when they don't. My other complaint is Steinberg found no one to rep Seattle.
       As for the writers...
       Frank Hinton's writing is in excellent shape here, hands down the best I've read from her and in a different style from her pieces I've seen in the past. This short story is down right terrifying: she depicts a descent into hell, a movement from the sterile comfort of the city to a hedonistic confused rural scene from which the narrator does not emerge unscathed. No punches are pulled and she avoids over-dramatizing the events that occur.
       Mira Gonzalez has a nice poem in which she whips the reader through the extremes of scale, replicating the enormity and isolation of city life. Breif and disorienting.
      Morgan Lent's piece is a series of vignettes of Los Angeles from different views narrated with an excellent voice and merciless wit. Within LA she encompasss the world from pole to equator and works the city theme for all it's worth.
      Mike Bushnell drops a breathless metaportrait of New York, switching voices on you without warning and replicating the driving ghost of the city.
     Janey Smith, a writer I had as of yet not heard of,  has a really nice piece of strange realism in which the narrator prepares to attend thier father's funeral. This is the sort of piece that has a quality that can't be adequately put into words, suffice it to say that it definitely stands out from the rest in it's degree of cohesion, development and heart. Certainly a writer I'll be looking into.
     Irene Gayraud's piece, translated by Caitlin Adams, is written with an ease and grace that hints at considerable talent. The fact that the setting is a pretty run of the mill relationship scene (one which could be portrayed a hundred different ways, 90 of them uninteresting) makes her piece that much more impressive.
      Noah Cicero predictably blows it out of the water with a trifecta of tiny funny poems. Just read them.
      Vivek Namana's piece is one of the longer of the bunch and is socially and personally aware. This might be unsettling for those used to the often pathologically self-centered bent of internet writing, and Namana's piece certainly stands out for better or worse. I loved it.
      Viktor Iberra Calavera has these eye sharpening, fucked up word salads reminiscent of, though separate from, Sean Kilpatrick's style. I'm often lost in this style but Calaverra (with the help of Steinberg's translation) drew me in and shook me. It's all about the sounds.
      The pieces in "Cityscapes" are framed by a peroxide clean layout and Steinberg's terse and thought provoking introduction this is a well done anthology, definitely worth the money (it's free, duh) and your attention. Bask in your favorites, expand your horizons authorially and geographically.- perfidiousscript.blogspot.com/

 "The idea for this project was born one day this past winter in Buenos Aires. As I walked to the subway, I remembered my third year of college, when a friend of mine took a seminar about space and our relationship to it. She explained to me how there are meaningful spaces (our dwellings, where we work, or our destinations, to name a few), and then there are inter-spaces: the paths we simply travers...e between points of significant contact. Julio Cortázar would frequently write about the Parisian métro as one of these surreal interstices where the displacement from our daily lives leads to a heightened creative perception. Removed from the quotidian, observing it from these non-places, we are able to draw what he called “figures” and forge connections between ostensibly random events.

Oftentimes as I walk down the sidewalk and vaguely take in my surroundings, lines of verse start to write themselves in my head. I believe Cortázar when he says that from these non-places, we begin to see things differently. As I become distracted, the points beyond me form their own shapes and my observations become astute. The city around me becomes a womb nourishing my thoughts and crafting my words. No matter what topics appear in my writing, there are always traces that remain lingering in the background: the anonymity of the urban imaginative.
Our surroundings affect us. They are the palette on which we develop our lives, our beliefs, and our feelings. The great twentieth-century Kabbalist Rav Ashlag explains that “just as the seed that is sown in the ground manifests its potential only through its environment,” that is, the quality of the soil, the amount of water or sunlight available, “once the individual has chosen his environment, he is subjected to it like clay in the hands of a potter.”
It is well known that people ascribe different cities with their own identities; our urban landscapes most certainly have their own unique way in which they are represented in culture, film, and writing. But what interested me for this project was how those identities are so often transplanted onto their inhabitants. And while dispute continues over terminology to define contemporary literature, there is an undeniable shared quality in how we write, publish, and take in literature in the internet era.
The “cityscapes” in this project are reflections on the urban environments that we all know and how the current generation of writers relates to them..." - Queen Vic Knives


Cityscapes / Jacob Steinberg Prologue
Cityscapes was edited by Jacob Steinberg. Jacob goes to NYU (does he still go to NYU?). I remember he used to bro-down with Spencer Madsen and one time they did a Ustream from the beach in Florida or something. I’ve been in many Tinychats with Jacob. I like him.
Jacob mentions Julio Cortazar in his prologue. We’re both fans of Cortazar and of Clarice Lispector, not that those are rare people to be fans of, but I feel as if we’ve e-bonded over being into those authors. Jacob asked me to be in this but my piece wasn’t really about Chicago particularly. Took place on the internet.

This project used to be called Alt Lit Cityscapes but Jacob decided to drop “Alt Lit” because there were non-Alt Lit people in it. I also heard “somewhere” that “someone” refused to be in an anthology with “Alt Lit” in the title.

 “i live in a magical kingdom” Jackson Nieuwland
I love this poem. The second-to-last stanza is particularly great, to me. I’ve noticed Jackson likes metaphors and patiently carrying out extended metaphors. Really love the second-to-last stanza.

4 shorts by Alice May Connolly
I’m not sure if these 4 shorts are interrelated or seen as separate from each other. Thought of Under Milk Wood by Dylan Thomas while reading these, via the “shifting between characters in their little lives all in one place” aspect. I enjoyed them. I have been seeing Alice May Connolly’s name pop up more recently and her pieces seem to be well-crafted and unpredictable. The last of the shorts is about the health and physical appearance of the speaker’s buttocks.

Melbourne / Susie Anderson
I have known of Susie for a long time. I think we may have interacted a few times. She used to (still does?) run a blog with Stacey Teague, who is also in this anthology. They both live in London now, I believe, having moving from New Zealand and Australia. This prose or prose poem is called “thank you batman, i feel magical now.”

Auckland / “snail” / Stacey Teague
Stacey is coming to New York to visit, I have heard. We’ve been in many Tinychats together. I published her in Pop Serial #3.

“waiting for a flood” / Dave Shaw
Dave seems cool. I don’t know him very well at all. He made a nice image for the next issue of my magazine. I know he’s been friends with Steve Roggenbuck and other people I know for a while now. I like his book reviews he posts on Facebook. Seems like a cool guy. I have heard many girls (and boys) say they thought he was cute.

“hunter gather” / Frank Hinton
Frank’s been in Pop Serial. She/he/them/it is supposed to send me something for the next one too. I like Frank’s writing. This piece strikes me as more lyrical or something than other things I’ve read by Frank. Might re-read it.

London / Alexander J. Allison
I’ve interacted with Alexander but I don’t know him too well. He has a novel coming out. Several friends of mine seem to be enamored of his writing. He has hung out with various British friends of mine. I remember liking a thing he had in Kill Author (RIP hehe…).

Excerpt from “nature poem” / Crispin Best
I love Crispin Best. He is a wonderful presence online and in person. I had the pleasure of hanging out with him and Ben Brooks during AWP this year. They are quite the duo, I love them both. Crispin is a hilarious, clever, delightful fellow, what can I say, lol… We’ve discussed publishing the complete version of this poem in Pop Serial #4 but haven’t decided yet. I love Crispin Best.

Thom James
I have known of Thom James for a bit. He sent me a prose thing unsolicited for Pop Serial #4 (I mostly solicit) and it, as they say, knocked my socks off. I even compared it to Beckett in my message back haha.. I’ve liked his poems but that thing he sent to me was better yet than anything I’d seen by him. I am excited to read more stuff by Thom.

Giles Ruffer
I’ve vaguely known Giles for a while. He’s been very supportive and friendly on social media but I’ve never had much or any (?) direct contact I think. I know he’s friends with my friends in England. He seems like a very nice guy. Interesting piece. Seems restrained. Kept thinking “paragraphs” while reading. The paragraphs as units seems to be something i thought about while writing (really don’t know what I’m getting at here, what the fuck lol…). Restrained. Interesting piece. Feeling dumb at the moment. Need to pee brb.

“high male vocals” / Ana Carrete
I love Ana. She is the first person to publish me. She’s been in every issue of Pop Serial I think. She visited me in Chicago once and I visited her in Tijuana. I’m always wishing the best for Ana. I’m glad she has a book out now. This story is about her relationship with a character named Macaulay Culkin. Was interesting for me trying to guess the Culkin character’s possible real-life counterpart. I know Ana has had a longstanding extreme crush on the actual Macaulay Culkin.

“palm trees are not native to los angeles” / Mira Gonzalez
I like Mira a lot. She’s a really fun, nice person. We talk pretty regularly on the internet. I read her forthcoming book and like it. Got to get a blurb to her soon. She has poems in the next Pop Serial. I’m excited about her. I can tell she’s trying hard with her poetry.

Megan Lent
Megan seems nice, I don’t know her very well. My first interaction with her was when we both participated in a roundtable discussion with a pseudonymous shit-talker whose pseudonym I honestly can’t remember anymore. The roundtable was to be published by Housefire but has been delayed a bunch of times. Now the controversy with the shit-talker is irrelevant and everyone mostly forgot about it, so there’s no real point in publishing after all these delays. Was disappointed with the delays initially because I planted a cheeky quote in there and was excited to have the cheeky quote out there in the world. Was something like “Pop Serial has the most sexually attractive contributors of any literary journal in history” or something haha…

Portland / Zeke Hudson
I don’t know Zeke Hudson. Ampersands. Unconventional spacing of the poems.

San Francisco / M Kitchell
I like Mike. We used to hang some when he lived in Illinois. Good guy. He admitted he didn’t like me before meeting me IRL. I like that he liked me after meeting me, lol. I know of several people who love his writing a lot. I like it. I’ve mostly heard him read it out loud moreso than read it by itself. I’m interested in his ideas about the impossible and imagining a different life/reality. I’m glad he’s happier living in San Francisco. His contribution to this anthology is self-portraits taken on webcam, no text. That’s fun. I wish all the best for Mike.

“Bodies in DC” / Carolyn DeCarlo
I’ve met Carolyn, with Jackson Nieuwland, at AWP this year. I like her. I immediately felt comfortable talking to her. I like what she’s done with her magazine, UP.

J. Bradley
I think I know him from Facebook. No offense to Bradley, going to keep moving along because I want to get through this.

“F.I.L.A. (Forever I Love Atlanta)” / Michael Hessel-Mial
These are some sweet-ass macros by Michael. I’ve met Michael once, he had dinner with me and Roggenbuck in Chicago when he was passing through town. Steve had him take over as managing webmaster of Internet Poetry. Michael seems like a really nice, awesome guy. I love that he is in the academic world and very smart and then makes these silly, inspired, awesome macros. A thing I appreciate with Michael’s macros is that the imagery is always kind of pretty/nice-looking, whereas many macros are intentionally kind of ugly/crude-looking–I also like that he goes for more than just irony with his macros. His macro repertoire includes irony, nonsequitur, post-irony and more.  I asked Michael to make a special two-page spread for the next Pop Serial. I expect it’ll make me very happy to look at.

New York / Alex Dimitrov
I think CA Conrad or someone mentioned Dimitrov on Facebook, so I assume he’s well-known to some. Going to google Dimitrov now.
 OK he was in Yale Review. I don’t know, I feel tired.
 Saw a photo post by him with the title, “America I’ll Be Your Poet.”
 He runs a queer poetry salon in New York.

Mike Bushnell
Prose-poem with run-on sentences. I’ve seen Mike several times. I’ve seen him read–he’s a very charismatic reader, reads with facepaint on oftentimes. I admire his boldness and spirit. We talked a bit on the subway during AWP I remember. I like Mike.

Regina Green
Short poem. No comment, I don’t know.
Willis Plummer
I like Willis. We’ve been chatting more recently. Seems like a nice, fun guy. Hoping we can hang in New York soon. I’ve seen him sleeping on cam in Tinychats numerous times, which I find endearing.

“ode to flatbush” / Jacob Steinberg
I think anything I read by Jacob is more fun for me because of my interactions with Jacob. His charm and personality and my knowledge of him make reading him more entertaining.

CAConrad
I like the style and the multiple versions of CA talking to each other. Not too familiar with CA’s work, but I remember a very cool, fun girl I dated for a while said CA was her favorite poet.

Chicago / Sam Pink
I love Sam Pink’s writing. He’s one of my favorites. Heiko Julien and I were talking today about how much we admire him. I like the concept of this piece. Feels like typical Sam Pink humor. He imagines his suicide and then provides a “fun fact” about Chicago. Haha.
 
Cassandra Troyan
I like Cassandra. We’ve hung many times in Chicago. Very nice person. I dig her writing and her reading-style at readings. I like this poem. Tristan Tzara name-drop. Some good lines in this.

Memphis / Janey Smith
Janey is intriguing to me. He “like”s things I post on Facebook pretty frequently. His writing and persona online seems peculiar, somewhat difficult to parse. Which I’m sure is what Janey is going for. I think he once submitted to my magazine and said he was going to run into traffic if I didn’t accept it. Haha. I’m too tired to read all of this right now.

New Orleans / Rod Naquin
Rod’s a neat guy. I follow him on Twitter. He used to jump into conversations a lot back when Roggenbuck was doing essays on poetry. I appreciate his intelligence and thoughtfulness.

Sao Paulo / Ana Guadulupe
Cool that there’s poetry in translation. I like the line “a map carried by a turtle.”

Paris / Irene Gayraud (Transl. Caitlin Adams)
I like this. Nice prose style. A bedroom scene. “…easy in that exoticism without voyage.”

Barcelona / Luna Miguel (Transl. Jacob Steinberg)
Luna is fierce, wonderful, I love her poetry. She always has memorable lines and a terrific energy in her poetry. “Like those pigeons run over on the Rambla I seek to be just a hole.”

Seoul / Noah Cicero
I like Noah. We’ve chatted numerous times. I appreciate his sense of humor and his passion for literature. These appear to be sarcastic poems? The narrator of the first claims to be from Brooklyn, and Noah is not from Brooklyn. I’m not sure. Interesting.

Brittany Wallace
Brittany seems nice. The one time we met IRL I didn’t get a chance to talk with her much.

Buenos Aires / Malen Denis (Transl. Jacob Steinberg)
Couldn’t think of a comment. I’m glad there’s translated poems. I want to visit Buenos Aires.
 
Taipei / Ben Townsend
“the gloss jungle plants” stuck out to me. Some interesting combinations of descriptive words in this.

Dubai / Vivek Nemana
I don’t know what to say about a lot of these. Usually if I don’t know what to say it means either I read it and it seemed fine but I didn’t see a memorable line or couldn’t think of a nice thing to say about it. I haven’t hated any of these pieces. Some just I don’t have anything nice to say or nothing comes to mind.

Aurelio Meza (Transl. Jacob Steinberg)
I’m regretting deciding to do notes on every piece. I’m glad everyone contributed to this. I like this anthology. Good job, Jacob.

Ibarra Calavera (Transl. Jacob Steinberg)
Nice energy to this. Thought the word “mighty” while reading this. “Mighty verse.” Idk lol…

Port-au-Prince / Ariana Reines
I have known of Reines a long time. People seem to love her. I’ve liked all the poems I’ve read by her, I think. Have looked at her Facebook, her photos. Interested in the fact she seems cool but is accepted by “the establishment” maybe??? Like she seems “young” and “with-it” but also considered serious and important.
I like how her poems feel casual and yet she has lots of memorable lines. “I get hit by  a car / I like it.” I like lines about self-violence. Roggenbuck and I were very into requests for someone to bludgeon/murder us last year. Well I thnk we’re still into it lol… Being violently murdered.
I feel like Ariana’s poems always feel long in a good way, like she keeps going and going until the thing’s been done. Good poem. Probably my favorite in this.
This has been my shitty-ass liveblog/notes on “Cityscapes.” Cheers to Jacob Steinberg. Cheers to all the writers. Goodnight.  -















Blake Butler, Vanessa Place & Christopher Higgs - two writers have produced textual bodies, one speaking for the interior and the other describing the exterior, while a third writer has assembled these two bodies into a single grotesque symphony of chimerical language

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Blake Butler, Vanessa Place & Christopher Higgs, One, Roof Books, 2012.


'From the room inside the room, from the house inside the house, memories of a one-legged father and various acts of jurisprudence haunt the mysterious creature who writhes in somatic isolation from one waking nightmare to another. In ONE two writers have produced textual bodies, one speaking for the interior and the other describing the exterior, while a third writer has assembled these two bodies into a single grotesque symphony of chimerical language. A hitherto unprecedented collaborative experiment, ONE defies categorization and heralds a new approach to exploring the boundaries of authorship and narrative.' -- Roof Books






'What you are about to read is the product of a collaborative experiment: what if one writer (Vanessa Place) wrote a narrative composed entirely from the interior landscape of a character while another writer (Blake Butler) wrote a narrative composed entirely from the exterior landscape of a character, neither writer communicating with the other until both writers gave their finished product to another writer (Christopher Higgs, Me) who would then assemble the two narratives together to form one unified piece? The project originated in the fall of 2009, while I was studying Alfred Jarry’s Pataphysics, reading Kenneth Goldsmith’s Fidget, and watching a gluttonous amount of Jean-Luc Godard films. My work at the time revolved around an obsession with remixing preexisting material, specifically turning stage plays into prose poems. The idea for this book arose from those conditions.

'One night in October, I emailed Blake to explain the basic premise and ask if he might be interested in participating. He agreed to join the project and enthusiastically encouraged me to pursue it. Soon thereafter I contacted Vanessa to ask if she might be interested. Unlike Blake, with whom I had a prior relationship, contacting Vanessa was a shot in the dark. I sent her a long email, introducing myself and the concept for the project, which concluded with, “What do you think? I know this probably sounds absolutely insane, especially because you & I don’t know each other, but I’m hoping you might look past those minor glitches.” Shortly thereafter Vanessa replied, “Dear Chris, I adore minor glitches, and the project sounds like potential fun. In spite of that, I’m in.” ...

'What follows, then, the product of our experiment, could be described as a grotesque symphony of chimerical language, a fever dream of so- matic isolation that depicts the gore of loneliness arising from persistent waking nightmares and an obsession with the history of jurisprudence. As a textual body, you may consider our text akin to Frankenstein’s creation. Recall, if you will, the way Shelley describes the creature as an amalgam of materials “from the dissecting room and the slaughterhouse,” and perhaps conceive of Blake as the slaughter-house and Vanessa as the dissecting table, or vice versa. Of course, that makes me the Doctor, the unpardonable villain.' -- Christopher Higgs 







 Excerpt

[l]

One has a plan. One did not have a plan previously, when the dimensions of one’s situation were not known to one. This is always the case. Say something to remember. Say something by which one would remember. Say never again, again. Plans are made retrospectively, if they have any hope of working at all.

I have to know how to get back here when I am done with wherever else there is. One has considered a schematic representation of one’s situation, which is no more euphemism than the predicate possessive pronoun, and in this way reminds one of a dream one once had about a man with one leg who insisted on riding a bicycle.

Memorize: I say I say I say I said, one method of flight involves the cre- ation of the simulacrum, often out of bits of whatnot, soap, lather, foam, hair, air, oysters and thatch. Soot is also good, if one can find a hearth. If no hearth, wait till the next Lent and stand in line five or six times. You can also simply weep till ashen. One day, perhaps the story of the family will be told, and how they came to be in the various institutions. There were numerous complaints that various authorities had exceeded their power. One is a proud people, though pointless.

Here’s a joke. Stop if one’s heard it before. Equity grew in its desire to deal with the de facto failings of the common law courts, and did not con- cern itself with doctrinal differences. Acts of jurisprudence, again. Of jus- tice. Again. As one was saying, one day there was a one-legged man on a bicycle riding by, one swore it was one’s father, it looked just like him, from this perspective, of course, that is to say. Horizontal. Lateral. When in relation, as he used to say—what was it? Something about a bicycle.

But stop one if one has heard this one. A one-legged man is riding a bi- cycle when he comes across—one’s father, horizontal. It was bound to happen, an accident like that. There’s nothing like alterity. Nothing at all. Fate, in other words. Does the other believe? Naturally. What’s not to? Nothing. Nothing doing. If one had a nickel for every bit of nothing one cradled and put to bed, there’d be a sea of change, that’s all. Don’t mistake this, though, for one does love a bit of nothing. Warm nothing, nothing with syrup. Say nothing. Say no more. Nothing for nothing, that’s what one’s father used to say. How the other could laugh as he rode by on his bicycle. One should like a sequence of numbers played at this moment, a-harmonically, as if this were possible. There’s harmonics in it, all the others say so. For example, returning back, as if there were an- other way or direction to it, referring back one means to say, referring back to one’s earlier statement on equation. Take a simple proposition, one sure to warm the cockles of any well-tended member. Such as, dogs are like people. No argument there. From petting to pounding, and hap- pily brown-eyed in between. Dogs are like people, ergo people are like dogs. There. Mathematically proven. Collar ’em, leash ’em, license ’em, implant chips for their safe relocation. Call them Jake, Princess, and one’s own true bitch, it’s all well-organized. This is the great fact of epis- temology, by which is meant mathematics. Truth is math, math is truth, not understanding one, except for in the grossest, simplest formulations, makes one a better one. Truer, as if the eyes were bluer. Impossible. There is none more azure eye than I. I’ve a critique du rhythme, counted out in the metronome of an augenblich, nicht, nicht-ich, nicht, nicht-ich.

Lovely. It must be getting on a quarter of there. Or somewhere. Surely we can submeasure in minutes, if we can grasp the hours. Often, a suitor who was dissatisfied with the result in a common law court would refile the case in Equity or Chancery. This seems to be the point, at least from where one squats, to seize the mechanism by which the other parcels out one’s particulars. As previously mentioned. One mentions the particulars because they have that grainy quality so common to the commonplace. Like old photos. Non-existent, in other words. Like in other words. Like old photos. One has to admit of something. Speaking only for oneself, one can allow as one has been many places, and hopes for more. Say thirty-one. Then again, there’s also the call of no place in particular, or rather in particular, no place. As one was saying, this is a mathematical proposition, a measure of means, meaning: meaning. When one was younger one had various items that one would associate with mathemat- ics, imaginary items to be sure, but real nonetheless—four pieces of chocolate plus three pieces of candy equals what, if one has six jacks and two hands, and one gives a red ball to another, what does one have on hand, and so on. The point is there was methodology, by which is meant taxonomy, and this is where liberation begins. Systems. Plans. No secrets. No troves for treasuring. Things to be spoken of. These latter courts saw their role as being ‘equalizers’: socially, legally, economically. In this position, and encouraged by Roman law traditions, they were al- ways creative in producing new writs which could not be found in the common law courts. Good as done. Like lunch on a Monday evening or a fresh set of slippers, the plastic loop looping them together still in situ. There’s a French word for it, meaning avole. As one recalls, it was Tues- day one had lunch last. No supper. Sardines in tomato sauce, with a salad of wild rice and fava beans. One wishes. Feta or somesuch was intro- duced to collegial effect. The sardines went off while one was eating, which lead to this, the plan. Subtraction. The take-away. It was in this spirit that Justice Berrewyk in 1302, ordered an infant to be brought be- fore the court with a writ subpoena: ‘under pain of (forefeit) of 100 pounds’. The less as lessor, the entailment being another form of more. So that if there is growth, there will necessarily be elimination. Take cancer, for example. Take the rising tide of public sentiment and the corresponding lack of real feeling. Take two, if you like. There’s a mesh tote bag available at the front desk, if there was a front desk. Due to the recent decrease in funding, one has had to make due with simply leaving a small side window open during business hours, which one no longer has. The other saves a tremendous amount of money by spending more—see how the logic is impeccable. But there is evidence that ‘threat of penalty’ had been attached to writs used by the government to induce behavior as early as 1232. It’s all a matter of product placement, and the strategic use of feta cheese.

 




Daniela Cascella - An archival fiction of listening, where landscape is reinvented and abstracted across autobiographical narratives of sounds, books, pictures and songs

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http://earroom.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/en-abime-hi_res.jpg

Daniela Cascella, En Abime: Listening, Reading, Writin. An archival fiction, Zero Books, 2012.

Daniela Cascella's blog

En Abime explores listening and reading as creative and critical activities driven by memory and return, reshaped into the present. It introduces an idea of aural landscape as a historically defined cultural experience, and contributes with previously unexplored references to the emerging area of listening as artistic practice, adopting an expansive approach across poetry, visual art and literature.

"…poetic, incisive, grounded in politics and history yet continually pushing at the edges of what we now consider to be sound. She interrogates notions of music and the shifting experience that is silence with a freshness and coherence that is inspiring"
David Toop, Author of "Ocean of Sound", "Haunted Weather" and "Sinister Resonance"

"… compulsive and fast, rushing with you through textual territories that seem spoken, direct and contemporary while being nostalgic - invoking a past that creates the present tense."
Salomé Voegelin, author of "Listening to Noise and Silence: Towards a Philosophy of Sound Art"

  • Mise en abyme means placed into the abyss. In art theory, it refers to an image containing a smaller copy of itself; in postmodern literary theory it becomes a tool for analysing complicated texts that contain a number of subtexts. To be thrown into the abyss could also be a description of what happens when we listen to music, especially that which contains unfamiliar, non-musical sounds. Here, it’s a writing device, allowing Daniela Cascella, who is Italian, to use English as a Verfremdungseffekt, or distancing effect, which reflects the polyphonic nature of memory and indeed the multiple texts of the mise en abyme. Among the stories she tells is one of a real abyss, recounting how Nero’s villa, Domus Aurea, was rediscovered in the 15th century by a boy who had accidentally fallen into a hole that led to the ruin. Such vivid, bodily experiences recur throughout En Abîme. African-American poet Audre Lorde coined the term biomythography; here, Cascella complicates the genre of memoir by referring to an “archival fiction”. Her book is a personal meditation on her life, giving the impression of someone trying to pick up the pieces and put them together in a meaningful way. As a music writer and art historian, she has travelled widely to her objects of passion, curiosity or fascination, and the book oscillates between several geographical spaces, which in turn evoke metaphorical spaces. One is a Protestant cemetery near the Spanish Steps in Rome, where Gramsci, Keats and Shelley are buried. Another is New York, where Cascella researched a dissertation on the interdisciplinary avant garde magazine Possibilities, edited by William Baziotes with John Cage and Robert Motherwell. In New York she befriends Baziotes’s widow, Ethel. And in Berlin, she meets Mika Vainio, who, instead of giving her a straightforward interview, plays records to her. Rome, a place of pilgrimage for many poets, writers and artists, is a city that åprovokes memories for Cascella. One of these is of listening to Bella Ciao, a compilation of workers’ and partisans’ songs, with her brother. The compilation is named after a famous song sung by the anti-fascist resistance movement in Italy and later covered by punk groups. In 1964, at the Spoleto festival, Giovanna Marini, a friend of communist film director Pier Paolo Pasolini, sang this song to a scandalised public who were not keen to be reminded of the past. But Cascella is haunted by the past because she wants to understand it, and she draws upon the experiences of other visitors to Rome – Herman Melville, Rainer Maria Rilke and Italian poet Carlo Emilio Gadda, whose work uses various dialects and languages – to help her to put together her own existence. A novel by Melville, Pierre: Or, The Ambiguities (later filmed by Leos Carax as Pola X, with a soundtrack by Scott Walker), where a prospective author writes two versions of a book – one for the reader and one only for himself – is the basis for a chapter of direct self-commentary on the author’s own reading and writing. Somehow this cascade of disrupted impressions makes sense. I felt at times as if the voice of the late Chris Marker was speaking to me – Cascella has a similar aphoristic style that recalls Sans Soleil’s meditations on memory. She never neglects the political aspect of her stories, all of which are painfully immersed in history, like the song “Bella Ciao” – the book’s real heart, and its musical leitmotif. En Abîme is, like Marker’s films, a road book, and as in his creations, there is at the end an elusive but firm sense that our world has transformed a little. ~ Agata Pyzik, The Wire
  • This slim volume from the Zero Books series is a collection of brief, interrelated reflections on sound by Daniele Cascella. There are extracts from journals, close readings of literary texts, snippets from interviews (with Steve Roden, among others). While the emotive exploration of sound's role in cultural and personal life is adventurous, perhaps the strongest aspect of Cascella's adoption of sound technique's writing is the way she repeats various themes, even phrases and sentences, as the probes her material and develops her argument. ~ Marc Weidenbaum, GoodReads.com
  • I consider Daniela Cascella to be one of the leading theorists and explorers of an exciting new discourse growing up around the practice of listening. Her book is poetic, incisive, grounded in politics and history yet continually pushing at the edges of what we now consider to be sound. She interrogates notions of music and the shifting experience that is silence with a freshness and coherence that is inspiring. ~ David Toop, author of Ocean of Sound, Haunted Weather, Sinister Resonance
  • En abîme is compulsive and fast, rushing with you through textual territories that seem spoken, direct and contemporary while being nostalgic - invoking a past that creates the present tense. It produces a wonderful séjourne into history that brings with it the contemporary condition of being, remote, apart, unseen, but in constant contact. Its words compose a listening journey that reminds of diaries written before the computer and the internet: crafted by hand, meticulously inscribing every shard of the travellers experience and thought. And so it talks intriguingly about listening to culture and cultural artefacts, not to know about sound but to know about culture, the social, the political and to make you understand rather than know the expanding function of listening. I read its voice aloud in my mind. A strong single narrating voice that is dispersed but not distracted, connecting in sound the circumstance of now as a fluent stream of poetry, philosophy, fiction, description and reverie. ~ Salomé Voegelin, author of Listening to Noise and Silence: Towards a Philosophy of Sound Art
  • Daniela Cascella is a talented writer whose research into the literary aspects of silence is original and timely. Danielas work is, by nature, transdisciplinary yet manages to retain an intensive methodological focus on its subject. ~ Maria Fusco is a Belfast-born writer based in London, and Director of Art Writing at Goldsmiths University of London
  • At Sound and Music Ive had the pleasure of commissioning Danielas writing on a number of occasions. As an organisation that explores the wider contexts of music, listening and sound we have found her discursive and personal approach particularly suitable at a time when the celebration of biographical approaches to listening, and the emergence of a wider analysis of sound references within non-sounding art forms are on the rise. ~ Richard Whitelaw, Senior Producer, Sound and Music

Daniela Cascella

Daniela Cascella is an Italian writer based in London. Her research is focused on sound and listening across a range of publications and curated projects. Before moving to London in 2009, she worked in Italy as a curator and as a contributing editor of Blow Up music magazine (1999-2008). Her latest book En Abîme: Listening, Reading, Writing is available through Zero Books from September 28th 2012. For comprehensive information please visit www.danielacascella.com or visit Daniela’s blog at www.enabime.wordpress.com

ER. Could you give a synopsis of what the book is about; its themes/topics etc.
En Abîme explores listening and reading as creative and critical activities driven by memory, reshaped into the present. At the core of the book is an idea of aural landscape as a constantly changing and historically defined cultural experience that I expressed by adopting an expansive approach across poetry, visual art and literature. I devised a three-layered structure through which the book’s narrator revisits, at different points in time, a number of places in Rome – the Protestant Cemetery sung by Pier Paolo Pasolini in The Ashes of Gramsci, via Appia, the Catacombs, among the others – and attaches onto them a series of connections to her recollected archive of poetry, music, literature. The words of Herman Melville’s Roman diaries, Pasolini’s verses and films, a number of other songs and poems build up a mise en abîme; knots of visions and densities of prose are juxtaposed with sparse moments of stillness, as the book zooms in and out of the archival fiction of a city, morphs into criticism and abstraction, and back into a literary landscape [see related blog post].

ER. When did you begin writing it and how did it manifest?
DC. I’ve been thinking about this a lot recently: where does the book come from? When I was working in a journalism context, writing features and reviews for magazines I would often write in my notebooks a different version of my articles – at times more fictionalised, at times more playful, or poetic, or abstracted; I was never sure where these texts belonged, and I suppose because the journalistic work was constantly and consistently ‘out there’, for many years I didn’t think that the other writing would ever come to the surface; so there was always an internal – albeit unexpressed – tension in my work, between a very focused (and published) type of writing and another, hidden version. Of course, like in every Romantic tale or book, the hidden double takes over – be it with tricks, or sudden revelations – until it cannot be hidden any longer. I think this book is exactly the place where my ‘other’ writing took over.
I also thought a lot about how to write after listening [see related blog post]. How to claim for a writing and reading experience which could have the same authority as the experience of listening? How to determine a ground for writing which would not be seen as ancillary or dependent of the act of listening, but could stand in and of itself and perhaps trigger an opposite movement: from reading to listening? Thoughts on fabulation came along and contributed to the project. And so did the awareness of writing as an act of crossing an edge: simply put, a sheer act of volition, a ‘step into’. I thought of my writing as performing this ‘step into’, and I thought of how the space of writing is built before and after this step: in listening, in spending time listening, in building up a wealth of experience. The idea of ‘having done’ something, having been in a place, the load of experience that shapes you uniquely, all informed this book.

ER. It’s not a conventional read by any stretch of the imagination. Can you talk about the structure of the book?
DC. The book is actually a mise-en-abîme – a narrative within a narrative within a narrative. There are some more or less hidden tricks that I used in the text to formally structure this mise-en-abîme, but I don’t think it’s necessary to supply a ‘user’s manual’ here: I’d rather have the text unravel in each reader’s experience, than reveal its supporting structure. What I’m keen on saying is, I was interested in employing three different but very close degrees of subjectivities and seeing what happens when you place these slightly different ‘I’s together. The decision to use these layers is also an attempt at placing my words in different degrees of proximity to the moment of listening. It was generated by the awareness that writing and listening can never be one, there will always be something missing, as Robert Walser once wrote. I use the expression ‘unsteady unison’ to talk about this: listening takes you over, in many different ways, and it’s an experience that defines your sense of being, and of being in a place. In recalling the experiences of listening that animated my book, I felt they were so distant and dead, in time, and yet so embodied, present, alive in the space of recalling. So, writing after listening is loaded with a strong feeling of detachment, of separateness, and yet there is this strong sense of ‘having listened’, ‘of ‘having been there’ that weighs upon you – I want to explore this space between the moment I listen and the moment I write [see related blog post].

ER. Did this structure aid the writing of the book?
DC. As often is the case in my work, once I’ve found a structure (or a tone, or a shape) the writing moves much quicker. In a few cases in En abîme I deliberately use repetition in the text: the same paragraph, with slight variations, reappears in different chapters to articulate situations that can seem different and then turn out to be actually attached to the same experience. A vague, yet not entirely grasped sense of ‘having been there’ inhabits the pages of the book; I tried to inform the writing with the mixture of distance and embodiment that I’ve just discussed above.

ER. Although the book is non-linear it seems heavily researched although not in an academic, question and answer sort of way.
DC. When I started writing the book I was very frustrated with reading essays and books characterised by a theory-driven approach to sound and listening, in which the sense of direction was very clear, too clear. I felt the need to experience the territory of listening rather than drawing its map and – to carry on with the territory analogy – instead of just measuring the land and its geological features, the need to consider instead the unknown phenomena and creatures that you encounter, and the weather, the seasons that constantly reshape it. To convey a sense of discovery, not just safety. I also felt the need to introduce other references, and to propose a way of writing sound which is not referred to the writings of theorists but is shaped through the words of writers and poets.
At the beginning of all this reasoning is the fact that I approach a subject such as listening in a non-academic way. The book is not theoretical and it is not a survey either: to a certain extent, the actual prompts for this book were not listening, not sound, not art or film, but the act – the pleasure, the struggle – of writing, in and of itself. There was also the need to attempt a writing attached to and shaped by experiences and details and what is peripheral, marginal perhaps, but constitutes listening as much as what is usually distilled and canonised – what is usually left out because it won’t be generalised [see related blog post]. As a writer, the more I thought of sound in theory, the more I found I didn’t have much to tell, or at least I didn’t have any intention to focus on theory in my work. The ‘show, don’t tell’ tactics helped a lot, and so did reading an essay by Flannery O’Connor, The Nature and Aim of Fiction, where she writes of ‘all those concrete details of life that make the actual the mystery of our position on earth’. Listening, like the devil, is in the details! On the other hand I realised that what I could and most of all wanted to say/write was in fact more related to the experiences of listening and all the passing thoughts attached to them, and all the ways you could inhabit a place (in listening, in reading, and then in writing) without necessarily understanding it. To recall that invaluable and transient moment of the encounter with a sound, an image, a string of words, before you can figure them out. And how these stretch and change in time and challenge the habit of listening. All these had to be at the core of my book.

ER. And in terms of the books non-linearity?
DC. In terms of structure, the book couldn’t be ‘linear’ because while working on it I did not aim at writing how listening and reading function but how they affect you – which is not linear or whole or concluded: you stumble into the past, you enter a reference and suddenly exit it as the sheer sound takes you over, and so on. It’s about being attached to a place through listening (sometimes even when we don’t want to) through different angles and registers, being always there and always removed. I have nothing to conclude, but that’s not because I don’t have anything to say. That’s also why I used the expression ‘archival fiction’ – the book is a function of my archive, and not just a physical archive but what I could call my archives of listening, which are both fact and fiction.

ER. You also write in a first person narrative yet as you say constantly blur fact with fiction – why did you write it in this way?
DC. At one point in the first part of the book I quote a song whose first verses are ‘I lost all my strength and my ability’: I use this verse as a device throughout the book, voicing the loss of one’s sense of self and only finding it again at the end as a polyphonic ‘I’, after having inhabited different ‘I’s and places. A recurring theme in the book addresses losing one’s voice in the beginning and finding a way of saying something throughout nonetheless: building it through writing, rather than by defining it a priori [see related blog post].
Also I think the more you turn inward, the more you become estranged from yourself and rather than self-absorbing, this process in fact flips over to the outward, which is after all what is so typical of the listening experience. Only yesterday I was reading one of the essays in the catalogue of the Edvard Munch show at Tate Modern, discussing Munch’s obsession with self-portrait, and I was struck by a quote from Sören Kierkegaard referring to a ‘quiet transparency in which the inner reposes in a corresponding outer’. I seek this quiet transparency.

ER. Does your nationality have any impact upon the type of autobiography/first person narrative?
DC. I’m sure part of my approach to autobiography has to do with the fact that I wrote the book in English, even though my first language is Italian. Writing in the first person in English definitely feels more distant and detached than my Italian ‘I’ – the language I learnt to feel and think and listen in. At the time of writing En abîme I’d only been living in England for a couple of years, so I felt not entirely here or there with language; I really wanted to capture this slippery moment in the use and the shaping of my ‘being in a language’ and listening and writing in it – or, better, on its edges.

ER. So would you say the ‘I’ that you use isn’t necessarily a conventional autobiographical ‘I’?
DC. Yes, definitely. A lot of the book is fictionalised and I’m still not sure how much of that I want to reveal in my sources: what ‘really’ happened, what I projected, or anticipated, or imagined. Of the places I write about, at least one of them I have never been to – and yet, it doesn’t come across as more or less vividly as the other places I write of. A lot of the book happens on the margins of a half-recalled, half-imagined hazy idea of the city of Rome; when making these decisions, I thought a lot of how E.T.A. Hoffmann never visited Rome and yet he wrote of it in his book Princess Brambilla by looking at Callot’s engravings of Rome: the perfect rendition for his fantastic tale, in between dream and reality, set in the Carnival.
However, the songs, poems, films, sounds that I write in the book are very close to me. I suppose the closest to the ‘authentic I’ is in my sources and in my experience of them, in my being with them at different times – ultimately you can find me in the bibliography, discography, and in the act of writing: in what the writing went through and how it was sifted by my listening and reading experiences. InThe Predicament of Culture by James Clifford there’s a chapter entitled ‘Ethnographic Self-Fashioning’ that I’ve read so many times throughout the years, and that helped me a lot in thinking about where I place my writing. I like to think of En abîme not as autobiography but as self-ethnography. There’s a ‘graphein’, a writing element that I’m really attracted to, how the self is shaped in writing. Clifford also shows how Joseph Conrad’s self is fashioned out of a ‘not being in a language entirely’: this happens in bi-lingual writing. It makes you ask these types of questions: where is the self?

ER. Could you have written this in Italian?
DC. I don’t think so. As I said before, the book was born out of the need to write in a state of removal, of fluctuation, so it was crucial to use a language I’m fluent in, but not quite so comfortable in. I needed to retain a certain hesitation in my tone, to embody the unsteady unison in my words. A little anecdote here: I recently wrote something in Italian, and I ended up grasping for words! When I started to get back into my first language, I really got a sense of the artifice and the construction of the ‘I’ in my native tongue [see related blog post].

ER. This makes sense when thinking of the ‘Archival Fiction’ tag within the title. Which category will the work reside in when it’s on the bookstore shelf?
DC. En abîme can be found in the ‘literary criticism’ category, which I’m quite happy about. But this was one of the issues when I started to look for a publisher: which discipline does this book belong to? Apparently it didn’t fit into the ‘music’ or ‘sound studies’ categories. The moment I saw its form – a novella, a long-form story – rather than the discipline it belongs to, I understood a better way of presenting it.
Wax Cylinder recording of Daniela reading from En abîme by Aleks Kolkowski

ER. I noticed there’s also no introduction as such…
DC. There are already many voices in the book and I just didn’t want to have another layer, particularly one that would be explanatory. I don’t think the book needs that type of support and framing; the bibliography reveals that side of things enough. It’s the same with the omission of footnotes. I just wanted it to be experienced as a piece of writing in itself, with all the references and notes at the end for anyone who wants to find my sources and details of my quotes. This is the reason why I really like Salomé Voegelin’s foreword: it does not explain my text, it resonates with it.

ER. How do you begin/structure your writing in general.
DC. Initially when I write I know little of where I’m going. I can’t see from A to B in my drafts, I don’t see a trajectory, rather a series of visions (Joan Didion called them ‘shimmering images’) and rhythms that need to cohabit, at times even in spite of themselves and of what might be predictable. So I work with clusters of words and thoughts, gradually adding on to them. I have a strong feeling of where I am, but not where I will go. It’s a constant process of self-motivation, to stay close to these clusters as they appear, and to trust them. I never set out saying ‘I want to prove this or channel that’, writing for me is about responding to something else, something coming from outside – be it a sound I hear or a book I read – rather than being generated by me deliberately and out of the blue saying ‘today I’m going to write about that’. I’d say my writing process is not speculative, but experiential. So when all these clusters have taken space, and expanded, then I think the really hard and excruciatingly enjoyable work begins: editing, arranging words, leaving out (a lot), working with forms. In fact researching a book works for me in two parallel ways, not only researching a topic, but also researching a form, a language and its structures.

ER. Where do you think this attention to shape comes from?
DC. I think it’s got to do with writing it in English – not only did this choice place me, as I said before, in a terrain vague: it also allowed me to see the form and the sound of language in a more exaggerated manner. Those moments of transition where I used very long sentences, typical of Italian language, yet employing English words: or, the repeated use of Latin, for example, which in Italian is a lot more common than it is in English. I sought to render these moments of transition. I also think that the attention to form comes from the very way my writing language has been shaped throughout the years – since I was a teenager I was immersed in fiction, and what really shaped my thinking and what formed my language is undoubtedly literature and poetry. In writing a short book I also hoped that the form could be experienced in its totality more clearly than if it had been a longer text. ‘To be read in one sitting’, to quote Poe.
To go back to your question on form: I have an attraction to surfaces, a soft spot for the shape and the look and the sound of things, my first response when I read a book or listen to a record or look at a painting or watch a film, is always about their texture, only later I become concerned with what they might be ‘about’ as a deliberate way of thinking, because ultimately what they are ‘about’ resides in what they sound like, what they look like or move, and so on. I just don’t trust casual forms or shabbiness. I suppose that’s why Pasolini appears so often in my book [see related blog post].

ER. Is there a book which opened up this way of writing for you?
DC. A very early influence. Earlier this year I read again Proust’s In Search of Lost Time and I realised I’ve been returning to this book once every decade! So, apart from obviously having laid the grounds for a project of ‘comparative reading’ when I’m in my seventies, I have this sense of being physically affected by this book. I remember spending summers as a teenager reading it and being engrossed, not trying to understand, just experiencing it. When I re-read it this year things fell into place, and I realised it had been with me all these years, although I didn’t rationally know it.
In terms of more recent works, the list can be too long, but in general I’m always inspired by the work of writers and artists who are not easily canonised, who liberate their form instead of being caught in it, who don’t care about being prescriptive, who play freely with their past. Some of them also appear in my book: the Italian writers Giorgio Manganelli, Carlo Emilio Gadda, Cesare Pavese; Herman Melville who is still so much of an enigma; Steve Roden; David Toop; the Italian performer Chiara Guidi; musicians such as Mike Cooper and Mika Vainio; in a very diagonal yet very meaningful way, Michel Leiris.

ER. What is the relationship between listening and reading for you?
DC. Listening and reading seem to occupy a fairly similar starting point for me. I don’t think I’ve ever experienced a pure listening moment without it being reflected in my reading, but again that’s just part of how I work. The books I read inform the way I listen – and feel and think. And that’s basically how this book took shape. I was thinking about how certain places and landscapes would always reappear in my attempts to write about sound, and my thoughts would always return to certain places.
At some point in the book I quote a sentence by Antonio Gramsci that has always meant a lot to me: he wrote in his Prison Notebooks about ‘the organic adherence by which feeling-passion becomes understanding, therefore knowledge’. These words have always been for me as foremost keys into listening. To listen is to grasp a deeper sense of place, of self, of stories. In Italian the verb comprendere, to understand comes from Latin and means to embrace. It is expansive, not normative. It embraces diversity. Sapere, to know, comes instead from a verb that means to have a taste of, to catch a flavour. And sentire in Italian means both to feel and to listen. Gramsci’s claim for ‘a shift from knowing to understanding, to feeling, and back, from feeling to understanding, to knowing’ encompasses the expanding function of listening: from having a taste of something to embracing it – ultimately, to knowing it.

ER. It’s clearly a very creative, artistic work – where do you position yourself as an artist, researcher or writer?
DC. At the beginning I thought I would write a book on ‘sound’ – I say ‘I thought I would’ because the idea was very blurred, certainly more an expectation, some sort of cause/effect silly reasoning than a real interest for me – something like: ‘OK you have curated sound-related projects for all these years and have written on sound, now why not collect it all in a book?’ sort of vague and predictable trajectory. I wasn’t satisfied, it was as if I was playing a part that did not belong to me. I just couldn’t think of ‘sound’ on abstract terms, or grasp it as a topic, as if it was a category. So I began looking backward to what had really animated my experiences of listening, what had drawn me to researching sound more and more? It was a sense and the shape of ‘being there’ before any recognition or awareness, that had nailed me to a number of listening experiences, and in turn these were always contaminated and impure: I couldn’t even start considering writing them in and of themselves, as if under a glass case. I realised my writing sound had to reflect the way I’d always experienced it: on different registers and languages and matters. My first degree was in Art History, I worked as a music journalist for many years, and even before all this I grew up reading fiction… Why did I have to ignore all this? I really began enjoying writing En abîme when I realised the book could embrace all of it. I ended up going into visual arts territories and into Italian traditions and history – I really couldn’t entangle them and deny they were part of my hearing.

ER. Do you ever write in situ, in the places you write about in the book?
DC. Most of the book was generated by displacement – written about elsewhere. I write in situ very rarely and when I do, it’s mostly to catch the rhythm of a sentence that occurs in my mind and how words are stitched together. It’s important to say that for me this book is not a nostalgic longing for an ‘original’ or uncontaminated place or time. In fact it’s the opposite, it’s got to do with ‘re-visiting forward’, and with writing this re-visiting in a different manner every time.

ER. How does your blog function for you – is it to generate ideas?
DC. It started because I had all these research notes and wasn’t sure what to do with them, also I wanted to somehow add another layer to the project. More recently I have been posting reviews and other texts not strictly related to the book but informed by the same approach. It’s a place where I can have all these different voices and hopefully give a sense of what I’m doing on different registers. The blog is great because I can experiment more, not be constrained by deadlines, use fragments (a form that I’m researching a lot at the moment) as well as longer texts which are not published elsewhere. Much like what I used to do with writing alternative reviews in my notebooks. It’s good that it’s there for readers – and it’s been helpful for others to find the writing. Things are also more immediate there and they have a sense of being more than a note in a book.

ER. What are you writing next; do you have another archival fiction on the way?
DC. At the moment I’m developing two new projects, both of them at very early stages so I won’t talk too much about either. The former is a collection of fragments and longer texts on lesser known or published writers and artists – whose work is too peripheral and certainly not ‘of the moment’, even insular in certain cases. It might end up being the first book I write that is not strictly related to ‘sound’ (although I like to think of it as a voicing). The latter book is a satire.

ER. And finally as always Ear Room asks: what does the term sound art mean to you?
DC. Oh, the very awkward moment I feared! It’s odd, isn’t it, this whole ‘sound art’ ghost and how some artists seem haunted by it to the point of denying it. The ghost cannot be ignored though, as annoying and nerve-wracking as it might be. Maybe we could just be like mediums: channelling the ghost although not always understanding the sense of its presence; and the space of listening won’t always coincide with the space of explaining; and sometimes this resounding ghostly space can be a bit of a con, or a mock-up, and other times it can speak straight to you and nail you to what is meaningful.
To go back to your question: I like to think of sound art as a non-canonised way of shaping listening – wandering around and being surprised. The less you can grasp it in a definition, the more I’m attracted to it: at its most self-effacing. Working in ‘sound art’ always meant for me the freedom to be in a field that, not being defined, allowed me to play with and ponder on thoughts and words which wouldn’t be able to exist together otherwise. The relation between sound art and the attempt to define it is like the relation in geometry between a curve and its asymptote line: they do not fall together. The former tends to touch the latter ad infinitum. And the curve will never be straight. I think sound art is a way of being elsewhere, and never quite straight.








Texts

  • En abîme
    ongoing
    My blog on Writing Sound.
    http://enabime.wordpress.com
  • En abîme: an interview
    2012
    Earroom website
    read
  • The whole landscape flushes on a sudden at a sound
    2012
    Fondazione Aurelio Pietroni, San Cipriano Picentino, Italy
    Short text in Viso come territorio / Face as Territory exhibition catalogue.
  • Your voice has / cosey complex
    2012
    Koenig Books, Cologne, Germany
    Edited by Maria Fusco and Richard Birkett.
    'A major new publication shifting Cosey Fanni Tutti from noun to verb. This new book is the first major publication discussing and theorising Cosey as methodology'. Contributors include: Martin Bax, Gerard Byrne, Daniela Cascella, Lili Reynaud-Dewar, Diedrich Diederichsen, Graham Duff, Anthony Elms, Chris Kraus, Patricia MacCormack, Clunie Reid, Rob Stone, Corin Sworn and Cosey Fanni Tutti. Designed by Zak Kyes.
    http://mariafusco.net/editing/cosey-complex-book/
  • Lines written at the end of a dream, when I encountered leif elggren's 'the sudarium of st. veronica'
    2011
    Psykick Dancehall Recordings / Put the Music in Its Coffin, Glasgow, UK
    Text for Leif Elggren's 'The Sudarium of St. Veronica'.
    read
  • A landscape
    2011
    SoundFjord, London, UK
    Text on Steve Roden, published on the occasion of his London residency, 26-30 March 2011.
    read

Selected articles and reviews

  • Luciano chessa / luigi russolo
    Interview in Frieze Blog, London, UK, 18 July 2012
    read
  • Sonic somatic
    Review of Sonic Somatic: Performances of the Unsound Body by Christof Migone in The Wire. Adventures In Sound And Music, #342, London, UK, August 2012
  • Soundworks
    Review of Soundworks website in The Wire. Adventures In Sound And Music, #342, London, UK, August 2012
  • Luigi russolo, futurist
    Review of Luigi Russolo, Futurist: Noise, Visual Art and The Occult by Luciano Chessa in The Wire. Adventures In Sound And Music, #341, London, UK, July 2012
  • Pauline oliveros
    Article in Frieze Blog, London, UK, 21 May 2012
    read
  • Listening to noise and silence: towards a philosophy of sound art
    Review of Listening to Noise and Silence: Towards a Philosophy of Sound Art by Salomé Voegelin in The Journal of Sonic Studies, Leiden University Press, vol. 2, May 2012
    read
  • John wynne
    Review of Wynne's Installation no. 2 for High and Low Frequencies in frieze.com, Frieze, London, UK, 1 May 2012
    read
  • Phonographies
    Article on Aleksander Kolkowski's wax cylinder archive in Frieze Blog, London, UK, 15 December 2011
    read
  • Off the page
    Report in frieze.com, Frieze, London, UK, 28 February 2011
    read
  • David toop. sinister resonance
    Interview in frieze.com, Frieze, London, UK, 17 August 2010
    read
  • Chris watson. whispering in the leaves
    Review in frieze.com, Frieze, London, UK, 28 June 2010
    read
  • Bill fontana
    Review in frieze.com, Frieze, London, UK, 12 May 2010
    read

Hidden Agendas: Unreported Poetic & Avant-post: The Avant-Garde under "Post-" Conditions

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Louis Armand, ed., Hidden Agendas: Unreported Poetic, Litteraria Pagensia Books, 2010.


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This volume brings together writings on Edwin Denby, Mark Hyatt, Bern Porter, Asa Benveniste, Lukas Tomin, William Bronk, Gilbert Sorrentino, Robbie Walker, Bob Cobbing, Paddy Roe, Philip Whalen, Loop Poetics, Cyberpoetics, Flarf and other fringe poets and poetics from the 1960s to the present.

CONTRIBUTORS
Ali Alizadeh, Louis Armand, Livio Beloi, Jeremy Davies, Stephan Delbos, Michel Delville, Johanna Drucker, Michael Farrel, Allen Fisher, Vincent Katz, Stephen Muecke, Jena Osman, Michael Rothenberg, Lou Rowan, Kyle Schlesinger, Robert Shepperd, Stephanie Strickland, John Wilkinson.


Hidden Agendas: Unreported Poetics, edited by Louis Armand, collects essays by poets about marginal poetries and poets; recalling John Ashbery’s series of lectures on unknown poets, Other Traditions. Hidden Agendas does not purport to be some kind of conclusive collection of marginal poetics; its premise, rather, is refreshingly contingent on personal proclivity: “a number of writers / editors were invited to reflect on a poet, a group of poets, or a poetics from the last half-century, that they deemed of personal significance and which they felt to have been underestimated, neglected, or overlooked. Consequently, each contribution is subjective and critical” (4).

Indeed most of the book’s eighteen contributors are probably better known than their subjects. Roughly half of these contributions are about poets and their work; the other half about (the concept of a) poetics. The essays about poets include: Kyle Schlesinger about Asa Benveniste, Robert Sheppard about Bob Cobbing, John Wilkinson about Mark Hyatt, Vincent Katz about Edwin Denby’s sonnet series “Mediterranean Cities,” Stephan Delbos about William Bronk, Jeremy Davies about Gilbert Sorrentino, Louis Armand about Lukasz Tomin, and Michael Rothenberg about Phillip Walen. The essays about poetics include: Stephanie Strickland about digital poetry, D. J. Huppatz with a history of Flarf, and Allen Fisher with an essay about complexity and incoherence.
Before looking at these and other essays, let us first return briefly to the book’s title, Hidden Agendas: Unreported Poetics, which immediately lays bare the apparent paradox of this anthology: are we offered a report of the unreported, an exposition of the hidden, a centralizing of the marginal? Not necessarily. Perhaps these poets and poetries will be allowed to remain hidden, unreported and marginal even as they are examined in this book. This is true in the obvious sense that this one anthology is unlikely to lead to a widespread retroactive appropriation of these various poets into the various canons from which they have hitherto indeed remained hidden in the unreported shadows of their margins. However, as Louis Armand writes in “Notes in lieu of an Introduction”: “an unreported poetics could not be allowed to simply be thought of as the disenfranchised other of a presumed mainstream” (3).
Another possibility, then, is to consider the marginal not in resentful opposition to the canonical, but as an expression of its own kind of affective difference. “[T]here is the question of how ‘marginality’ itself may be seen to underwrite a poetics — not simply a style or poetic stance, but a technics of composition” (2). Looking, for example, at one etymological root of the word “margin,” we find that apart from meaning something of little consequence, something that resides on the edge of the center, it also shares a root with “mark,” namely, “mereg-” (edge, boundary). For the word “mark” this has a recorded meaning of “sign of a boundary” → “any visible trace or impression.”[1] So a remnant of this slight trace or impression can also be thought of as lingering as an effect of the margin, allowing us to think of it affirmatively instead of appositionally. Instead of dismissing the margin as the boundary between text and the edge of the page, perhaps we can think of it in terms of what traces it leaves at this boundary of text and space. Much like Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of minor literature, Pierre Joris’s (Deleuze-inspired) Nomad Poetics, or Joan Retallack’s poethics of the swerve, a literature that is marginalized in this sense is not one that is forced into a position of powerlessness but one that merely makes a slight difference, leaves a nearly imperceptible, but not insignificant, trace. As a way into this book, Hidden Agendas, we can thus ask: What singular impressions do these poets and poetics leave? What is it that makes them marginal?
Of course the marginal subsists in what is major, mainstream, of “central importance”; in the same way that mainstream literature/art will carry traces of the inassimilable, the outside, the margin. “The marginal is a complex — a whole web of parallel universes surrounding and overlapping whatever purports to constitute a ‘centre’, yet about which it remains in the dark” (5). What does this notion of the margin as a complex mean? Alternatively to thinking about the margin as something that has veered away from a “the centre,” [2] the margin as a complex might be thought of as being part of the interconnectedness of things — what Timothy Morton has theorized as the Mesh — in which of course there is “a centre” depending on where you stand.[3] But thinking in terms of a complex, or mesh, allows one to think from below about how a poem emerges from its particular circumstances, instead of imposing from above a normative standard in which it must somehow be straightjacketed.

A marginal poetics — alternatively to being opposed to the mainstream — can thus be a poetics of the mesh, an ecology of poetry. British artist, poet, and critic Allen Fisher takes a similar approach in his closing contribution to Hidden Agendas, proposing a diagrammatic poetics, which tries to include a diagram of the poet’s whole environment in the poetic process. Instead of the poem emerging from the supposed deep recesses of a poet’s sensitive mind observing the world from a distance, Fisher prefers to talk about the poetic process in terms of a poet’s proprioception (the body’s sense of itself and its spatial surroundings) in relation to its environment. The focus is not on an ostensibly coherent collection of words that appear as if out of nowhere on a blank page, but precisely on the surroundings that give rise to a poem, what Fisher calls, somewhat awkwardly perhaps, archaeological spacetime. When the poem starts from the poet’s proprioception, “it comprehends the planet as home and proposes both a dig down and a dig upwards, by which can be meant an understanding made cogent from both historical perspective and geological information … the archeological spacetime implicitly fields an ecological understanding in all directions …” (249). An explicit reference here is Charles Olson (d. 1970) who similarly emphasized the specificity of place as a constantly reiterative creation of a Polis, a coexisting.
Similarly to Olson, too, Fisher extends his discussion of the ecology of poetics to include superficially unrelated disciplines such as archaeology, mythology, modernism, theoretical biology, quantum mechanics, and contemporary literary theory. Ecology, the diagrammatic, spacetime; all concepts that emphasize spatiality and dimensionality (as opposed to viewing a poem as no more than the flat words on the page). Letting in spatiality and ecology means recognizing not only a coherence in any situation, but also the inhering incoherence. So in addition to the poem as a straightforward linear narrative, Fisher examines the possible ramifications for poetry of different facets of incoherence and chaos.
Fisher’s multifocal style zaps through historical eras, scientific disciplines, and schools of thought, sometimes within the same paragraph. Witness his discussion of incoherence in which Fisher begins with a rejection of Plato’s view of poetry (as intuited “mental poison” and “enemy of truth”), then jumps forward twenty-five hundred years to cite Alan Turing’s insolvability solution (which proved that there are mathematical problems which cannot be solved by pure logic, thus demonstrating, “within mathematics itself, […] the inadequacy of ‘reason’”), only to borrow from theoretical biology the concept of chreod — which refers to the necessary paths for brain activity and cognition — as an example of the inherence of chaos in equilibrium and vice versa; subsequently showing how this can be “ventriloquized” in poetry in as much as poets’ “consistent patterns or chreods in the cellular connections of their speech productions are characterized and can be discerned in the patterns of their language presentations”[2] (253, 257, 259).
In part two of the essay Fisher discusses Joan Retallack’s Poethics as an example of a poetics of incoherence. Retallack’s poethics of the swerve too stresses nonlinearity and complexity and chaos theory as inspirations for her poethics. “How can one frame a poetics of the swerve, a constructive preoccupation with what are unpredictable forms of change?’ (271). Her swerve brings to mind many other such references to a minor or marginal movement that nevertheless is an impetus for/of change: Lucretius’s famous clinamen (the unpredictable swerve of atoms), or Deleuze/Guattari’s nomadic becoming minor (a movement always away from the major). Retallack writes: “Imagining a cultural coastline (complex, dynamic) rather than time’s horizon … thrusts the thought experiment into the distinctly contemporary moment of a fractal poetics” (274).
So where along this complex and fractured coastline do some of these forgotten poets surface? What swerves did they make in their environments and in their poetry’s environments that make them memorably marginal? And how do we find them if not in the neat chronological presentation of the school textbook, the bookstore’s alphabetically ordered poetry section, the ostensibly all-inclusive, decisive anthology? Hidden Agendas offers a variety of answers to these questions. Amongst these, one very intriguing sounding poet is Lukasz Tomin, whose short life and virtuosic writing is introduced by Louis Armand.
Lukasz Tomin’s life and work started from various positions of marginality. It is poignantly ironic that, born in 1966, he grew up during normalizace, the period from about 1969–1987 that saw the reestablishing of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, in reaction to the reforms of the Prague Spring. As the son of dissident intellectuals, Tomin moved around during his childhood, first to London, then France. Later he moved back to Prague, but by now he had made the choice to write in English, a third degree of marginalization, and one that, at first, alienated him from both the Czech and UK literary circles.
So does Tomin’s personal entanglement within the political turmoil of his time find direct expression in his writing? Is his writing positioned in opposition to the “normalizing” tendencies of the Czech state to which he returned? The answer appears to be both yes and no: Armand argues that Tomin’s writing is not overtly political, but that it is precisely in this rejection to engage with the political agenda as set by the state that Tomin creates works that think directly about “the secret life of what we call ethics” (118): “In the context of the post-Revolution literary nationalism, Tomin’s writing carries no instructive message — it remains alien, unassimilated and ostensibly inassimilable. Against the poetics of tribal evocation, Tomin’s is a poetics of dispossession” (123).
The Doll, for example (the first of three books that Tomin wrote), is on one level a story of the escape and travels of two children who plan to build a large doll as a symbol of hope, but with a Bataillean flavor and “steeped in the ‘perversity of innocence’” the children’s plan “gives way to self-flagellation, confusion, and dissipation” (118). Armand suggests that not only can this be seen as an allegory of itself, it can furthermore be thought of precisely as a critique of allegory, as a tired and ineffectual, and overly didactic form (popular we mustn’t forget, amongst exiled writers, artists, composers) that no longer sufficed as a vehicle for social change. It is not surprising therefore that Tomin, too, rejected a linear coherent style, but rather wrote layered texts which were “a surface kinetics of interpenetrating ‘figures,’” in which “one thing does not lead to another; everything is rather détourned.” (120, 122)
Despite the meaningful and lasting effort Armand argues that Tomin contributed through literature to that “secret life of what we call ethics,” Tomin did not live to see recognition for his writing: he committed suicide at the age of thirty-two (118). And although he is discussed as someone who was not interested in confessional poetry of sentiment, the fragment with which Armand closes his essay hints of the personal darkness with which this young writer must have been struggling:

With an ending.

Try to be homeward try to be sane.

In the river.

Of your choosing.

Secure the wranglings of madmen.

To a nowhere.

Another singular example in Hidden Agendas of a poet writing from the margins is the English poet Mark Hyatt (1940–1973). A drug abuser, gay, and semiliterate, the margins Hyatt was writing from were those of adaptation to the norms of society and “proper” standard English. An important point that Wilkinson makes in his essay is that if subjected to formalist, normative (or, if you will, normalizing) close-reading, Hyatt might not be said to have written many good poems; and yet, Wilkinson argues that Hyatt’s poetry holds up to extended and repeated readings. In a way, Wilkinson writes, Hyatt’s work can be qualified as, “stoner poetry; amidst a general vagueness more or less interestingly warped from poem to poem, something amazing occurs and amazingly often.” (52). Here are some of those lines:

and I am having one

of those sexless nights

where birds fly out

of the mouth

with their tails

on fire. (62)

And from another poem: “He steals a small poem / And scars it madly” (53). Lines that are — remembering Hyatt’s semi-literacy — pertinent, and even more so when we learn that he even often did not want his grammatical mistakes to be corrected.
Hidden Agendas as a whole is certainly a motley collection, both in the variety of obscure and unknown poets and in the different approaches taken to introduce them to the reader. Although this variegated approach mostly works, some contributions unavoidably seem to be less synchronized with the rest of the anthology. Huppatz’s essay on Flarf, for one, in its very structured and chronological presentation of the movement, feels strangely canonizing for a book about marginalism. Johanna Drucker’s playful essay offers a more titillating counterpoint to Huppatz’s effort. Drucker presents an episode in the history of Language Poetry in the form of a kind of fantasy novel:
The leaders of the LangPo were scattered, one of whom had chief influence in New York, exceedingly beloved by many people, and others among the Canadians, and the Californians, but their forces were still gathering out of sight to put down the Workshop poets and convert the Traditionalists. (189)

Michael Rothenberg’s contribution about Philip Whalen might for some also be somewhat awkward. Rothenberg’s piece consists of fragments of highly personal conversation and poems from what appears to be Whalen’s last few weeks in hospital, sometimes giving the reader an uncomfortable sensation of voyeurism and nostalgic sentimentalism. A different issue is whether Whalen can really be said to be unfairly forgotten — as recent as 2007 there appeared the nearly one thousand-page tome The Collected Poems of Philip Whalen with forewords and introductions by the likes of Gary Snyder and Leslie Scalapino.
Nevertheless, Hidden Agendas is a welcome stringing together of diverse and forgotten poetic fringes into one diverse collection. It is devoid of the snide competitive remarks sometimes found in academic writing, perhaps since the emphasis in these essays is on personal tribute to a particular poet or poetics. Also, the fact that there is no real organising principle to the book apart from its eclecticism really complements its starting point of poetry as emerging from a complex of factors. It is definitely exciting to have the feeling of sifting through fragments of the past and learning about nearly forgotten poets. The thorough documentation, research (including some nice chapbook cover artwork), and close-readings in many of the essays certainly add to this experience. Hidden Agendas is another of many innovative volumes brought out by the prolific Prague based publisher Litteraria Pragensia. - Jeroen Nieuwland


There is trouble here, starting with the title: the lower case monicker, and the upper case subtitle. This is an anthology of essays and surveys of various figures and literary scenes plucked from the multitudes of poets and scenes operating in English in the second half of the 20th century. Subject to the vagaries of writers who actually contributed -- many were asked, but few responded-- this book is nonetheless true to its dubious title and subtitle. Are there purposefully hidden modern/postmodern/linguistic/ conceptual agendas? Hidden from whom? By whom? Why? Certainly not by poets, included or not included. The poets under consideration here have done their best to make their agendas public, or at least to get their work and their names before the public. The works may have been hiding the poets' bad habits or sexual histories from the poets' parents or other kin, but they were not shy in informing the public at large as to just what their agendas were. The best essays in here, for my money, are Louis Armand's preface and Jeremy M. Davies consideration of Gilbert Sorrentino's love/hate problem with writing, writers, and himself. Armand gives voice to the inevitable critical anxiety brought about by the internet. He worries that the internet archives are "unstable," while being so capacious as to absorb everything, including the careful distinctions poets have worked their entire lives to establish and make visible. It's a warranted anxiety these days when "archive" is the second-best known word in the English language, the first being its daddy, Google. This anxiety is felt by everyone in the book under various forms: fears of being forgotten and fears that what one writes will be forgotten no matter how much of it one writes. Most of the poets under scrutiny exhibit these fears themselves, though considerably less than their critics. The critics have subjects (the poets), while the (most interesting) poets had the whole world for a playhouse, and they were hardly worried at their peak about the eventual disposition of their oeuvre. The "most interesting" meaning precisely those poets who cared little about their posterity or their archives. They all cared somewhat, and, if they lived long enough, they did start caring when they got older, if only because some of their letters and manuscripts were occasionally worth some money. Another take on "hidden agendas" would be the reassuring malevolence of an "establishment" that hides literary work from public view on purpose, like the government does with "the truth." There is some validity here, because the government does hide the truth (see Wiki Leaks), and the literary establishments (such as they are, appendages of welfare states mostly) do hide outrages against language and propriety in order to not lose their funding. This latter kind of establishmentarian skin-saving is mostly a thing of the past four decades of the 20th century, when hopes for therapy through art were aided and abetted by audiences fooled (like any audiences, like the idea of audience itself) by the hope of miraculous cures. The poets served snake oil made from powedered alphabets and the witnesses walked away healed, leaving behind a pile of crutches (essays). In the case of the better-known "official" poets, the snake oil was fabricated with the aid of public-language machines already set in place by the "entertainment industry," a collaboration that was met with rightful indignation by practitioners of more honest writing that intended to be both critical, political, and esthetically distinct. The trade-off was that "collaborators" (with the machine, the prize/grant/job pie) were "hidden" by posterity, left to "mainstream critics" (also doomed by that special, discriminating "posterity"), while the practitioner of "poetics" threw their lot in with a critical posterity that is somewhat late in showing up. Some of the poets here (principally the "Language" crowd, exemplified by Bruce Andrews in this book) were aware of this possibility, so they did their best to include as many possible clues to their own work as their esthetics allowed. Others, who are the subject of painful cataloguing and tormented attempts at description of their work in the language known as Critiquese, didn't care so much because they had their own gangs, they were mini-pop stars who had a great time boozing, talking, smoking, staying up all night, and having girlfriends, wives, breakdowns, visions, and arrests, in short, lives. Either way, there are no "hidden agendas," per se; on the contrary, the figures here have self-exposure agendas. Not even the "high" modernists (Joyce, Beckett, Stein) had "hidden" agendas: they set up writing cults and invited everyone to "share" the mysteries, a task that proved way too daunting for non-members of the gang. The "high modern" mysteries were then made compulsory by the lesser gang members who became professors and assigned them. As compulsory reading, the rag was off the bush as quickly as you can say "Fiction 101." The inventors of "hidden" agendas are none others than their keepers, who must proclaim the esotericism and hiddenness of their subjects at the peril of losing tenure. This might sound cynical from the editor of "Exquisite Corpse," a journal that paid attention for many years to the very writers whose "hidden agendas" are discussed here, but the "Corpse" claimed only that it was dead from the very start: "exquisite" yes, like all dead things. Once dead, things can't talk back. That's exquisite, don't you think? One could look then at the "hidden" agenda of Exquisite Corpse as a mausoleum for those choosing to be entombed. The fact that the voluntary entombees were/are some of the liveliest humans around, made the mausoleum a great party pad for decades. We had fun. "Fun" is the chief "hidden agenda" missing from this book of "unreported poetics." I won't even go into the silliness of the notion of "unreported," which smacks of the school and the police. Jeremy M. Davies' esay is interesting because it deals with the paradox of Gil Sorrentino's reputation as a "comic genius," acquired somehow despite the fact that he is a bitter, uncomfortable, judgemental, nasty writer, whose best sentences make you feel like shit. Davies is good enough to distinguish Sorrentino's sociopathic despair from William H. Gass' equally despondent insights, but commits a sleight-of-hand in order to do so: he claims that Gass was affectionate toward the literature, while Sorrentino hated it. The problem is that Gass' "affection" is mostly his personal desire to be loved, hardly a genuine feeling of empathy, while Sorrentino (to his credit) doesn't give a fuck. The problem remains, of course: if he didn't give a fuck, why did he bother? One cannot answer that: he did give a fuck, he had to give a fuck, just like Robert Creeley, in his bitterest "love" lyrics does give a fuck, a lot of fuck (motly about not getting fucked). The weakness of this collection is not the palpable anxiety of its academic collaborators, but the lack of big, generous essays about writers who really matter: Tom Raworth is mentioned but his work is not, Anselm Hollo is mentioned, but his work is not. I learned a lot about the British poetry scene in the Sixties and Seventies, but none of the information is live. The beginning of the 21st century is the site of archival anxiety, and until it subsides there will be no relxed, extended appreciation of just how great the poetry scenes and their best figures were. Let's hope they make some special Xanax for the Humanities divisions before they are completely eliminated, so fine minds like the ones partially visible here, can get down to the work. Such as it is. Meaning that most of the "work" of the last decades of the last century was in its making, and that in talking about it one has to make more, not just translate it like forensic detectives. This is a cheerful prospect, actually, because the internet (since when was "stability" a value of any "poetics," "hidden" or not? allows for social projects with a participatory audience. What's dead, and has been dead since 1916 Zurich Dada, is the passive audience. In calling for an "audience," these critics are invoking "the hidden" as a (feint) lure to the unwary (students), but there hasn't been such a thing for a long time, and it's becoming obvious right now that there will never be.- Andrei Codrescu




Louis Armand, ed.,  Avant-post: The Avant-Garde under "Post-" Conditions, Litteraria Pagensia Books, 2006.

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"The question at the heart of these sixteen essays--alternately theoretically demanding, impishly elusive, stylistically impacted, and wholly absorbing--is this: what, in the context of contemporary politico-aesthetic practices, is the avant-garde, and how, if at all, can some version of it continue to exist in an historical moment when ... everything is permitted, hence nothing is any longer possible?" - American Book Review

"Avant-Post engages the question of whether or not avant-garde practice remains viable under the prevailing conditions of a whole series of "post-" ideologies, from Post-Modernism and Post-Structuralism, to Post-Historicism, Post-Humanism and Post-Ideology itself.
Contributors include a range of artists and theorists, such as Johanna Drucker, Michael S. Begnal, Lisa Jarnot, Ann Vickery, Christian Bök, Robert Archambeau, Mairead Byrne, R.M. Berry, Trey Strecker, Keston Sutherland, Rachel Blau DuPlessis, Robert Sheppard, Bonita Rhoads, Vadim Erent, Laurent Milesi, Esther Milne..."

"The success of the collection should be attributed to its two editors. Their brilliant understanding of the conditions of the novel after modernism has allowed them to revive this ‘distant dream’ and follow the red line which offers an explanation of the cultural situation from the 1930s to the 1960s and after, from high modernism to late modernism, through their interpretation of the realisms (of intermodernity), all the way to awkward postmodernism. This collection – whose Leitmotiv is that ‘historical considerations became ontological condition’ – offers a new vision of late modernity. It effectively explains the ‘filmic narrative,’ the montage and pastiche techniques. It also shows that in the overall mid-century re-writing of modernism, an appropriation, adaptation and adoption of modernist features was actively taking place. Randall Stevenson asserts that this is what generated a new ‘innovative and creative cultural response’ in the work of novelists like Rushdie, Mo, and Ishiguro. Contributions on Doris Lessing or Iris Murdoch would have enhanced this critical rereading of modernism.
The title of this collection of essays chiefly exposes the main contradiction implicit in some contemporary theories sharing a widespread misconception of the Avant-Garde: that ephemeral aesthetics are unlikely to survive in “post”-movements. As R. M. Berry reminds us in “The Avant-Garde & the Question of Literature,” we have to regard the Avant-Garde as an advanced position – for it takes its name from a military term – “running counter to the main current in history” (35). Do we still find this opposition in our days? And most importantly, is it still running? This is the area under discussion from the opening line of the introduction: “Is an avant-garde viable under the conditions of “post-modernism?” (1). The assumption is that it is possible, and the real question that remains is ‘How?’ The sixteen contributions to this collection examine the different “qualities” implied in the avant-garde, and how they have evolved, from Post-Modernism and Post- Structuralism to Post-Historicism, Post-Humanism and Post-Ideology. In this close examination of past, present and even future we find post- and re- terms in plenty. However, the profusion of these prefixes is not a bad sign in this particular case: contributors to this compilation range from university professors to poets, from artists to editors, and provide this ensemble with a sound basis and a new twist. If we look at the table of contents of this collection, we are bound to think that its organisation is also part of the avant-garde flavour. The sequence is not effective for the reader who is not in the picture. A good point of departure is the essay by editor Louis Armand, together with the contributions by Milesi and Berry. These essays embrace the ideas inherited from a first stage of avant-gardes and chaperon the reader to the crucial avant-garde junctures of the 20th century. Armand’s “Avant-Garde Machines, Experimental Systems” is a theoretical analysis of the historical interpretations of mechanisation, as “less a historically-determined” concept and more as an instrument “to signal a condition at the very core of cultural experience and cultural production” (194). Jargon is abundant. But so are the elucidating illustrations from the literary work of Swift, Sade, Joyce, Perec and Robbe-Grillet. Berry’s essay examines some of the well-known assumptions about literature during the first half of the twentieth century, and redefines Modernism not as a “response” to historical conflicts but as arising “from necessities internal to literature itself” (36). This assertion serves his purpose when investigating such concepts as time, space, art, and politics. Berry’s focus on a 1936 lecture delivered by Gertrude Stein and on AVA, a novel by Carole Maso, bridges the gap between historical avant-garde and avant- post writing. Milesi contributes an illuminating research paper on “mythopoetics,” retracing the connections between poetry and philosophy. Particularly interesting is the idea of having a contributor whose literary work is another contributor’s essay topic…" - Yolanda Morató

Grzegorz Wróblewski - It is Kafkaesque and yet tender poems, cynical and yet warm, elliptical and yet wholly immediate

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Front cover


Grzegorz Wróblewski, A Marzipan Factory, Trans. by Adam Zdrodowski, Otoliths, 2010.


A Marzipan Factory is the most original and enticing book of poems I have read in years. It is Kafkaesque and yet tender, cynical and yet warm, elliptical and yet wholly immediate. Grzegorz Wróblewski can take the most ordinary of phenomena and then give them the twist of a knife: to "spare" the life of a living organism—a "dry" tangerine for instance—is, from another angle, to forget it.   The pleasures and terrors of sex, of age, of the fear of death, of the deceptions of our social life, have rarely been so brutally—yet wittily and charmingly—documented as they are in these short, often gnomic poems, surprisingly well rendered in Adam Zdrodowski’s translation. Grzegorz Wróblewski restores one’s faith in the power of lyric poetry to renew itself. — Marjorie Perloff

Grzegorz Wróblewski's poems are ironic and serious, quick and probing, nailed to place and character but soaring in imagination.  If you haven't read his poems, it's not too late to start and this new volume is the perfect place to do that. —John Z. Guzlowski


"You are an> accidental being / just like me," writes Grzegorz Wróblewski, in his poem "Black Head," and the lines go a long way toward describing the provenance of his poetry. Wróblewski's present volume, A Marzipan Factory (the volume in which this quote appears), continues his Dada-Surrealist portrayal of our Dada-Surreal lives. In his better poems (and there are gratifyingly many) contexts are implied. Variations upon common phrases, in the opening lines, generally make them seem familiar for just a moment. By the end of the poem, those almost common phrases arrive at mock closures that suggest that there is little in life that isn't purely subjective, even crazy.
There is, however, a definite "feel" to life, and, frequently, a sense of an objective reality within which human existence is a-swim, poignantly ludicrous. In the poem "Cindy's Cradle" the protagonist obsesses over the daughter that he has not yet had or perhaps never will have:
Look what he's up to
How he's losing his head in the center of this asphalt island
surrounded by the police and the angels
from parallel worlds.
Until the angels appear, there is not a word in the poem that is anything less than humble, quotidian. There is only a vague suggestion, in the opening line, that something is vaguely out of hand: "Watch out for the cars, man—I shouted." With the arrival of the police a well-known closure is suggested but then suddenly there are the angels.
This method is remarkably effective at expressing a riotous abundance of life in the midst of bland, irrational, often unsightly details. It is the blandness, at which Wróblewski is uniquely talented, that gives the poems of A Marzipan Factory their special poignancy.
The details of romantic love are among the most bland. In a poem such as "If She Was Still Sipping Wine With You" it is barely mentioned and is everywhere:
You used to only care about women
and now you discourse about jays all the time.
You explain they have souls,
you analyze their appearance and behavior...
You observe them for hours, I even caught you
working out their nervous
birdy hops
It is an effective preventive against triteness. If there could be said to be an overall pattern to the human behavior in A Marzipan Factory it is obsession. In no particular does that obsession arrive at a more muted mixture of bathos and pathos than romantic love:
The first girl I fell in love with
told me incessantly
about her passion for preparing hens' stomachs.
Even listening to Brahms
in the evenings didn't help us.
If there is anything more pathetic than a man in love, it is a man not in love.
It is not likely that Grzegorz Wróblewski would agree that he has a "method." It is certainly true that a reader will find the volume more diverse than most. Moreover, Piotr Gwiazda has recently received a grant from the PEN American Center in order to translate Wroblewski's book of prose poems, Kopenhaga (2000), from the original Polish, highlighting the fact that the poet avails himself of a particularly wide range of techniques and voices.
The poems in A Marzipan Factory (also translated from Polish) display a considerable range, as well. (One is even a prose poem.) Perhaps the most magical lines in the volume can be said to have been crafted with completely different tools than those described:
This is not a dog although the natives describe him as such
he must have fallen out of the sky
I realized it
from the way he would conduct his argumentation—
He made two steps forward
And then
The sandstorm came.
Even the translations from Kopenhaga that have been released thus far, however, tend to be most successful when they may be said to employ the method described here. The farther the poet strays from it the more often his poems seem merely trendy and sometimes over written.
In the final analysis, Grzegorz Wróblewski is a tremendously energetic and talented poet and painter who is working his way toward the recognition that he deserves. The volume A Marzipan Factory: new and selected poems, at its best, is a particularly effective celebration of our deeply flawed humanity. It is also a fine record of the poet's journey to this point. -Gilbert Wesley Purdy



Grzegorz Wróblewski:According To The Enclosed Brochure / Cindy’s Cradle

Translated from the Polish by Agnieszka Pokojska

According To The Enclosed Brochure

Three pills were said to help, or at least do no harm.
Still, after I took two, unpleasant things started to happen.
Suddenly Homer disappeared from my memory and then
thieves walked out through curtained windows
with a week’s supply of food.
Loss. Anger. Misunderstanding.
The chemistry promised relief
but instead
I landed myself in new trouble.

I am now thinking of changing my prescription.
The thought of upping the dose excites me.
I have always been much too impatient.
(I could have kept the pet macaw but I was obsessed with betrayal… )
I took the third pill.
And then the fourth.
I half-close my eyes.
Someone’s hand creeps up to the tin of jasmine tea.
I wait.

(Translated from the Polish by Agnieszka Pokojska)


Cindy’s Cradle

Watch out for the traffic, man! — I shouted
and all he replied was,
she was supposed to wear pink tights and
gorge on melons with me

Cindy, Cindy!
You should visit your old man sometime

Look at him now
losing his head on the safety island
surrounded by police and angels
from parallel worlds.

(Translated from the Polish by Agnieszka Pokojska)


Poems by Grzegorz Wróblewski
Translated from the Polish by Adam Zdrodowski
 

Ambient
In the salty sand. Jellyfish...
The plane slowly went up.
Several mango sellers

or retired generals.
(A platinum sombrero.)
A flare

and
they’ll find the lipstick within a radius of...
Urine, suspenders –

Two offended skeletons:
Do you think they could've copulated
on the wing?

Psycho Taiga

A chicken with cut-off wings.
Misery. Somebody’s wrapping an old iron in newspaper
(acid rain! save water,

Greenland’s melting away).

The prostate’s sucking away our Noble Lord
and

spruces, business, they’ll go get the kidney.
(the queen’s throwing up like any ant)
and
Greenland’s melting away... What does she have in her belly?

She’s carrying a shark,
a whole swarm of salty bugs.



Two Grilled Tuna
He’s being quickly transported to the dragons’ hollow.
Listen, I’d like to sleep with a sort of amoeba
or something even more repulsive,
(It’s no wonder; when he was young, they bashed in
his face and knee.)
I can’t specify what species I have in mind…
As a reward, you can have some fun with my old lady,
he offers the garrulous XXL.
But shouldn’t the objects be notified
first?

Are you out of your mind? Surprise is the key.
He finishes a bottle left from yesterday’s session. (Unknown
cults and organisms are budding in vases.)
In the morning he calls XXL. He’s just been to a city
famous for its wonderful grilled tuna. He had
two servings.
He only thought about her and couldn’t help himself.

Highway of the Sun           

Flesh and horns over the run over wing and a pig got out of the metal
he cooperated with the papacy and the Habsburgs
a renaissance art patron
he had a triceps and a sticker but it wasn’t enough that’s why the radio
and
the lipstick khaganate used to exist on Mongolian territory (they’ll serve coffee with
amphetamine any minute now) the wing already in purgatory but the patron Rubens life’s lesson
a watch
an ass
and
politics
and
your panties
and
my ass
together with the watch
and
the plane
and
the bambi doll
Rape of the Daughters of Leucippus.

Drunken Children
They jumped all around us like kangaroos


“Turn the torch off, the light
will bring us bad luck”


I noticed their small hands,
knives


A group of drunken children


A black, buzzing box on a line
(Moons in a sack)…

They quickly walked away towards
the flyover

As if frightened by the shape
of your dentition


Cinnamomum Bark

Out of cinnamomum bark emerged chitin
knights. Alex’s smoking a cigar.
In his childhood he signed a pact with the devil,

but back then people still believed in dragons.
Yesterday he split a pillow and an armchair.
He was looking for diamond cones.



Mice

We know them only through descriptions in books.
They have to be small, fluffy and quite cunning? Or maybe you mean
midsummer night?
An old cat is also indispensable. (All the people you could trust have been
eradicated.)

Experienced enough not to be afraid of fireworks in Iraq?

You suggest making love in the fresh air. And let there even be
predatory leeches.
‘Cause we’ve come too much unstuck from the skin.
It seems to us that the sun was installed yesterday by Mcorso,
the stiff from the ground floor, the scenography guy.


The Dodo

The islanders lick the snow with respect.
No occultists in sight. (The feuding cats
are out of the game.) The dodo couldn’t
adjust

(the hot ocean evaporated from the stone floor).
I stopped walking.
And here’s my skipping rope!
I roll in a jar,

together with a damaged sweet cherry
and an autistic beetle.


A Marzipan Factory

Even birds persuaded that I’d lost my mind and terrified
chose the tricks of the street juggler. (Where are the promised
moors?)

Worried tramps steal a paper medallion with
rose petals fastened to it.
I don’t react, nor call anybody for help. The city’s guardian
passes me by
not suspecting anything.

Lying under the monument of a Danish king, I patiently wait for
the bus to S.

I’ll have a look at the chimneys of a marzipan factory closed down
a dozen years ago.


He’s Worth Following

Let’s go, he’ll lead us to the apartment that still belonged to us today,
he’ll fish the keys
out of the sea,

This is not a dog although the natives describe him as such
he must have fallen out of the sky
I realized it

from the way he would conduct his argumentation –
He made two steps forward
And then

The sandstorm came.

Potato Crop

The parish priest falls asleep over a book on turbulent
motions of matter. Could this fieldstone,

on which dappled birds rest,
have once been a strongman in the circus?

You haven’t changed much – I console him.
Look! The others ended up as potatoes.

My Life With Ann 3



Island

Shells have been entering triangles since morning.
Stocks with grey fruit

grew in the evening in the middle of our bedroom.
You were reading Wu Ching, and I Doctor Dolittle’s Circus.


Lords of the Night

They’re no bandits, they’re rather old bats
cowering in fright.

They furtively pull out their hip flasks,

women prod their groins
with pink umbrellas.

The Rose Demands a Poem

The rose demands a poem sensitive to a lizard’s tongue,
crooked cumulus clouds or the gesticulation of deranged
children.
(You remind me of a rose, my cunning rose!)

She would like a lofty day, a betrayal or a duel over a demonic
woman
that would have cheeks as smooth as her delicate
petals.

Could the rose be a feminist?
A calculating politician?
(Thinking about the rose, I associate independence or only domination.
A lot of blood has been spilled, and the rose took part in this incident...
)

A withered rose or a juicy rose... (The rose doesn’t have to be connected
with baroque lyricists exclusively, the rose was also inspiring to lonely
astronauts and ruthless procurers of all descriptions.)

The rose has always been the muse of poets.

Does this poem give you satisfaction at last?

Escapes and Approximations

I am by no means the one you had been dreaming about...
Are you waiting for a change of my interests?
Even two-headed butterflies under meticulously
dusted glass, would they do?
Meanwhile, since morning I’ve been sending you love letters...
Calm down, there are still so many important errands
to run
, you escape.
Important errands don’t have the taste of your lips,
I’m imitating an ancient poet.

Let’s set it:
The day is allotted to the pursuit of carpets and the night
to a rational rest before the next day...
(At noon you can afford to read the Guardian.
So move away to a safe distance.)
In this case:
Effusiveness of feelings after the end of an evening chat
about how you should prepare sweet potatoes
(but then it’s time to put out the light...).

Once again lips and colourful, exotic shells.
I dreamt that I made love to you in a steaming ocean.
And do you know how much a steaming ocean costs?
You’d better go to a course in masculinity in Istanbul,
let them show you women slaves and a jewel case full of
almighty gold.


Afternoon Apparitions

This bulky woman sipping her wine next to me Or the other one, in a black dress,
whom I’m passing now
and whom I’ll probably never pass again Or even the doctor without make-up
who’s checking my pulse with a cool hand, surprised that I’m still breathing

Suddenly I see their faces leaning over me I think we have
something in common

– that for a moment I could be happy with all of them...


The Return of the Armada

In the flat country, poetry still flourishes:
Water-nymphs
stopped pestering me.
We should dig in the Jute peat bogs.

Certainly,
there lie there many brown men with slit
throats and seeds
in well-preserved entrails.
(Seamus Heaney should become an honorary
citizen of Aarhus.)

When will the armada I sent in 1970 in search of
Atahualpa’s rings return?
Rotten, Lilliputian ships – two-headed birds
will come out to greet them.


2

The first girl I fell in love with
told me incessantly
about her passion for preparing hens’ stomachs.

Even listening to Brahms
in the evenings didn’t help us.
Love evaporated in no time.

The second one ate tulips before going to sleep.
Then I began to ponder again
about the first one.


A Visit by a Woman from Before Five Months Ago


Instead of you – something very
similar to you.
(Doesn’t scream.)

Then a telephone:
And how was it this time?

Be careful choosing new lovers.
Sex with phantoms is worse
than nicotine.

A chubby blonde
will prove the easiest.
If you are of medium
height.

So the star-gazers say.

The black-haired ones are dangerous.
They won’t leave your mind
for 200 long days.

You can drink boiled water
but you’ll still have nightmares
and humiliation.


A Summation Scheme (About the Illnes of John T.)


A general state of consciousness?
In the tenement house live a pimp and a carpet-seller.
Neither of them can stand Dante.
Because
they have never set their eyes on him.
Because we’re flooded by light literature and life
is devoid of a single shred of comedy.
A mannerism of thought is out of the question here.

It’s rather the style of the punchline or a classicaly degenarate speech.
Secular, prehistoric content.
But... no!
The pimp has heard something about Virgil.
Because it had something to do with the stealing of old prints.
He might have meant Caligula’s white stallion.
Why is there so much bitterness in me?
And it would be like that everywhere:

Even
if somebody mastered the whole of Cervantes,
it would never occur to him
to devote himself to the study of Diderot or, say,
Panfilo Sasso’s summation scheme.


Black Head


1.
Ghosts are unhappy at our place. Together with a mad family of cats, we look
at the snow-covered Black Head. “Don’t you think that Black Head
is heading in our direction?”

2.
Calm down, it’s just a mountain.
Mountains don’t move yet. And even if they do...
(Then we’re dead.)

3.
Will the cats manage to hide?
Yes, cats have their mysterious tunnels (cats and May bugs.)
Something must have provoked her!

4.
Was it the skyscrapers? Then you should quickly believe in your reality...
You’re an accidental being,
just like me.


Three Plaits

Amulet trade in the morning.
Bone serpents haven’t started their negotiations yet.
Bards hidden in oaks twitter
about the gods’ will and men not born
of women.
Your spells on the back seat
– you look like Macha Mong Ruadh,
the daughter of Aed Ruadh.



Light at the River

Already wingless (The moon flees from
the insects) In a moment
starry leftovers

in the reeds, the first crayfish catchers
Kidnap her and make her weave
wicker baskets.



In The Afternoon Babylon

A leaf functions until the last moment. Even when it falls from the tree,
it still breathes. In 1546 an unknown fish was caught off the shore of Denmark.
The fish had long fins and a tail, and its scales were covered by a brown habit.
They called it a sea monk. Did you know that Richard Kuklinski
from the Bronx murdered 100 people? He kept the quartered bodies
in the fridge. He went down in history as the mad “Iceman”! A seal trainer:
My alumni can play water polo and are the idols of handicapped
youth. (The Copenhagen zoo greets people and pensioners – animals:
no admittance!) An invasion follows… A mushroom, clasterosporium carpophilum,
is approaching us… Lazy pugs – multum in parvo!
In 1733 Karl Alexander, The Duke of Württemberg, had a pug monument
erected in Winnenthal castle. (Pugs need a 20-minute walk every day.)
Remember before you fall asleep: Only broccoli will cure your paranoia
once and for all. 3 inconvenient questions: What was the fate of the sea monk?
Did they let him speak to the smoked flounder mongers?
Or maybe they had a festive post-mortem? The chronicles are silent on this point…
Peroxide Joanna speaks: My relatives used to like plums and in December they fed on
meatless sauerkraut stew. It must blend well…– they would whisper mysteriously
beneath their quilts. (The Clasterosporium mushroom…) This time it was my
last visit – I promise to myself and I shut my eyelids tight.
On the other side the winged “Iceman” awaits me.


 (IN A MOMENT SOMETHING BAD WILL HAPPEN)

In a moment something bad will happen,
something I’ll be forced to forget quickly.
Or just the opposite.

Who knows their fate? An old washerwoman
hangs bed-clothes on lines between the trees.
When she sees the clear sky she is happy again.


OUR FLYING OBJECTS

In the beginning we observe bumble-bees and colourful petals
We are still small and fascinated by the flies
enjoying themselves in the sugar-bowl

After them are sparrows which we shoot with a catapult
Later on we keep canaries and this way
we learn to love the animals

The first sexual act we associate rightly with the nightingale
and maturity with the regular
feeding of the pigeons

Finally there are only eagle owls
We sit offended by the window and everything alive
brings on a rabid fury


MR. ROBIN DIES OF PNEUMONIA
(ABOUT THE IRISH CONQUERORS OF NORTH AMERICA)


12 hours daily for 50 years, without even seeing the sun,
in meat factories and mines, repairing other peoples trousers,
only to drink himself unconscious every Saturday,
and later getting sober during Sunday mass at St. Patricks,
and on Monday working again, without seeing the sun,
trying to convince himself that one day everything will change,
and in the end taking apart an old chest of drawers,
and taking out a bundle of bank-notes and giving them
to his surprised wife, who will say, that one could travel to Honolulu
for that money or at least buy two pigs, but now there’s no reason
to do that, she could have married the local doctor, but made
a mistake and chose, how stupid, this rascal, slow-witted Robin
and wasted her life instead of buying two pigs, and now he will
desert her, and did such a life have any meaning at all?


HACIENDA

Old González, who feeds on grass
and collects fag-ends under the tables.
They say, that he once ate tortoise
to become immune from the coming
epidemic. (Americans throw him lettuce
leafs now!) Since that time tortoise have
never left him. González crawls on the ground
in silence. Filthy and popular as no other
tortoise in the vicinity.


Translated from the Polish by the author and Malcolm Sinclair


TRUE FRIENDS

Some times it’s women with a false diamond
in the ear, other times gossiping parrots
or failed politicians.
There came often to my uncle’s house, a priest
in company with a professor in corpse
conservation. They played poker
and drank peppermint liquor.
They had a good time together.
I also knew a man who chose
loneliness. (He had a passion
for silence and vermin crawling
on the walls!) When he died,
he bequeathed his body.
He was a huge man.
He lasted many months.


Translated from the Polish by the author and Malcolm Sinclair


VALBY LONGSTREET

a brothel (250 per head)
a slaughter-house (a sweetish, sickly smell)
a barber (clips old men who are already dead)
this is my danish space and specifically
Valby Longstreet

a tired house-painter in white overalls
goes in, makes quick love
and leaves in his van from which
a folding ladder protrudes

(the butcher shovels up the red grease
from the street)

but I can’t go so suddenly in
and come so quickly out


Translated from the Polish by the author and Malcolm Sinclair
(IN A MOMENT SOMETHING BAD WILL HAPPEN)

In a moment something bad will happen,
something I’ll be forced to forget quickly.
Or just the opposite.

Who knows their fate? An old washerwoman
hangs bed-clothes on lines between the trees.
When she sees the clear sky she is happy again.


—Translated from the Polish by the author and Malcolm Sinclair


RETURN TO THE BEGINNING PLACE

Stooping streets and bars on the windows.
(Inhabitants guard their hard-won rings...)
It occurs to me that I recognise some faces.
Someone suddenly answers my greeting.
The last day I pass a girl, whom once I loved.
The girl is dirty and limps. She doesn’t see me.
She disappears pulling a hand-cart filled
with glass, old newspapers and ripe tomatoes.

—Translated from the Polish by the author and Malcolm Sinclair

Aaron Apps suggests communication as beastly, 'extra-somatic,' 'liquid infection.' Morphine drip as the scalpel tears open the new machine. The petri dish is an appetite for the borderlands of experimentation which is now shattering

$
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Aaron Apps, Compos(T) Mentis, BlazeVOX, 2012.

Excerpt

blog

 "Knuckles digging in the knee and not knowing it, while reading! To be disturbed and to be reminded of something you never quite knew. To be reminded and made to know that memory a new way, this is the way Aaron Apps gives it. Morphine drip as the scalpel tears open the new machine. The petri dish is an appetite for the borderlands of experimentation which is now shattering. You are now under the spell, you have been since you started reading it. If poetry is a way to live then I want to live with these poems, permission without question!" — CAConrad

"If angels represent the human idea of frictionless communication between souls, the 'fuckscapes' of Aaron Apps's ranty, violent first book COMPOS(T) MENTIS suggests communication as beastly, 'extra-somatic,' 'liquid infection.' Instead of the perfect, clean medium of the angels, Apps wants his medium to be 'dripping filth.' Instead of the ideal of private interiority, Apps's book pushes his poetry as a form of violence to the self, constantly brutalizing and opening up bodies with cuts and liquids. Even beauty is rubbed, ripped open and made to 'bleed ink.' Apps is not looking for angels, he is becoming a goat." — Johannes Göransson

"Aaron Apps's poems turn language upside down. As the reader tries to hang on to this new reality, Apps's poetic powers reimagine the connection between reader and writer. His visionary approach offer directions few poets take. This freedom of form and experience lifts this book beyond normal relationships between language and the larger world. Aaron Apps's gifts are clear. In this age of wonder, he has plunged ahead and created a sequence of poems that are one key in understanding what American poetry is accomplishing in the new century." — Ray Gonzalez


[ I am reading “A Carnal Shitstorm of Affections.” The cover looks like a tomato based stew and I want to eat it, but it is actually a petri dish with agar, festering with bacteria and fungus growing on and from Aaron App’s nail clippings, which nourish them, and I begin to eat it. Am I the agar, the nails, or the bacteria, or the microscope that is looking at it? Is the poetry the agar, the nails, or the bacteria, or the microscope or the person who put the nails in the agar or the person who clipped the nails, or the person who touches fingers beneath the nails and lies encrusted on the clippings? Reading this carnal shitstorm, I think about the way a poem is an ecosystem of dirt and cells and oil that smells kind of like cheese or butt crack. It is the exposure of a dark space between folds of a sensitive organ like the skin to air and light, the nasal and intellectual membranes of the perceiver. These lines grow as dense and complex as microbes on agar, via the fertile crescent of a moment as small, sad, and dirty as a nail clipping, the ungerminated seed that germinates the environment around it instead. I look closer and the microbes are actually a field of tiny cocks. I see that these cocks are infused by aesthetic philosophy and hip hop. I see that Nicki Minaj is bouncing and peeing with these cocks. I look closer and I see industry. I see tiny factories. I see that these factories are words. I see the failure that reflects the flaccid, diseased and swelling cocks of the industrialized world, of which I am a part of, through which I see and feel the tiny oars of App’s technically amazing poetic lines flick tiny crumbs from his navel, stinging my cornea. I feel and see that these flicked morsels are microscopic sympathetic somatic pains. There is vigor in how Apps’s agar medium bubbles forth helpless, nerve-filled tumors of language, a kind of tangle that I cannot describe but by being vulgarly infected by it. The math here is tender. Almost mushroom-like the toxic line decays the corpse of the body-politic and sprouts from it. Underneath the noise of decay there is silence. The sound of a void somewhere through this fluid-filled cancer, subjectivity fucking an O, another hole, which turns into itself, the Ape/App(s) which is a body of quotes grown from other bodies and chunks and proliferates. I am sad and ecstatic. Why am I thinking of the garden of Eden? It grows in you. Sometimes I am almost revolted but I feel infatuated, which becomes the same thing, guts and bubbles and waste. Now I know it is the same pain, I feel beauty. I am eating and drinking this shit in the storm and it eats me in everything. Light, feel-sight, “the liver a moth” and “at the base of the navel the whole irrational system blows
out into tubular microbes, not up.” ]
The above is an excessive blurb I wrote that was mostly not included in the marketing of Aaron App’s book, whose title was changed to Compos(t) Mentis to offer a more appropriately avant-garde texture. But it is still a lovely carnal shitstorm of affections. I have been trying to do a review of it for months now. It’s been festering in my body, and I have been feeling it in relationship to many other books/bodies and readings I’ve done. Now I will attempt to note some of the traces they leave in my water.


!) Slime Dynamics: Ben Woodard argues that time and slime is the dark vitalism or force that drives all activity/life. I see in his attention to slime a little bit of kinship with Black Ecology, which views nature as a network in which all objects have agential roles, not just humans. Slime Dynamics looks at the slimy basis of life, the way that it is entwined with decay, bacteria, microbes and fungi, these being the movers and the horrible universal infection, unseen but all-permeating beneath all life, (whatever that may be). I see slime dynamics in poetry such as Apps’ particularly when grammar and syntax break down as if cracked by decay, slime molds being the miraculous swarm made up of individuals, as the body is a swarm made up of innumerable other swarms of infection. What does time have to do with the poetry? I remember hearing Aaron say that instead of focusing on the foot that does not step in the same river twice (time = change), we should focus on the pebble underneath, the crushed dirt clod, the bodies underneath the clod, the blood that runs in it the tiny life that germinates in it, the unsaid history. Time stops, runs back on itself. The difference between Apps’s ethics and slime dynamics / dark vitalism is that App’s does not believe that one can transcend the social, no matter how posthuman.  Apps: “Everything is run through with infection, bacteria, and microbes. Smegma. Poetry should be especially aware of this bodily extension. Every subjectivity that perceives is phallic and diseased…” (7).
@) “Every subjectivity that perceives is phallic and diseased.” Aaron’s poetics is a poethics that smashes. There is no body uninfected by oppressive systems, conscious or not. He pushes our noses into our own shit. The shit that piles at our feet as we are blown back by the airy lines of history. Pooping angels. The digestive ecologies barely bordering on pathology allow the body to pass gas and waste. Ideological ecologies do the same (Racism, sexism and classism are infections and miasmas permeating us and not us, the air between us). So Compost Mentis is not an argument about the division between soul and body or its rupture. In fact it is an explosion of both, while knowing that there is no thinking outside the body, without the body. “Ensoulment” (a word I read on Elaine Castillo’s blog and that I have come to love) is a fold in the flesh, the darkness in it, the unseen machine materialized by slimy bodies. Totally porous, we are already open to the terror of the world which folds into our contours and content. “When I say lyric, I mean the I that is not I. I mean I take the complex I and put it in a single limb or single stone that rattles in a biological tumbler” (12).
#) Yet moments of collectivity, which I interpret as both being-in-multitude and being-multiple, are ephemeral: “The body seeps thoughts on plastic, petroleum, petri discs and watches them grow. Receives feedback from other subjects in fleeting moments. The body then notices all the trash, waste and pain this process caused others. The beyond the poem. The thing the body pushes into the act of writing, spitting on the filled page. The refuse of the short reaching dark-elsewhere. / But that realization is fleeting, the bodies in these poems feel helpless. The bodies howl through all the holes in their bodies” (21). Being numerous oscillates between one, the navel, and many, the dissipation of ego. I see in the lines a self-critique of poetic practice. I also see an analogous loop in any perception of others, any trying to interact as bodies embedded in already corrupted, slimy (figurative and not) systems. The poem acts as a membrane or a placenta (see Sarah Fox’s posts on placental economy) that sustains a symbiotic relationship that then immediately slips into parasitism. The body is not just meat. The body is bacteria and language, capital and power, affect and effect. But all of these things collapse into the form of a digestive tract in process and decay within a world.
$) Thom Donovan’s essay on somatic poetics talks about the body as a form (coextensive with content, becoming, written). It begins with an epigraph quote from Eleni Stecopulos: “I dreamt we were susceptive to language / that care might be agency’s complement / and form never more than condition / passing as body…” These poetries encourage me to think about ways in which we can reconfigure the ways we conceive of communities. How can we level hierarchies to exist with one another, when we are composites of such infections and conditions? “The poems contained are a splatter of my body that is infected with cheap academic “complexity,” racism, patriarchy and consumerist wastefulness. I jiggles its fleshy war-nodes. They break into a thousand thousand perceiving sexes [ . . . ] The field writhes into itself and, in turn, upholds the tower. I writes a poem to turn the tower into the shadows in the grass that are filled with sexing worm tongues.”
%) If we could shadow each other’s shadows and worm into each other’s perceiving sexes.
&) “The darkness, the darkness” (70) as an inversion of the horror in the Heart of Darkness, this poetry is darkness within and without, as the subject is implicated in the systemic horror all around us. The dark tentacle in the poem that reaches out to the dark tentacle in you. From inside to inside, bleeding form to bleeding form. The poems between the reflexive prose-blocks are where affective flashes collide, vulnerably, democratically extending their sense-tongues to you, an invitation to deep touch, to love, to “fuck-hands.”
*) I <3 -="-" b="b" book.="book." this="this">3>

 Parrhesia

Aaron Apps, Parrhesia, Lulu, 2011.



 
Apps:
I'm currently co-editing an anthology titled "Unbecoming: An Anthology of Posthuman Poetry" with Feng Sun Chen.
For more information go here.
Call for Submissions:
Unbecoming: An Anthology of Posthuman Poetry
In the twenty-first century poetry interfaces with animal-machine. The “human” is not a given concept, but rather is one that is made in an ongoing technological and anthropological process. We hope to publish an anthology of poetry that participates in technological, biological, representational, sexual, political and theoretical post-humanisms. We’re looking for poetry that engages with or is written by animals, beasts, monsters, creatures, aliens, cyborgs. How do bodies that are misunderstood, misfitting, ugly, failures, etc., challenge western, enlightenment figurations of the “self” and “human”? We are interested in poetry by rhetorical bodies that exceed definition.
Any contemporary work in English (domestic or translated) that addresses the post-human is welcome. Please send up to 20 pages of poetry, in standard format (*.doc, *.docx, *.rtf, *.pdf) to Aaron Apps & Feng Sun Chen via [submishmash].
Previously published work is welcome; please include acknowledgements (if any) and a brief bio with your submission. If you have any questions please contact us at posthumanpoetry[at]gmail.com
Please feel free to forward this call via your e-mail, blog, facebook, tumblr, twitter, etc. We look forward to reading your work.

I just completed a collaborative art project with a group of fellow artists from the University of Minnesota.
Description:
“Subterranea” is a collaborative art project with the general aim of bridging the everyday and the political by uncovering and making explicit the growth of microorganisms in unexpected contexts. While much of our work was process oriented, our final project involved projecting a time lapse video underground in a garden bed. We hoped to create a visceral, bodily connection to hidden worlds that are both technologically and bureaucratically mediated. Our project is both about our inability to see clearly all that constitutes the earth we live on and eat from, as well as our need to have a more intimate relationship with that earth both physically and conceptually.
You can view images and videos of the project here: http://subterraneaproject.tumblr.com/ And here is a video of the installed piece:

Thomas Nagel - the widely accepted world view of materialist naturalism is untenable

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Thomas Nagel,Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False. Oxford University Press. 2012.

read it at Google Books


The modern materialist approach to life has conspicuously failed to explain such central mind-related features of our world as consciousness, intentionality, meaning, and value. This failure to account for something so integral to nature as mind, argues philosopher Thomas Nagel, is a major problem, threatening to unravel the entire naturalistic world picture, extending to biology, evolutionary theory, and cosmology.
Since minds are features of biological systems that have developed through evolution, the standard materialist version of evolutionary biology is fundamentally incomplete. And the cosmological history that led to the origin of life and the coming into existence of the conditions for evolution cannot be a merely materialist history, either. An adequate conception of nature would have to explain the appearance in the universe of materially irreducible conscious minds, as such.
Nagel's skepticism is not based on religious belief or on a belief in any definite alternative. In Mind and Cosmos, he does suggest that if the materialist account is wrong, then principles of a different kind may also be at work in the history of nature, principles of the growth of order that are in their logical form teleological rather than mechanistic.
In spite of the great achievements of the physical sciences, reductive materialism is a world view ripe for displacement. Nagel shows that to recognize its limits is the first step in looking for alternatives, or at least in being open to their possibility.



Thomas Nagel, a distinguished philosopher at NYU, is well known for his critique of “materialistic reductionism” as an account of the mind-body relationship. In his new and far-reaching book Mind and Cosmos, Nagel extends his attack on materialistic reductionism—which he describes as the thesis that physics provides a complete explanation of everything—well beyond the mind-body problem. He argues that evolutionary biology is fundamentally flawed and that physics also needs to be rethought—that we need a new way to do science.
Nagel’s new way is teleological—scientific explanations need to invoke goals, not just mechanistic causes. The conventional story of the emergence of modern science maintains that Galileo and Newton forever banished Aristotle’s teleology. So Mind and Cosmos is an audacious book, bucking the tide. Nagel acknowledges that he has no teleological theory of his own to offer. His job, as he sees it, is to point to a need; creative scientists, he hopes, will do the heavy lifting.
Nagel’s rejection of materialistic reductionism does not stem from religious conviction. He says that he doesn’t have a religious bone in his body. The new, teleological science he wants is naturalistic, not supernaturalistic. This point needs to be remembered, given that the book begins with kind words for proponents of intelligent design. Nagel applauds them for identifying problems in evolutionary theory, but he does not endorse their solution.
Nagel’s main goal in this book is not to argue against materialistic reductionism, but to explore the consequences of its being false. He has argued against the -ism elsewhere, and those who know their Nagel will be able to fill in the details. But new readers may be puzzled, so a little backstory may help.
In his famous 1974 article “What is it like to be a bat?” Nagel argues that current science lacks the concepts that would allow us to understand how subjective experience is possible. Present-day science can give us information about the bat’s brain, but it cannot answer the titular question of Nagel’s article—what is it like, how does it feel from the inside, to be a bat? Nagel chooses bats as his example because they have a sensory system (echolocation) that we lack. This choice makes the problem vivid, but Nagel thinks the difficulty arises at home: each of us knows what sugar tastes like, yet current science lacks the vocabulary to understand and explain what that peculiar subjective experience is like. Nagel is cautious in the bat article; he hopes that a future materialistic science might be able to do better.
In Mind and Cosmos, Nagel holds that materialism can’t deliver the goods. Drawing on his bolder and more recent paper “The Psychophysical Nexus,” he now says that materialistic reductionism is false, not that we currently don’t understand how it could be true. For Nagel, perception and other psychological processes involve irreducibly subjective facts; important aspects of the mind are, therefore, forever beyond the reach of physical explanation.
This position is compatible with many doctrines that are associated with materialism. For example, Nagel doesn’t gainsay the slogan “no difference without a physical difference”—if you and I have different psychological properties, then we must be physically different. Indeed, Nagel’s position is even compatible with the idea that every mental property is identical with some physical property—for example, it may be that being in pain and being in some neurophysiological state X are identical in the same way that being made of water and being made of H2O are identical properties. The problem, Nagel thinks, is that this identity claim, if true, cannot in principle be explained by physics. Mind and Cosmos begins with the thesis that materialistic reductionism hits a roadblock with the mind-body problem, but there are others ahead. Although Nagel has more to say about the mind-body problem than I have just outlined, the most novel part of his book, and my focus, lies elsewhere.
Evolution
Nagel believes that evolutionary biology is in trouble, but what sort of trouble is it in? There are two possibilities. Evolutionary theory could be in trouble just because it is committed to materialistic reductionism; if so, the theory would be perfectly okay if it dropped that commitment. Understood in this way, it’s the philosophy that has gone wrong, not the biology. But much of what Nagel says is not in this vein. He thinks that the biology itself is flawed. Even without a commitment to materialistic reductionism, the theory would be in bad shape. For Nagel, the combination of evolutionary theory and materialistic reductionism is false, while evolutionary theory taken on its own (without the philosophical add-on) is incomplete. Incompleteness means that the theory cannot fully explain important biological events.
For Nagel, important aspects of the mind are forever beyond the reach of physical explanation.
Here I want to consider two criticisms that Nagel makes of evolutionary theory. The first concerns probability, the second, ethics. Neither criticism depends on the idea that evolutionary theory is committed to materialistic reductionism.
Nagel thinks that adequate explanations of the origins of life, intelligence, and consciousness must show that those events had a “significant likelihood” of occurring: these origins must be shown to be “unsurprising if not inevitable.” A complete account of consciousness must show that consciousness was “something to be expected.” Nagel thinks that evolutionary theory as we now have it fails in this regard, so it needs to be supplemented.
Nagel doesn’t impose this condition of adequate explanation on all the events that science might address. He is prepared to live with the fact that some events are just flukes or accidents or improbable coincidences. For example, it may just be an improbable coincidence that in the mid-1980s Evelyn Marie Adams won the New Jersey lottery twice in the span of four months. But the existence of life, intelligence, and consciousness are not in the same category. Why do Nagel’s standards go up when he contemplates facts that he deems “remarkable”? Maybe the answer falls under what Nagel refers to, in a different context, as his “ungrounded intellectual preference.” It isn’t theistic conviction that is doing the work here, but rather Nagel’s faith that the remarkable facts he mentions must be “intelligible,” where intelligibility requires that these facts had a significant probability of being true.
My philosophical feelings diverge from Nagel’s. I think that Beethoven’s existence is remarkable, but I regard it as a fluke. He could easily have failed to exist. Indeed, my jaded complacency about Beethoven scales up. I don’t think that life, intelligence, and consciousness had to be in the cards from the universe’s beginning. I am happy to leave this question to the scientists. If they tell me that these events were improbable, I do not shake my head and insist that the scientists must be missing something. There is no such must. Something can be both remarkable and improbable.
Moreover, if an improbable state of affairs comes to pass, this does not mean that the state of affairs is unintelligible. Consider: mom and dad have two daughters. Why are both children female? A simple Mendelian answer is that all of mom’s eggs had an X chromosome while half of dad’s sperm had an X and half had a Y. The process of fertilization randomly combines an egg from mom with a sperm from dad. This means that the chance of a daughter is 1/2, so the chance of two daughters is 1/4. We explain the two-daughter outcome not by showing that it was to be expected, but by elucidating the process that produced the outcome with a certain probability. Before you insist that the Mendelian story doesn’t really explain the outcome, reflect on whether you think that the Mendelian story sheds no light at all on why the parents had two daughters. Surely it does not leave us totally in the dark.
In thinking about Nagel’s probability argument, we need to be careful about which facts we are considering. The fact that life on earth started some 3.8 billion years ago, and that intelligence and consciousness made their terrestrial appearances more recently—this is a local fact about our planet, and maybe it was very improbable, given how the universe got started. But consider the more global fact that the universe contains life and intelligence and consciousness at some time in its total history. What’s the probability of that, given the universe’s initial state? Science doesn’t really have much of a clue (yet), but this gap in our present knowledge does not show that fundamental presuppositions of the sciences need rethinking. After all, conventional science does tell us that the universe is a very big place with lots of planets that are about as close to their stars as our planet is to the sun. Maybe life and intelligence and consciousness had a high probability of arising (someplace and sometime, not necessarily on earth in the last 3.8 billion years). If this global fact is the remarkable fact that Nagel has in mind, he should not conclude that biology needs to be supplied with new organizing principles. Do not confuse the proposition that Evelyn Marie Adams won the New Jersey lottery twice in four months with the proposition that someone won some state lottery or other twice, at some time or other. The first was very improbable, the second much less so.
Before leaving the topic of probability, I want to highlight what is involved in Nagel’s requirement that the facts he says are remarkable must be shown to be unsurprising. For the sake of concreteness, let’s take this to mean that the probability must be greater than 1/2. Suppose that to get from the universe’s first moment to the origin of consciousness, 200 stages must be traversed. The universe starts at stage S1, then it needs to pass to S2, then to S3, and so on, until it reaches S200, at which time consciousness makes its first appearance. Suppose further that we have a theory that says that the probability of going from each of these stages to the next is 99/100: this means that each individual step is very likely. Still, the probability of going from S1 all the way to S200 is (99/100)199, or about 1/10. The demand that the origin of consciousness must have had a probability greater than 1/2 entails that the theory I just described must be wrong or seriously incomplete.
I agree that it might be wrong or incomplete, but this is not because it violates Nagel’s demand that we must show remarkable facts to be likely. In addition, I think that a theory of this sort could shed considerable light on why consciousness arose. It doesn’t show that the event was to be expected, given the universe’s initial state. Instead, if true, it elucidates the step-wise process that produced the outcome we observe. When a theory says that X was improbable, this does not mean that the theory says that X is unintelligible: the final result could be improbable even though each step in the process was highly likely.
The words ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ do not occur in theories in physics, yet you and I have beliefs and desires.
What makes more sense than Nagel’s probability requirement is one about possibility—that an adequate theory must allow that the origin of life, mind, and consciousness all were possible, given the initial state of the universe. If this were all that Nagel meant by his claim that “the propensity for the development of organisms with a subjective point of view must have been there from the beginning,” I would have no quarrel. But then there would be no objection to the sciences we now have.
Not only does Nagel require that remarkable facts be fairly probable; he also insists that they can’t be byproducts (a.k.a. side effects). He applies this requirement to the appearance of minds, consciousness, and reasoning. Nagel doesn’t reject all byproduct explanations. For example, he is comfortable with the standard evolutionary account of why vertebrate blood is red. This didn’t happen because there was an adaptive advantage in having red blood. Rather, the hemoglobin molecule was selected because it transports oxygen to tissues, and hemoglobin just happens to make our blood red. And it isn’t only useless traits such as the color of blood that evolutionary biology says are byproducts. Sea turtles use their limbs to dig nests in the sand when they come out of the water to lay their eggs, but the tetrapod arrangement evolved long before turtles developed this behavior. Being able to build nests in sand is a side effect. Evolution often recruits old structures to new uses.
Evolutionary biology leaves open the possibility that even Nagel’s remarkable facts are byproducts. For instance, the co-discoverers of the theory of evolution by natural selection, Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace, disagreed about how the human capacity for abstract theoretical reasoning should be explained. Darwin saw it as a byproduct. There was selection for reasoning well in situations that made a difference for survival and reproduction, and our capacity to reason about mathematics and natural science and philosophy is a happy byproduct. Wallace, on the other hand, thought that a spiritualistic explanation was needed. Nagel finds Darwin’s side effect account “very far-fetched,” but he does not say why.
I now turn to Nagel’s second reason for thinking that something is seriously amiss with current evolutionary theory. Nagel is what philosophers call a “moral realist.” This doesn’t mean he has the cynicism of a Humphrey Bogart character. It means he thinks that some statements about right and wrong are true and that what makes them true isn’t anyone’s say-so. Nor are they made true by the fact that we would come to believe them if we engaged in a certain type of deliberation. For Nagel, the statement that causing suffering is bad is like the statement that the Rocky Mountains are more than 10,000 feet tall—both are true independently of whether anyone thinks they are true. Nagel thinks “moral realism is incompatible with a Darwinian account of the evolutionary influence on our faculties of moral and evaluative judgment.” He resolves the conflict as follows: “since moral realism is true, a Darwinian account of the motives underlying moral judgment must be false.”
Why does Nagel think that evolutionary theory conflicts with moral realism? His reasoning is based on Occam’s razor, the principle of parsimony. It seems pretty clear that some of our psychological capacities evolved because they provided our ancestors with reliable information about the world they inhabited. Perceptual beliefs are the clearest example. Our ability to use our sensory systems to form beliefs about our immediate surroundings evolved because the beliefs they generated were largely true. Nagel thinks that no such explanation can be offered for why we have the moral beliefs we have. Indeed, biologists don’t often make such offers. For example, Darwin argued that moral norms enjoining altruistic behavior are now widespread in human societies because groups that internalized and complied with these norms outcompeted groups that did not. Whether it is true that we ought to act altruistically isn’t something that Darwin or more recent biologists need to take a stand on to explain why people accept such norms.
Okay, you may be thinking, why is the evolutionary explanation of our moral beliefs an argument against moral realism? Here you need to reach for your razor. Nagel’s idea is that if you don’t need to postulate the existence of moral facts to explain why we have the moral beliefs we have, then you should slice those alleged facts away. This doesn’t just mean that you should decline to believe that there are moral facts of the sort that moral realism postulates. It means that you should believe that there are no such things. The razor doesn’t tell you to suspend judgment; it tells you to deny. That is Nagel’s reason for thinking that there is a conflict between evolutionary theory and moral realism: evolutionary theory underwrites a parsimony argument against moral realism.
I don’t buy this argument. I agree that you don’t need to postulate moral truths to have an evolutionary explanation for why we have the moral beliefs we do. But that doesn’t mean that evolutionary theory justifies denying that there are such truths. Nagel is assuming that if moral realism is true, then the truth of moral propositions must be part of the explanation for why we believe those propositions. I disagree; the point of ethics is to guide our behavior, not to explain it, a thesis that Nagel defended in The View from Nowhere (1989) but has now apparently abandoned.
Nagel demands that we show remarkable facts to be likely, but Beethoven is remarkable, and he could easily have failed to exist.
I said before that Nagel thinks evolutionary theory, shorn of its commitment to materialistic reductionism, is incomplete, not false. Nagel’s probability argument conforms to this pattern, but his argument about ethics does not, at least not when it involves a claim of incompatibility. If evolutionary theory and moral realism are incompatible and moral realism is true, then what follows is that evolutionary theory is false, not that it is incomplete. This suggests that we should set this talk of incompatibility to one side. Nagel’s considered position is that evolutionary theory, construed as proposing a complete explanation of why we have the moral convictions we have, would conflict with moral realism. The upshot is that something needs to be added to the evolutionary explanation.
Teleology
So Nagel thinks that an adequate scientific account of the existence of life, mind, and consciousness must show that those events had significant probabilities. He holds that current science does not do that and therefore needs to be supplemented. But with what? Nagel’s answer is that science should go teleological: concepts of goal and purpose need to be used in new scientific theories. This suggestion conflicts with the dominant scientific tradition of Galileo, Newton, and their successors. Teleology is the most radical idea in Nagel’s book.
Nagel says that teleology means that “things happen because they are on a path that leads to certain outcomes.” Suppose that X caused Y and that Y then caused Z. A teleological explanation of Y will say that it occurred because it was on the path from X to Z. This explanation of Y cites Z, which occurs later than Y. However, the teleological explanation does not say that the later event caused the earlier one; for Nagel, teleological explanations are non-causal. In addition, Nagel wants a naturalistic and non-intentional teleology, one that does not involve God or any other intelligent designer directing the universe toward a goal.
According to Nagel a teleological theory says that things tend to change in the direction of certain types of outcome. This is right, but, as Nagel realizes, it isn’t sufficient for a theory to be teleological. The second law of thermodynamics says that closed chambers of gas tend to evolve in the direction of increasing entropy, but that doesn’t mean that they are goal-directed systems. Nagel also says that conventional (non-teleological) physics describes “how each state of the universe evolved from its immediate predecessor,” but a teleological science will be different: “teleology requires that [some] successor states . . . have a significantly higher probability than is entailed by the laws of physics alone.” Whether or not this is a necessary condition for teleology, it too is insufficient. Suppose I buy a lottery ticket on Monday, win the lottery on Tuesday, and splurge on luxury goods and big charitable donations on Wednesday. The probability of my winning on Tuesday, given that I bought the ticket on Monday, is low, but the probability that I win on Tuesday, given that I bought the ticket on Monday and was a big spender on Wednesday, is much higher. This isn’t teleological, however, since it isn’t true that my spending on Wednesday explains why I won the day before.
I do not reject teleology wholesale. I do not reject claims such as “flowers have bright petals because they attract pollinators” and “Sally went to the park at 8:30 because there were fireworks at 9 o’clock.” These statements do not say that a later event caused an earlier one, but they are true because certain causal facts are in place. The statement about flowers is true because there was selection for bright colors among plants that gained from the services of pollinators that used color vision. The statement about fireworks is true because Sally knew there would be fireworks at 9 o’clock, and she wanted to arrive in time to get a good seat. Maybe there are true teleological statements about life, mind, or consciousness. But if there are causal underpinnings for those teleological statements, as there are for the teleological statements about flowers and fireworks, the materialist need not object.
Nagel’s thesis is not just that there are true teleological statements about the emergence of life, mind, and consciousness, but that these statements cannot be explained by a purely causal/materialistic science. Only then does his teleology go beyond what materialistic reductionism allows. I see no reason to think that there are true teleological statements of this sort. If readers are to take seriously the possibility of teleological explanations that are both true and causally inexplicable, it would help if Nagel identified some modest phenomenon that clearly has that sort of explanation. He never does. That raises the worry that the kind of explanation for which Nagel hankers is a pipe dream.
Nagel wants a teleological science partly because he is moved by probability considerations. If conventional science says that remarkable facts had low probabilities, given what came before, the probabilities of these facts can be boosted by adding information about what came after. In this respect, the emergence of life resembles my winning the lottery on Tuesday. Each event is quite probable, given what happened later. The problem is why we should regard that as an explanation.
Anti-Reductionism
Nagel is hardly unique in being an anti-reductionist. Most philosophers nowadays would probably say that they are against reductionism.
What sets Nagel apart is his idea that current biological and physical theories need to be fundamentally overhauled. Why do other anti-reductionists decline to take this radical step? It is not that they are faint of heart. Mostly they decline because they endorse the following picture. When an organism has a new visual experience, the physical state of the organism has changed. And when an economy goes into recession, the physical state of that social object also has changed. These examples obey the slogan I mentioned before: no difference without a physical difference.
That science should go teleological—incorporate concepts of goal and purpose—is a radical idea.
However, when it comes to understanding visual perception and economic change, the best explanations are not to be found in relativity theory or quantum mechanics. Sciences outside of physics can explain things that physics is not equipped to explain. But this doesn’t mean that physics needs to be revised. The philosophers and scientists I am describing disagree with Nagel’s claim that evolution is more than a physical process, though they agree that physics is not the best tool to use in understanding evolution.
Brute Facts
A true and well-confirmed causal statement such as “smoking cigarettes causes lung cancer” calls for explanation. We want to know how inhaling the smoke causes the tumor to grow. If someone said that this causal statement is just a brute fact—that it is true but has no explanation—we would raise our eyebrows. When one event causes another, we expect there to be intervening events. We explain why C causes E by showing that C causes I1, that I1 causes I2, and so on, up to some further I that causes E.
But materialism should not assume that this must always be the case; maybe there are occasions where C causes E without there being an intervening event between C and E. Materialism should be open to the possibility that some causal relationships are brute facts. This is one reason to be suspicious of the view that Nagel calls materialistic reductionism—that physics provides a complete explanation of everything. Scientists already leave room for brute facts in another context. When they say that a law is “fundamental,” they mean that it can’t be explained by anything deeper.
If there can be brute facts about purely physical causation, why can’t there be brute facts about physical events having mental effects? Suppose event C is the hammer hitting your thumb and E is the pain you feel. Science explains why C caused E by interpolating causes. The chain of events that goes from C to E passes (perhaps gradually) from the physical to the mental. The idea that there can’t be brute facts about physical-to-mental causation is just as misguided as the idea that there can’t be brute facts about physical-to-physical causation.
Nagel writes, “All explanations come to an end.” This could point to a practical matter: when we run out of time or patience, we settle for what we have. But the limitation may also be forced on us by the world. Maybe there are brute causal facts. Maybe some scientific laws are fundamental. And maybe some crucial facts about the mind-body relation are brute as well. Not that we should be complacent. If smoking causes lung cancer, it makes sense to expect that there is an explanation as to why. But we should not over-generalize, turning a good heuristic into a metaphysical principle that brooks no exceptions. Whereas the materialistic reductionism that Nagel criticizes says that everything has a complete physical explanation, a more circumspect materialism would assert that everything that has an explanation has a complete physical explanation.
Mind and Cosmos is dominated by a set of very strong assumptions about explanation: remarkable facts must have explanations; those explanations must show that the remarkable facts have fairly high probabilities; and remarkable facts cannot be byproducts. Nagel does not take seriously the possibility that the world may not be so obliging.• • •
Current science may suffer from fundamental flaws, but Nagel has not made a convincing case that this is so. And even if there are serious explanatory defects in our world picture, I don’t see how Nagel’s causally inexplicable teleology can be a plausible remedy. In saying this, I realize that Nagel is trying to point the way to a scientific revolution and that my reactions may be mired in presuppositions that Nagel is trying to transcend. If Nagel is right, our descendants will look back on him as a prophet—a prophet whom naysayers such as me were unable to recognize. - 

As I’ve mentioned before, the respected philosopher of mind Thomas Nagel has joined the ranks of Darwin-dissers with the publication of his new book Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly FalseI am eager to read this, but haven’t yet had a chance because I’m travelling and reading Sophisticated Theology™ (this book may qualify in that genre).
Nagel has always evinced a sympathy for Intelligent Design creationism, and in fact he chose Stephen Meyer’s ID book Signature in the Cell as his “book of the year” in the respected Times Literary Supplement (read the letters following Nagel’s endorsement at the link).  But Nagel is no slouch academically, and so it’s very surprising that he joins his colleague Jerry Fodor in bashing Darwin at book length.
In the latest issue of The Nation, Brian Leiter and Michael Weisberg review Nagel’s new book. Their verdict isn’t pretty.
Nagel’s is the latest in what has become a small cottage industry involving a handful of prominent senior philosophers expressing skepticism about aspects of Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection. Some, like the overtly Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga, have made a career of dialectical ingenuity in support of the rationality of religious faith. Others, such as Jerry Fodor, are avowed atheists like Nagel, and have only tried to raise challenges to discrete aspects of evolutionary explanations for biological phenomena. Plantinga’s influence has largely been limited to other religious believers, while Fodor’s challenge was exposed rather quickly by philosophers as trading on confusions (even Nagel disowns it in a footnote). Nagel now enters the fray with a far-reaching broadside against Darwin and materialism worthy of the true-believing Plantinga (whom Nagel cites favorably). We suspect that philosophers—even philosophers sympathetic to some of Nagel’s concerns—will be disappointed by the actual quality of the argument.
Nagel not only attacks evolution and materialism, but, after touting Stephen Meyer, now gives encomiums to the unctuous Alvin Plantinga!  One wonders if Nagel is losing his critical abilities, or simply is plagued by a nagging desire to go to church.
A good philosopher gone bad
Weisberg and Leiter do agree, though, with one of Nagel’s beefs—the notion that reductionism is overrated:
Nagel opposes two main components of the “materialist” view inspired by Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection. The first is what we will call theoretical reductionism, the view that there is an order of priority among the sciences, with all theories ultimately derivable from physics and all phenomena ultimately explicable in physical terms. We believe, along with most philosophers, that Nagel is right to reject theoretical reductionism, because the sciences have not progressed in a way consistent with it. We have not witnessed the reduction of psychology to biology, biology to chemistry, and chemistry to physics, but rather the proliferation of fields like neuroscience and evolutionary biology that explain psychological and biological phenomena in terms unrecognizable by physics. As the philosopher of biology Philip Kitcher pointed out some thirty years ago, even classical genetics has not been fully reduced to molecular genetics, and that reduction would have been wholly within one field. We simply do not see any serious attempts to reduce all the “higher” sciences to the laws of physics.
Here all three academics (Weisberg is a philosopher; Leiter a professor of law) make a mistake: the view that all sciences are in principle reducible to the laws of physics, which is materialism, is not identical to an attempt to reduce all sciences to physics.  The former must be true unless you’re religious, while the latter is a tactical problem that will be solved to some degree as we understand more about physics and biology, but is unlikely in our lifetime to give a complete explanation for higher-level phenomena. Remember, though, that “emergent phenomena” must be consistent with the laws of physics, even those laws may not be useful for explaining things like natural selection.
And, of course, more and more phenomena are being explained by physics. That’s what physical chemistry is all about, and even some aspects of natural selection (e.g., why eyes and ears evolved as they do) depend on knowing principles of physics.
But never mind. Nagel’s target appears to be naturalism, and his method similar to that of Plantinga, who believes that natural selection could never have given humans the ability to seek out and discover truths about nature:
The second component of the thesis Nagel opposes is what we will call naturalism, the view that features of our world—including “consciousness, intentionality, meaning, purpose, thought, and value”—can ultimately be accounted for in terms of the natural processes described by the various sciences (whether or not they are ever “reduced” to physics). Nagel’s arguments here are aimed at a more substantial target, although he gives us few specifics about the kind of naturalism he opposes. He does characterize it as the attempt to explain everything “at the most basic level by the physical sciences, extended to include biology,” and the one named proponent of this view is the philosopher Daniel Dennett. Although Dennett would not characterize his project as trying to explain everything at the “most basic level,” he does aim to show that phenomena such as consciousness, purpose and thought find a natural home in a picture of human beings inspired by Darwin. In the absence of any clearer statement of the argument, we will assume that this is the so-called “neo-Darwinian” picture that Nagel opposes.
One would assume that Nagel must be thoroughly acquainted with the evolutionary literature to make such a claim, but apparently he’s not near as savvy about our field as is Dennett:
Defending such a sweeping claim might seem to require a detailed engagement with the relevant science, yet in a striking admission early on, Nagel reveals that his book “is just the opinion of a layman who reads widely in the literature that explains contemporary science to the nonspecialist.” And a recurring objection to what he learned from his layman’s reading of popular science writing is that much science “flies in the face of common sense,” that it is inconsistent with “evident facts about ourselves, that it “require[s] us to deny the obvious,” and so on.
The authors add dryly:
This style of argument does not, alas, have a promising history.
. . and then the reviewers make a point that resonates deeply with me: materialism and naturalism need no a priori justification, but are justified by their fruits:
Happily, Nagel does not attempt to repudiate the Copernican revolution in astronomy, despite its hostility to common sense. But he displays none of the same humility when it comes to his preferred claims of common sense—the kind of humility that nearly 400 years of nonevident yet true scientific discoveries should engender. Are we really supposed to abandon a massively successful scientific research program because Nagel finds some scientific claims hard to square with what he thinks is obvious and “undeniable,” such as his confidence that his “clearest moral…reasonings are objectively valid”?
In support of his skepticism, Nagel writes: “The world is an astonishing place, and the idea that we have in our possession the basic tools needed to understand it is no more credible now than it was in Aristotle’s day.” This seems to us perhaps the most startling sentence in all of Mind and Cosmos. Epistemic humility—the recognition that we could be wrong—is a virtue in science as it is in daily life, but surely we have some reason for thinking, some four centuries after the start of the scientific revolution, that Aristotle was on the wrong track and that we are not, or at least not yet. Our reasons for thinking this are obvious and uncontroversial: mechanistic explanations and an abandonment of supernatural causality proved enormously fruitful in expanding our ability to predict and control the world around us. The fruits of the scientific revolution, though at odds with common sense, allow us to send probes to Mars and to understand why washing our hands prevents the spread of disease. We may, of course, be wrong in having abandoned teleology and the supernatural as our primary tools for understanding and explaining the natural world, but the fact that “common sense” conflicts with a layman’s reading of popular science writing is not a good reason for thinking so.
I can’t resist adding this, though (and I do realize I’m quoting a lot of the piece), for the authors of the review have done a good job:
Philosophical naturalists often appeal to the metaphor of “Neurath’s Boat,” named after the philosopher who developed it. Our situation as inquirers trying to understand the world around us, according to Neurath, is like that of sailors who must rebuild their ship while at sea. These sailors do not have the option of abandoning the ship and rebuilding a new one from scratch. They must, instead, try to rebuild it piecemeal, all the time staying afloat on other parts of the ship on which they continue to depend. In epistemological terms, we are also “at sea”: we cannot abandon all the knowledge about the world we have acquired from the sciences and then ask what we really know or what is really rational. The sciences that have worked so well for us are precisely our benchmark for what we know and what is rational; they’re the things that are keeping us “afloat.” Extending this metaphor, we can say that Nagel is the sailor who says, “I know the ideal form a ship should take—it is intuitively obvious, I am confident in it—so let us jump into the ocean and start building it from scratch.”
I won’t dissect the rest of the review, or Nagel’s arguments as expressed therein, but let me add that Nagel fleshes out Plantinga’s arguments by claiming that there are indeed moral truths (if you object to Sam Harris, you must also object to Nagel), and that natural selection was impotent at giving us the ability to see them. Where do they come from, then? Nagel apparently has no idea.
I don’t think there are objective moral truths, though morality seems to be grounded on certain principles that most humans take to be true (i.e. increasing well-being is good), and it’s indubitably true that “morality” is not completely coded in our genes anyway. How could it be if those so-called “truths” have changed so drastically in the last few centuries?
In the end, Nagel calls for a revival of teleological thinking.  He’s not a believer, so I’m not sure exactly what the “driving force” of biological diversity is supposed to be.  Nor am I sure what has happened to Nagel, for he’s throwing over one of the best-established theories in science for some teleological process that he can only intuit. He appears to have caught some virus from Jerry Fodor, and if other philosophers don’t condemn Nagel’s mushy thinking, I’ll have lost a lot of respect for philosophy. For crying out loud, any average biologist can think harder about this problem than the vaunted philosopher Nagel!
Finally, here is Leiter and Weisberg’s summary of the book:
We conclude with a comment about truth in advertising. Nagel’s arguments against reductionism are quixotic, and his arguments against naturalism are unconvincing. He aspires to develop “rival alternative conceptions” to what he calls the materialist neo-Darwinian worldview, yet he never clearly articulates this rival conception, nor does he give us any reason to think that “the present right-thinking consensus will come to seem laughable in a generation or two.” Mind and Cosmos is certainly an apt title for Nagel’s philosophical meditations, but his subtitle—”Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False”—is highly misleading. Nagel, by his own admission, relies only on popular science writing and brings to bear idiosyncratic and often outdated views about a whole host of issues, from the objectivity of moral truth to the nature of explanation. No one could possibly think he has shown that a massively successful scientific research program like the one inspired by Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection “is almost certainly false.” The subtitle seems intended to market the book to evolution deniers, intelligent-design acolytes, religious fanatics and others who are not really interested in the substantive scientific and philosophical issues. Even a philosopher sympathetic to Nagel’s worries about the naturalistic worldview would not claim this volume comes close to living up to that subtitle. Its only effect will be to make the book an instrument of mischief.
Indeed: the Discovery Institute will be all over this one like ugly on a frog.
- whyevolutionistrue


As the title and subtitle make clear, Thomas Nagel's recent project is an extremely ambitious one; it is especially ambitious to attempt to tackle it in a very short book. Nagel thinks there is a wide consensus among philosophers and scientists around a certain view of nature, the 'materialist neo-Darwinian' conception, but that this view has proved radically inadequate. It has failed, Nagel argues, to provide adequate explanations for mind and for value, and these things are so central to an adequate picture of the cosmos that such failures constitute a fatal flaw. Of course, it is not just that no adequate explanation has yet been given, but rather, in Nagel's view, that there are systematic reasons for suspecting that none could be given. Nagel does not develop this argument from a religious perspective. Indeed, he makes it clear that theistic assumptions have no appeal for him. Instead, insofar as he has a positive alternative to offer, it is that we should add a measure of naturalistic teleology to our stock of explanations, a bias of nature 'towards the marvelous' (most marvelously, leading to ourselves).
I found this book frustrating and unconvincing. Much of the frustration derives from a difficulty in knowing what exactly its target is and, when this is clear, why. The subtitle offers us materialism and the neo-Darwinian conception of nature. Starting with the latter, I would have doubted that, except perhaps in the hands of Daniel Dennett, neo-Darwinism is as central to a conception of nature as the title suggests. Darwinism, neo- or otherwise, is an account of the relations between living things past and present and of their ultimate origins, full of fascinating problems in detail, but beyond any serious doubt in general outline. This lack of doubt derives not, as Nagel sometimes insinuates, from a prior commitment to a metaphysical view -- there are theistic Darwinists as well as atheistic, naturalists and supernaturalists -- but from overwhelming evidence from a variety of sources: biogeography, the fossil record, comparative physiology and genomics, and so on. Nagel offers no arguments against any of this, and indeed states explicitly that he is not competent to do so. His complaint is that there are some explanatory tasks that he thinks evolution should perform that he thinks it can't. But as far as an attack that might concern evolutionists, they will feel, to borrow the fine phrase of former British minister, Dennis Healey, as if they had been savaged by a sheep.
Materialism is something quite different. In Nagel's mind, at least, it is almost synonymous with reductionism, the term with which he most commonly refers to the views he opposes. He writes, for instance, 'I will use the terms "materialism" or "materialist naturalism" to refer to one side of this conflict, and "antireductionism" to refer to the other side' (p. 13). This reflects an earlier statement that 'among the scientists and philosophers who do express views about the natural order as a whole, reductive materialism is widely assumed to be the only serious possibility'. This is amazing stuff. The only citation in favour of this is to Steven Weinberg's Dreams of a Final Theory, a somewhat ironic choice given the open disdain for philosophy Weinberg expresses in that book. But actually it is hard to think of an appropriate citation from a philosopher. Nagel expresses a view that was popular among philosophers of science half a century ago, and has been in decline ever since. It is a view that is perhaps still common among philosophers of mind (David Chalmers much discussed book The Conscious Mind (1996), for example, bases its argument for dualism on a similar view of materialism), but reductionism has been almost entirely rejected by philosophers actually engaged with the physical and biological sciences: it simply has no interesting relation to the diversity of things that scientists actually do.
So here is the first problem. Reductionism can be understood as a metaphysical thesis, typically based on an argument that if there is only material stuff in the world (no spooky stuff), then the properties of stuff must ultimately explain everything. This is a controversial thesis, much debated by philosophers. But what the last 50 years of work in the philosophy of science has established is that this kind of reductionism has little relevance to science. Even if it turned out that most scientists believed something like this (which I find incredible) this would be a psychological oddity, not a deep insight about science. A more sensible materialism goes no further than the rejection of spooky stuff: whatever kinds of stuff there may turn out to be and whatever they turn out to do, they are, as long as this turning out is empirically grounded, ipso facto not spooky. Such a materialism is quite untouched by Nagel's arguments.
Why does Nagel believe that materialism has to have this reductive character? It appears to be because he believes that 'everything about the world can . . . be understood' (p. 17), and that 'rational intelligibility is at the root of the natural order'. It would not be an exaggeration to say that for Nagel, if science can't come up with a theory of everything it has, in some deep sense, failed. Nagel is thus, in effect, committed a priori to reductionism; the failure of reductionism is therefore the failure of science. Perhaps the most charitable reading of the position is that Nagel is trying to revive rationalism for an atheistic age. He doesn't, however, make it look like an encouraging project.
The main substance of the book, once this strange philosophical backdrop has been sketched, is an argument for the irreducibility to 'materialist neo-Darwinism' of consciousness, cognition and values, each of which gets a chapter. Consciousness is, of course, familiar territory for Nagel, whose classic paper 'What is it like to be a bat?' has been a major factor in the founding of the now thriving consciousness industry. Given the special status and mystery (even spookiness) attributed to consciousness within this movement, it is not surprising that it has given rise to some curious metaphysical views, most famously David Chalmers's dualism alluded to above. There are increasing stirrings of doubt about this project and even a few, like this reviewer, who doubt whether there is anything it is like to be a bat (see Hacker 2002; Dupré 2009), but this is not the place to pursue that argument. What seems to me beyond any serious question is that the results and insights gained by the vast quantities of philosophical and quasi-philosophical work on consciousness in the last few decades is hardly comparable with the successes that stand to the credit of evolution.
The starting point of Nagel's strategy is that if the general reductionist project is to be successful, then it must be shown how consciousness/cognition/value can be integrated into the materialist worldview. Prima facie these things are not material. The materialist story about how material came to possess these entities or qualities is evolution. So if evolution cannot account for consciousness/cognition/value, it is fatally injured. Let's assume for the sake of argument that we accept the philosophical framing of the issue. The next thing is to give an account of these topics that blocks the evolutionary explanation. Suffice it to say that in each case the account given is controversial. Most obviously this is true for the moral realism that Nagel defends. Here he is quite clear that the argument could also run from the truth of evolution to the falsity of moral realism, a direction taken, as Nagel notes, by Sharon Street (2006). I have already mentioned the possibility of doubts about Nagel's take on consciousness. Given the controversial status of these analyses Nagel's subtitle should at least be amended to 'why the materialist neo-Darwinian conception of nature might possibly be false'.
The case of cognition, finally, brings out most strikingly Nagel's rationalism. Nagel thinks that reason gives us insights into reality that evolution cannot account for. Whereas perception gives us a view of the world mediated by a 'mental effect' that it causes in me, something that emerged to serve my evolutionary interests, reason gives me direct, unmediated insight into the world. If I realise that my beliefs are in contradiction, I know directly that one of them is false (p. 82). These are deep waters, no doubt. My own views are, first, that the mediating mental effect in perception is a highly problematic entity, and second that surely logic is at least mediated by language. But here I will only repeat that we have surely not been offered anything harder to deny than the general truth of evolution.
Suppose, again counterfactually, that we accept Nagel's accounts of consciousness, cognition, and value, what would it take to show that beings with these capacities could not have evolved in the "neo-Darwinian" manner? How, for instance, can a collection of molecules evolve the ability to feel like something? I'll offer just one more diagnosis of what has gone wrong. Nagel is very impressed, like many before him and since, with the oddity of material stuff having experiences. But the explanation of mind does not, of course, lie in matter but in form. Of course matter must have the capacity to embody complex forms, as for instance the properties of carbon, oxygen, nitrogen and a few other elements that allow them to form complex organic polymers. It is then the relations that these forms make possible with other molecules and then up the scale of increasing complexity that underlie the emergence of the capacities that so impress us.
What can't evolution explain about all this that it ought to? Nagel constantly asserts that to explain the existence of consciousness, etc., evolution must not just show that they are possible, but also that they are likely, or to be expected. This is, I suppose, a further expression of his rationalism, the expectation of a certain kind of intelligibility. But still it seems to me poorly motivated. At the time of my birth it was very unlikely that I would several decades later be reviewing a book by a famous philosopher; but it is not mysterious that this eventually came about. The improbability has been declining rapidly for the last few decades. Just so with evolution. The evolution of reason may well be very unlikely indeed on a young, hot planet. It's a great deal more likely by the time there are highly social, if not yet rational, multicellular organisms with very complex nervous systems.
Nagel does not want to appeal to God and finds current evolutionary thinking in principle inadequate to account for central features of human existence. Yet he is committed to the intelligibility of the world we find ourselves in. So where can we go to provide more satisfactory explanations? The only positive suggestion that Nagel offers to solve the pseudo-problems he has devised is that there may be teleological laws, laws that 'bias towards the marvelous'. What is the evidence for these strange bits of legislation? Only that they would make the appearance of complex creatures such as ourselves, marvels that we are, more likely. I have never felt more proud to be an empiricist.
A final point. I have myself argued that it is a serious mistake to allow fear of creationists and other obscurantists to discourage discussion of the weaknesses and unanswered questions in evolutionary theory. Nagel has no fear of such people and expresses a considerable sympathy with intelligent design. On the basis of his understanding of evolution, he considers that the rejection of their criticisms of evolution is 'manifestly unfair' (p. 10). (This may, of course, reflect on either the understanding or the unfairness.) He just personally feels an aversion to the theistic perspective. The title of the book, however, all too readily interpreted as announcing the falsity of Darwinism, will certainly lend comfort (and sell a lot of copies) to the religious enemies of Darwinism. Notwithstanding my caution about being unduly influenced by such people, this seems unfortunate when so easily avoidable.
REFERENCES
Chalmers, David (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dupré, John (2009). "Hard and Easy Questions about Consciousness", in Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy: Essays for P.M. S. Hacker, eds. Hans-Johann Glock and John Hyman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 228-249.
Hacker, P. M. S. (2002). "Is there anything it is like to be a bat?". Philosophy 77: 157-174.
Street, Sharon (2006). "A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value". Philosophical Studies 127: 109-166. - John Dupré

Thomas Nagel, a professor of philosophy and of law at New York University, has made his reputation over the last fifty years as a leading contributor to moral and political philosophy, with occasional forays into the philosophy of mind. Most famously, and most relevant to his new book, Mind and Cosmos, he wrote an influential paper in the 1970s with the memorable title “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Nagel tried to demonstrate the implausibility of the notion that, even if one knew all the relevant physical facts about the brains of bats, one could have any idea what it felt like to be a bat. How could the subjective feeling of this experience be captured by a set of cold, objective biological and chemical facts about neurons? Nagel’s new book revisits some of these ideas and aims to “develop the rival alternative conceptions” to what he calls the “materialism and Darwinism” of our age.
Nagel’s is the latest in what has become a small cottage industry involving a handful of prominent senior philosophers expressing skepticism about aspects of Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection. Some, like the overtly Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga, have made a career of dialectical ingenuity in support of the rationality of religious faith. Others, such as Jerry Fodor, are avowed atheists like Nagel, and have only tried to raise challenges to discrete aspects of evolutionary explanations for biological phenomena. Plantinga’s influence has largely been limited to other religious believers, while Fodor’s challenge was exposed rather quickly by philosophers as trading on confusions (even Nagel disowns it in a footnote). Nagel now enters the fray with a far-reaching broadside against Darwin and materialism worthy of the true-believing Plantinga (whom Nagel cites favorably). We suspect that philosophers—even philosophers sympathetic to some of Nagel’s concerns—will be disappointed by the actual quality of the argument.
Nagel opposes two main components of the “materialist” view inspired by Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection. The first is what we will call theoretical reductionism, the view that there is an order of priority among the sciences, with all theories ultimately derivable from physics and all phenomena ultimately explicable in physical terms. We believe, along with most philosophers, that Nagel is right to reject theoretical reductionism, because the sciences have not progressed in a way consistent with it. We have not witnessed the reduction of psychology to biology, biology to chemistry, and chemistry to physics, but rather the proliferation of fields like neuroscience and evolutionary biology that explain psychological and biological phenomena in terms unrecognizable by physics. As the philosopher of biology Philip Kitcher pointed out some thirty years ago, even classical genetics has not been fully reduced to molecular genetics, and that reduction would have been wholly within one field. We simply do not see any serious attempts to reduce all the “higher” sciences to the laws of physics.
Yet Nagel argues in his book as if this kind of reductive materialism really were driving the scientific community. The only named target is the Nobel Prize–winning physicist Steven Weinberg, famous for his defense of the primacy of physics in such popular works as Dreams of a Final Theory (1992). Here is what Nagel writes in describing Weinberg’s view:
My target is a comprehensive, speculative world picture that is reached by extrapolation from some of the discoveries of biology, chemistry, and physics—a particular naturalistic Weltanschauung that postulates a hierarchical relation among the subjects of those sciences, and the completeness in principle of an explanation of everything in the universe through their unification. Such a world view is not a necessary condition of the practice of any of those sciences, and its acceptance or nonacceptance would have no effect on most scientific research.
Nagel here aligns himself, as best we can tell, with the majority view among both philosophers and practicing scientists. Just to take one obvious example, very little of the actual work in biology inspired by Darwin depends on reductive materialism of this sort; evolutionary explanations do not typically appeal to Newton’s laws or general relativity. Given this general consensus (the rhetoric of some popular science writing by Weinberg and others aside), it is puzzling that Nagel thinks he needs to bother attacking theoretical reductionism.
The second component of the thesis Nagel opposes is what we will call naturalism, the view that features of our world—including “consciousness, intentionality, meaning, purpose, thought, and value”—can ultimately be accounted for in terms of the natural processes described by the various sciences (whether or not they are ever “reduced” to physics). Nagel’s arguments here are aimed at a more substantial target, although he gives us few specifics about the kind of naturalism he opposes. He does characterize it as the attempt to explain everything “at the most basic level by the physical sciences, extended to include biology,” and the one named proponent of this view is the philosopher Daniel Dennett. Although Dennett would not characterize his project as trying to explain everything at the “most basic level,” he does aim to show that phenomena such as consciousness, purpose and thought find a natural home in a picture of human beings inspired by Darwin. In the absence of any clearer statement of the argument, we will assume that this is the so-called “neo-Darwinian” picture that Nagel opposes.
Naturalists, including Dennett, defend their view by appealing to the extraordinary fruitfulness of past scientific work, including work growing out of Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection. So what should we make of the actual work in biology that supports the “materialist Neo-Darwinian conception of nature” that Nagel thinks “is almost certainly false”? Defending such a sweeping claim might seem to require a detailed engagement with the relevant science, yet in a striking admission early on, Nagel reveals that his book “is just the opinion of a layman who reads widely in the literature that explains contemporary science to the nonspecialist.” And a recurring objection to what he learned from his layman’s reading of popular science writing is that much science “flies in the face of common sense,” that it is inconsistent with “evident facts about ourselves, that it “require[s] us to deny the obvious,” and so on.
 This style of argument does not, alas, have a promising history. After all, what could be more common-sensical, obvious or evident than the notion that the earth is flat and the sun revolves around the earth? All ordinary evidence supports that verdict: we know from experience that people fall off things that are spherical, especially when trying to hang upside down from them, and we know that the sun rises in the sky in one direction and sets in the other as it revolves around the seemingly flat earth. Happily, Nagel does not attempt to repudiate the Copernican revolution in astronomy, despite its hostility to common sense. But he displays none of the same humility when it comes to his preferred claims of common sense—the kind of humility that nearly 400 years of nonevident yet true scientific discoveries should engender. Are we really supposed to abandon a massively successful scientific research program because Nagel finds some scientific claims hard to square with what he thinks is obvious and “undeniable,” such as his confidence that his “clearest moral…reasonings are objectively valid”?
In support of his skepticism, Nagel writes: “The world is an astonishing place, and the idea that we have in our possession the basic tools needed to understand it is no more credible now than it was in Aristotle’s day.” This seems to us perhaps the most startling sentence in all of Mind and Cosmos. Epistemic humility—the recognition that we could be wrong—is a virtue in science as it is in daily life, but surely we have some reason for thinking, some four centuries after the start of the scientific revolution, that Aristotle was on the wrong track and that we are not, or at least not yet. Our reasons for thinking this are obvious and uncontroversial: mechanistic explanations and an abandonment of supernatural causality proved enormously fruitful in expanding our ability to predict and control the world around us. The fruits of the scientific revolution, though at odds with common sense, allow us to send probes to Mars and to understand why washing our hands prevents the spread of disease. We may, of course, be wrong in having abandoned teleology and the supernatural as our primary tools for understanding and explaining the natural world, but the fact that “common sense” conflicts with a layman’s reading of popular science writing is not a good reason for thinking so.
Incompatibility with common sense is not Nagel’s only argument against naturalism. A second line of argument begins by appealing to what he takes to be an everyday opinion: that there are objective moral, logical and mathematical truths. He then argues that the existence of these kinds of objective truths is incompatible with naturalism. For the moral case, Nagel asks: If our moral faculties are simply the result of evolution, how can they be reliable measures of objective moral truth? Why should evolution prefer the perception of moral truth to whatever happens to be advantageous for reproduction? Thus, if some of our moral beliefs really are objectively true, then they cannot be the result of evolution. And because he is confident that we do know some objective moral truths, Nagel concludes that “a Darwinian account of the motives underlying moral judgment must be false, in spite of the scientific consensus in its favor.” Recognizing that readers will find this inference jarring, Nagel adds: “I, even more strangely, am relying on a philosophical claim to refute a scientific theory supported by empirical evidence.”
There is, indeed, much that is strange here. To begin, there is nothing remotely common-sensical about Nagel’s confidence in the objectivity of moral truth. While Nagel and his compatriots apparently take very seriously their moral opinions—so seriously that they find it incredible to suggest that their “confidence in the objective truth of [their] moral beliefs” might, in fact, be “completely illusory”—this can hardly claim the mantle of “the common sense view.” Ordinary opinion sometimes tends toward objectivism, to be sure—often by relying on religious assumptions that Nagel explicitly rejects—but it also often veers toward social or cultural relativism about morality. Whether morality is truly objective is a philosopher’s claim (and a controversial one even among philosophers) about which “common sense” is either agnostic or mixed.
We take no stance on Nagel’s hypothesis that if our moral faculties are simply the result of evolution, they cannot be reliable measures of objective moral truth. But we should note that Nagel’s colleague, philosopher Sharon Street, accepts it and draws the opposite conclusion. She argues that because this hypothesis is true, and because we are obviously the products of evolution, we should give up the idea that there are objective moral truths in Nagel’s sense. Given the philosophical plausibility of Street’s alternative response—not to mention the simplistic evolutionary reasoning the whole debate is predicated on—it is hard to see why any biologist should be given pause by Nagel’s argument.
A more interesting challenge—really, the only interesting philosophical point raised in the book—concerns logical and mathematical truths. Is it possible, Nagel asks, to reconcile a naturalistic and biological picture of the evolution of our cognitive capacities with the confidence we have in our ability to do logic and mathematics? Nagel’s argument invokes a contrast with our perceptual capabilities, because our ability to reliably perceive many of the features of our physical environment seems likely to have an evolutionary explanation. (After all, if we could not reliably spot sudden cliffs or saber-toothed tigers, our reproductive fitness would be seriously compromised!) But logical truths are not like that, Nagel argues. It is self-evident that something cannot be both red and not-red at the same time (the “law of non-contradiction”). So, too, it is self-evident that if all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, then Socates is necessarily mortal. Even if evolution endowed us with the capacity to recognize the law of non-contradiction and to draw valid deductive inferences, how does it explain the obvious truth of these logical claims? Nagel’s response to this question is that evolution cannot—and the problem is even worse than that:
Any evolutionary account of the place of reason presupposes reason’s validity and cannot confirm it without circularity.
Eventually the attempt to understand oneself in evolutionary, naturalistic terms must bottom out in something that is grasped as valid in itself—something without which the evolutionary understanding would not be possible.
In other words, even if one thinks there is an evolutionary explanation for why we recognize the obviousness of logical, mathematical and scientific truths, there would still be the question of why we think evolutionary theory itself is justified. An evolutionary explanation of that latter fact would have to presuppose the correctness of the theory whose justification we are questioning, making the argument circular: we would have to assume that evolutionary theory is true in order to investigate whether it is true!
 There is a response to this kind of challenge, one that is widely embraced by philosophical naturalists (though, again, not mentioned by Nagel). This response starts by noting that we determine what is “rational” or “justified” simply by appealing to the most successful forms of inquiry into the world that human beings have developed. Paradigmatic examples of those successful forms of inquiry are, of course, physics, chemistry and biology. They are successful precisely in the way that Aristotelian science was not: they enable us to navigate the world around us, to predict its happenings and control some of them. To confuse one’s intuitive confidence in the logical and epistemic norms that make these sciences possible with some kind of a priori access to the “rational order of the world,” as Nagel puts it, is to forget whence that confidence derives—namely, the very success of these sciences. For philosophical naturalists, the charge of circularity is empty, akin to suggesting that the need for a usable table to have legs requires some justification beyond the fact that the legs actually do a necessary job.
Philosophical naturalists often appeal to the metaphor of “Neurath’s Boat,” named after the philosopher who developed it. Our situation as inquirers trying to understand the world around us, according to Neurath, is like that of sailors who must rebuild their ship while at sea. These sailors do not have the option of abandoning the ship and rebuilding a new one from scratch. They must, instead, try to rebuild it piecemeal, all the time staying afloat on other parts of the ship on which they continue to depend. In epistemological terms, we are also “at sea”: we cannot abandon all the knowledge about the world we have acquired from the sciences and then ask what we really know or what is really rational. The sciences that have worked so well for us are precisely our benchmark for what we know and what is rational; they’re the things that are keeping us “afloat.” Extending this metaphor, we can say that Nagel is the sailor who says, “I know the ideal form a ship should take—it is intuitively obvious, I am confident in it—so let us jump into the ocean and start building it from scratch.”
We agree with Nagel that if the sciences could not explain our capacity to have thoughts about the world around us, that would be a serious failing and a reason to call their findings into question. But they can and they do! It is here that Nagel’s lack of engagement with contemporary cognitive science and his idiosyncratic views about what a scientific explanation should look like make his argument especially perplexing. He writes, in what might seem a massive concession to his naturalistic opponents, “The appearance of animal consciousness is evidently the result of biological evolution, but this well-supported empirical fact is not yet an explanation—it does not provide understanding, or enable us to see why the result was to be expected or how it came about.” On Nagel’s view, consciousness arose from evolution, but despite knowing this fact, we have not explained the origin of consciousness. In a similar vein, Nagel writes:
It is not an explanation to say just that the physical process of evolution has resulted in creatures with eyes, ears, central nervous systems, and so forth, and that it is simply a brute fact of nature that such creatures are conscious in the familiar ways. Merely to identify a cause is not to provide a significant explanation, without some understanding of why the cause produces the effect.
Nagel endorses the idea that explanation and prediction are symmetrical: “An explanation must show why it was likely that an event of that type occurred.” In other words, to explain something is to be in a position to have predicted it if we could go back in time. He also writes, “To explain consciousness, a physical evolutionary history would have to show why it was likely that organisms of the kind that have consciousness would arise.” Indeed, he goes further, claiming that “the propensity for the development of organisms with a subjective point of view must have been there from the beginning.”
This idea, however, is inconsistent with the most plausible views about prediction and explanation, in both philosophy and science. Philosophers of science have long argued that explanation and prediction cannot be fully symmetrical, given the importance of probabilities in explaining natural phenomena. Moreover, we are often in a position to understand the causes of an event, but without knowing enough detail to have predicted it. For example, approximately 1 percent of children born to women over 40 have Down syndrome. This fact is a perfectly adequate explanation of why a particular child has Down syndrome, but it does not mean we could have predicted that this particular child would develop it. Causes alone are frequently deemed sufficient to explain events; knowing enough to predict those events in advance is an important scientific achievement, but not essential to explanation.
* * *
Nagel doesn’t think so, and because of that, he advocates the reintroduction of teleological reasoning into science. (Teleology—the idea that natural phenomena have built-in purposes or ends—was central to Aristotelian science, and it remained very influential until the scientific revolution.) In his discussion of the origin of life, Nagel says that natural teleology would mean that, “in addition to physical law of the familiar kind, there are other laws of nature that are ‘biased toward the marvelous.’”
This is an astonishing though certainly evocative phrase (Nagel adapts it from another writer), yet Nagel offers no further explication of it. He does admit that this proposal “flies in the teeth of the authoritative form of explanation that has defined science since the revolution of the seventeenth century.” Unfortunately, he is also extremely unclear about what he means by “natural teleology,” other than assuring the reader that it is neither part of standard physical laws nor the introduction of theology. One might think that “principles of self-organization or of the development of complexity over time,” which Nagel gives as examples of natural teleology, are the sort of things studied by mainstream protein chemists, developmental biologists and condensed-matter physicists. But apparently these sciences, which study how complex order can be built up from simple physical processes, are not on the right track. Nagel never explains why.
We conclude with a comment about truth in advertising. Nagel’s arguments against reductionism are quixotic, and his arguments against naturalism are unconvincing. He aspires to develop “rival alternative conceptions” to what he calls the materialist neo-Darwinian worldview, yet he never clearly articulates this rival conception, nor does he give us any reason to think that “the present right-thinking consensus will come to seem laughable in a generation or two.” Mind and Cosmos is certainly an apt title for Nagel’s philosophical meditations, but his subtitle—”Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False”—is highly misleading. Nagel, by his own admission, relies only on popular science writing and brings to bear idiosyncratic and often outdated views about a whole host of issues, from the objectivity of moral truth to the nature of explanation. No one could possibly think he has shown that a massively successful scientific research program like the one inspired by Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection “is almost certainly false.” The subtitle seems intended to market the book to evolution deniers, intelligent-design acolytes, religious fanatics and others who are not really interested in the substantive scientific and philosophical issues. Even a philosopher sympathetic to Nagel’s worries about the naturalistic worldview would not claim this volume comes close to living up to that subtitle. Its only effect will be to make the book an instrument of mischief. - Brian Leiter and Michael Weisberg
 

To review Thomas Nagel's new book for the Mises Daily seems at first sight a misplaced endeavor. The book has nothing to say about libertarianism or Austrian economics; moreover, Nagel's own political views are decidedly non-libertarian. He wrote the most influential critical review of Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia, and he rejects Lockean theories of property ownership, instead viewing property rights as conventional.[1] Nevertheless, one chapter in the book raises issues of profound concern to anyone interested in political philosophy, and it is for this reason that I wish to comment on it here.
Suppose one says that it is wrong to initiate force against other people. What does it mean to say that this claim is true? Are moral judgments just personal preferences, or are they more than this? Mises favored the former alternative. We can judge objectively that certain actions are suitable means to achieve a goal, but ultimate value judgments cannot be assessed as rational or irrational.
To apply the concept rational or irrational to the ultimate end chosen is nonsensical. We may call irrational the ultimate given, viz., those things that our thinking can neither analyze nor reduce to other ultimately given things. Then every ultimate end chosen by any man is irrational. It is neither more nor less rational to aim at riches like Croesus than to aim at poverty like a Buddhist monk. (Human Action, p. 880)
To many, though, this seems inadequate. It's isn't only that we prefer not to murder innocent children, for example: it really is wrong to do so, in a sense not reducible to people's choices or anything else. (Mises would I think say that the rule against murder, combined with other moral rules, is a means by which we can achieve a society of peace and prosperity, which nearly everyone wants; but that this latter preference is an ultimate judgment of value that is neither true nor false.)
As Nagel says,
Instead of explaining the truth or falsity of value judgments in terms of their conformity to our considered motivational dispositions or moral sense, as the subjectivist does, the [moral] realist explains our moral sense as a faculty that aims to identify those facts in our circumstances that count for and against certain courses of action, and to discover how they combine to determine what course would be the right one, or what set of alternatives would be permissible or advisable and what others ruled out. (p. 102)
In brief, morality is a matter of finding out, not choosing or feeling.
Nagel thinks it is coherent to reject moral realism, but nevertheless he finds the view more compelling than its subjectivist competitors:
To be sure, there are competing subjectivist explanations of the appearance of mind-independence in the truth of moral and other value judgments.… There is no crucial experiment that will establish or refute realism about value … the realist interpretation of what we are doing in thinking about these things can carry conviction only if it is a better account than the subjectivist or social-constructivist alternative, and that is always going to be a comparative question and a matter of judgment, as it is about any other domain, whether it be mathematics or science or history or aesthetics. (pp. 104–5)
But is not moral realism exposed to a decisive objection, famously pressed by John L. Mackie? In suggesting that values are "out there" in the world, rather than human preferences or sentiments, does not the moral realist postulate "ontologically queer" abstract objects, unlike anything else in the universe?
Nagel convincingly shows that this objection rests on a misunderstanding. Moral realism does not hold that there is, in addition to ordinary objects, a special class of metaphysical objects called "values." Rather, its contention is that moral reasons do not require reduction to something else in order to count as legitimate.
The dispute between realism and subjectivism is not about the contents of the universe. It is a dispute about the order of normative explanation. Realists believe that moral and other evaluative judgments can often be explained by more general or basic evaluative truths, together with the facts that bring them into play.… But they do not believe that the evaluative element in such a judgment can be explained by anything else. That there is a reason to do what will avoid grievous harm to a sentient creature is, in a realist view, one of the kinds of things that can be true in itself, and not because something else is true. (p. 102)
If Nagel spurns metaphysical objects, does this suffice to vindicate moral realism? A common objection holds that even if objective reasons of the sort Nagel favors are not metaphysical in a dubious sense, they remain inconsistent with the naturalistic outlook on the world required by evolutionary biology. Allan Gibbard has presented an influential account of this contention:
How could we be in any position to intuit moral truths, or normative truths in general? No answer is apparent in the biological picture I sketched. Non-natural facts are absent from the picture, and so are any powers to get at non-natural truths by intuition. Interpreting the natural goings-on as thoughts and judgments doesn't change this. If moral knowledge must depend on intuition, we seem driven to moral skepticism.[2]
The objection, in brief, is this: Evolution can account for our attraction to pleasure or aversion to pain. But it knows nothing of objective reasons: how could a faculty for grasping them have evolved? Unless, then, we abandon science, we must give up moral realism. Nagel considers a paper by Sharon Street, arguing to this effect, and he is much impressed by it. But he takes the argument in a different direction from that taken by Street and her fellow naturalists. If moral objectivity is inconsistent with our current picture of evolution, that is a reason to think that this picture gives us an incomplete and inadequate understanding of the world:
I agree with Sharon Street's position that moral realism is incompatible with a Darwinian account of the evolutionary influence on our faculties of moral and evaluative judgment. Street holds that a Darwinian account is strongly supported by contemporary science, so she concludes that moral realism is false. I follow the same inference in the opposite direction: since moral realism is true, a Darwinian account of the motives underlying moral judgment must be false, in spite of the scientific consensus in its favor. (p. 105)
If Nagel is right, it makes sense to speak of objective moral reasons; but what must the universe be like for this to be true? The question must not be misunderstood. It is not, what in the universe makes moral reasons objectively true? To ask this would be precisely to reject Nagel's chief contention, that nothing makes moral reasons true: they require no justification from something else. Rather, the question to be addressed is, what must the universe be like if there are free-standing moral reasons of the kind Nagel accepts?
One alternative to the Darwinian view Nagel finds untrue to the moral facts is theism, but to this he is temperamentally averse. He prefers what he calls a teleological view.
According to the hypothesis of natural teleology, the natural world would have a propensity to give rise to beings of the kind that have a good — beings for which things can be good or bad. (p. 121)
Nagel's teleological view is by no means confined to value, and other chapters of the book apply the teleological approach to subjective consciousness and cognition as well.
But even though natural selection partly determines the details of the forms of life and consciousness that exist, and the relations among them, the existence of the genetic material and the possible forms it makes available for selection have to be explained in some other way. The teleological hypothesis is that these things may be determined not merely by value-free chemistry and physics but also by something else, namely a cosmic predisposition to the formation of life, consciousness, and the value that is inseparable from them. (p. 123)
Nagel's argument is frankly speculative, but in the best sense; it opens to our consideration new possibilities, developed in an imaginative and deep way. Nagel is a great philosopher, and he could with justice say to his naturalist adversaries,
There are more things in heaven and earth …
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
Notes
[1] For Nagel's views on political philosophy, see, e.g., "The Problem of Global Justice" in Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament (Oxford 2010) and my review of this in the Mises Review.
[2] Allan Gibbard, Reconciling Our Aims (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 21. .  David Gordon

 
 How our hunger for definitive answers robs us of the intellectual humility necessary for understanding the universe and our place in it.
“The purpose of science is not to cure us of our sense of mystery and wonder,”Stanford’s Robert Sapolsky famously noted, “but to constantly reinvent and reinvigorate it.” And yet, we live in a media culture that warps seeds of scientific understanding into sensationalist, definitive headlines about the gene for obesity or language or homosexuality and maps where, precisely, love or fear or the appreciation of Jane Austen is located in the brain — even though we know that it isn’t the clinging to answers but the embracing of ignorance that drives science.
In 1974, philosopher Thomas Nagel penned the essay “What It’s Like To Be A Bat?”, which went on to become one of the seminal texts of contemporary philosophy of mind. Nearly four decades later, he returns with Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False (public library) — a provocative critique of the limits of scientific reductionism, exploring what consciousness might be if it isn’t easily explained as a direct property of physical interactions and if the door to the unknown were, as Richard Feynman passionately advocated, left ajar.
To be sure, Nagel is far from siding with the intellectual cop-outs of intelligent design. His criticism of reductive materialism isn’t based on religious belief (or on any belief in a particular alternative, for that matter) but, rather, on the insistence that a recognition of these very limitations is a necessary precondition for exploring such alternatives, “or at least being open to their possibility” — a possibility that makes mind central to understanding the natural order, rather than an afterthought or a mere byproduct of physical laws.
He writes in the introduction:
[T]he mind-body problem is not just a local problem, having to do with the relation between mind, brain, and behavior in living animal organisms, but that it invades our understanding of the entire cosmos and its history.
[…]
Humans are addicted to the hope for a final reckoning, but intellectual humility requires that we resist the temptation to assume that tools of the kind we now have are in principle sufficient to understand the universe as a whole.

As a proponent of making the timeless timely again through an intelligent integration of history with contemporary culture, I find Nagel’s case for weaving a historical perspective into the understanding of mind particularly compelling:
The world is an astonishing place, and the idea that we have in our possession the basic tools needed to understand it is no more credible now than it was in Aristotle’s day.
[…]
The greatest advances in the physical and biological sciences were made possible by excluding the mind from the physical world. This has permitted a quantitative understanding of the world, expressed in timeless, mathematically formulated physical laws, But at some point it will be necessary to make a new start on a more comprehensive understanding that includes the mind. It seems inevitable that such an understanding will have a historical dimension as well as a timeless one. The idea that historical understanding is part of science has become familiar through the transformation of biology by evolutionary theory. But more recently, with the acceptance of the big bang, cosmology has also become a historical science. Mind, as a development of life, must be included as the most recent stage of this long cosmological history, and its appearance, I believe, casts its shadow back over the entire process and the constituents and principles on which the process depends.
Ultimately, Nagel echoes John Updike’s reflection on the possibility of “permanent mystery”:
It is perfectly possible that the truth is beyond our reach, in virtue of our intrinsic cognitive limitations and not merely beyond our grasp in humanity’s present stage of intellectual development.
Though Mind and Cosmos isn’t a neat package of scientific, or even philosophical, answers, it’s a necessary thorn in the side of today’s all-too-prevalent scientific reductionism and a poignant affirmation of Isaac Asimov’s famous contention that “the most beautiful experience we can have is the mysterious.” -

 
Thomas Nagel's new Oxford University Press book Mind & Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False includes so many compelling statements about the scientific weaknesses in neo-Darwinian evolution and chemical evolution that it would surely violate copyright to reproduce them all for you.
But we can share a couple. John West already cited one striking passage where the well-known atheist, philosopher, and legal scholar credits proponents of intelligent design for providing potent criticisms of neo-Darwinian evolution. Nagel concludes that ID proponents "do not deserve the scorn with which they are commonly met. It is manifestly unfair." (p. 10)
To see exactly where Nagel stands, it's worth looking a little deeper into his criticisms of neo-Darwinian and chemical evolution:
It is prima facie highly implausible that life as we know it is the result of a sequence of physical accidents together with the mechanism of natural selection. We are expected to abandon this naïve response, not in favor of an alternative that is really a schema for explanation, supported by example. What is lacking, to my knowledge, is a credible argument that the story has a nonnegligible probability of being true. (Thomas Nagel, Mind & Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False, p. 6 (Oxford University Press, 2012).)
Nagel then poses two questions. He first asks whether the origin of life is likely to have occurred by purely physical and chemical processes alone. The second question pertains to biological evolution, and he frames it in a way that is very similar to how proponents of intelligent design address the same problem. Nagel asks: "In the available geological time since the first life forms appeared on earth, what is the likelihood that, as a result of physical accident, a sequence of viable genetic mutations should have occurred that was sufficient to permit natural selection to produce the organisms that actually exist?" (p. 6) Nagel begins to answers those two questions as follows:
There is much more uncertainty in the scientific community about the first question than about the second. Many people think it will be difficult to come up with a reductionist explanation of the origin of life, but most people have no doubt that accidental genetic variation is enough to support the actual history of evolution by natural selection, once reproducing organisms have come into existence.
Nagel, however, observes that the despite the widespread confidence in Darwinian accounts of the evolution of life, the case has not been made:
It is no longer legitimate simply to imagine a sequence of gradually evolving phenotypes, as if their appearance through mutations in the DNA were unproblematic -- as Richard Dawkins does for the evolution of the eye. (p. 9)
Also, with regard to the origin of life, he observes that "the coming into existence of the genetic code -- an arbitrary mapping of nucleotide sequences into amino acids, together with mechanisms that can read the code and carry out its instructions -- seems particularly resistant to being revealed as probable given physical law alone." (p. 10) What is refreshing about Nagel's perspective is that he's willing to ask hard questions -- even if those questions go against the "consensus," and even if, as he believes, no satisfactory answers are currently on offer. He writes:
My skepticism is not based on religious belief or on a belief in any definite alternative. It is just a belief that the available scientific evidence, in spite of the consensus of scientific opinion, does not in this matter rationally require us to subordinate the incredulity of common sense. (p. 7)
He continues, observing that too many people simply defer to the consensus and aren't willing to take problems with it seriously:
[D]oubts about the reductionist account of life go against the dominant scientific consensus, but that consensus faces problems of probability that I believe are not taken seriously enough, both with respect to the evolution of life forms through accidental mutation and natural selection and with respect to the formation from dead matter of physical systems capable of such evolution. (p. 9)
Nagel is a bold scholar who is brave enough to think for himself, and isn't going to be bullied into capitulating to the consensus. He has a lot more to say in his book -- and it's worth reading. Pick up a copy and see for yourself. - Casey Luskin











Prefatory Note: Our usual policy at The Threepenny Review is to assign one book to one author. But in this case two of our longtime writers—P. N. Furbank, an essayist, critic, and biographer who lives in London, and Louis B. Jones, a novelist and essayist who lives in the Sierra foothills—both wanted to review the same book. So we let them. We think the results are instructive: not oppositional, not mutually contradictory, but very different approaches to the same subject. We are also pleased that neither Jones nor Furbank is a professional philosopher. (After all, philosophical theories, if they bear on reality, should be meaningful to the rest of us.) So here they are—first Jones, then Furbank—commenting on Thomas Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False, out in the fall of 2012 in both America and England from Oxford University Press.
My stranded trailer in the woods looks onto a clearing where wild sweet pea vies with starthistle, fescue with blue-eye grass and miner’s lettuce, all competing as they’ve done, possibly, since the Sierra first crumbled into soil and started inviting plants to colonize. It is a patch of ground, then, that existed through the geologic ages in the peculiar twilight oblivion of being unwitnessed—until the first Maidu people came along, probably climbing up from the creek below. Before the Maidu, the witnesses of the place were the animals. And now these days I’m here, to substantiate this little clearing’s existence. It’s almost a weary old joke in philosophy, but still a surefire, hard-to-retire joke—thatI’m necessary to this clearing’s existence. My mind. The joke, however, is making a serious, small comeback in this century. What’s more, the entire antique notion of teleology seems to be making a comeback, and not in the disreputable fringes—rather, right in the middle, in physics and biology and cosmology and academic philosophy. Thomas Nagel’s new book, Mind and Cosmos, is a straightforward effort to invite back teleology.

The idea of a “teleological cause”—a notion of Aristotle’s, and much beloved in the Middle Ages—runs like this:

There are two kinds of answer to the question, Why did it rain yesterday? It’s one kind of answer to say, “It rained because water vapor condensed in the atmosphere.” That, in Aristotle’s language, names the efficient cause. But to answer, “It rained because the grass needs water to survive” is to offer a wholly other kind of reason. The latter is the teleological cause, or final cause. In teleological thinking, the final result is an event’s cause. The goal is the cause.

Efficient causes are likely to refer backwards in time: the rain precipitated because moist air rose to colder altitudes, which happened because the Pacific sent a wind up the Sierra, which happened after ocean water had evaporated, etc. In the other direction, teleological causes like to explore the future: the rain fell in order to make the grass grow, to provide grazing for summer cattle, so that the cattle may fatten and be butchered, to provide meat for the poet who lives in the glade, so that one day she may write her great meditative poem, so that, finally, Allah may be glorified.

Why do humans have binocular vision and centrally placed noses? So that (among many other excellent reasons) the letters spelling HOMO DEI may appear graphically in the arrangement of human facial features, and we may be reminded of our Maker. For two thousand years after Aristotle, teleology was the preferred explanation for events. Hard to imagine these days. These days, since the Enlightenment, teleology has been pretty much extirpated as unscientific. If there were any traces of teleological thinking that remained, in some hermit’s cave, or in some quaint parish churchyard, the trumpet blast of Darwin chased it out. How the Elephant Got His Nose used to be a wondrous tale, involving the Argument from Design. These days the proboscidea, like everybody else, have a clear explanation.

Philosophy has always been prompted most sharply by physics. This has been the case since philosophy’s birth among the Milesian Greeks, when defining “what Being is” brought up the first ideas about the basic constituents of matter. In recent years, physicists have been suggesting that, in a certain queer sense, mind is the cause of matter. Such a mysticism is still only a fume coming off quantum mechanics’ Copenhagen interpretation and many-worlds interpretation, and off the so-called anthropic theories of Big Bang cosmology. It’s a variety of thinking that is troubling, especially to many physicists. Maybe fans of the paranormal and the occult like to talk in such ways, saying mind causes matter, but for a serious empiricist it sounds like psychic hocus-pocus; it sounds like the road to solipsism, or nirvana; it sounds a little like Holy Writ.

Thomas Nagel, Professor of Law and Philosophy at NYU, now in his seventies, has made it part of his life’s work to keep us honest about a few small crucial distinctions, in particular to fight off reductionism: to fight off the oversimplifying tendency in scientific empiricism that would reduce our concept of mind to neurochemical phenomena alone. In mainstream science of mind, presently, reductionism rules. Everybody aims to discover “neural correlates of consciousness.” Everyone is watching MRI images in which brain-parts light up while subjects’ thoughts play. The ruling belief is that, when we have a “thought,” no part of it is an immaterial thing like a puffy dialogue-balloon over our heads; the thought has a physical, neural basis. The orthodox view is that the thought has a strictly physical basis. This is called the identity theory, that a “thought” and its nervous-system flicker are the same event. The identity theory, in the words of neuroscientist John Kihlstrom at Berkeley, explains the mind as nothing fancier than “sparks and drips at the synapses.” Thomas Nagel has been insisting that we must remain patiently agnostic in the face of this reductionist identification of mental with physical. In a famous essay from 1974, called “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?,” he defended the sovereignty of subjective consciousness. Each of us conscious beings, when we experience a simple thing like yellowness or a handclasp or anger, enjoys a personal, non-fungible subjectivity, whose mystery will never be accessible to the measurers of sparks and drips.

Nagel’s very nice analogy, in the book Mind and Cosmos, is to a pocket calculator. If I tap the keys marked 5, +, 3, and =, the little gray window displays an 8. This small miracle is explainable in purely physical terms, as the tender pulse of electrons traveling through microchip gates. Such is the reductionist view of the brain. What Nagel wishes to point to is the much larger miracle, that the figure-eight pattern of pixels in the screen has a meaning! That astonishment—meaning—is not accessible to reductionist analysis. Only a sovereign consciousness sees that.

Furthermore—and this is an additional leap of cognition that Nagel finds almost numinous—the little equation pertains to a logical, cognizable universe. How is it that this universe happens to fit, like a glove, our cogitations and surmises? There are still undiscovered theorems out there, theorems beyond the Pythagorean, or beyond the calculus, which we haven’t yet dreamed of, waiting to be rendered intelligible by the grey jelly in our skulls. So mind and cosmos are a pair of strangely mutual astonishments. And in addressing them, Nagel believes that the teleological step is necessary: “The intelligibility of the universe is no accident,” he says. His book suggests that physical matter itself—the proton, the quark, the first stardust—has always been imbued with a purpose, which it seeks to fulfill. This though he’s an atheist.

All this makes me think of vitalism, a philosophy I remember from grade-school as a disgraced fallacy of past centuries. (French tadpoles were born spontaneously out of cold mud, or something like that—out of an elan vital.) Nagel doesn’t intend to be an obfuscator or a mystic. He is a dyed-in-the-wool atheist and takes pains to make that clear. He is very much on the side of science. But he feels that science has oversimplified two important mechanisms of nature: mind and evolution. The mind must be more than sparks and drips; and consciousness must have evolved by more than random accident.


Mind and Cosmos lays out a far-reaching, general campaign. He wants to defend not only consciousness against reductionism, as in previous work, but also to defend the higher mental structures of cognition and ethics. Those two mental faculties, too, somehow inhered originally in matter. He is dubious of the Darwinian account of evolution on two accounts: he doesn’t think three billion years has provided enough sheer time for mere random mutation to have lifted us to the height of complexity that characterizes life today; and, more importantly, he sees unbridgeable gaps in the Darwinian story, especially at the point where the machine of self-replicating carbon-based matter is supposed to have flared up into full-blown consciousness. The Darwinians’ theory, at that point, lacks any sort of “pineal gland” of the kind Descartes resorted to, to be an interface between spiritual stuff and material stuff. Nagel thinks one must go beyond the Darwinian story to explain the appearance of “conscious organisms, and not merely behaviorally complex organisms.”

This is not the most persuasive part of the book. He puts little faith in the notion that consciousness and cognition might have offered some survival advantage; or for that matter, that ethics, as they evolved, might have had survival value. He rather undervalues the notion that an animal with insight stands a better chance of surviving to reproduce, or that a species which has evolved a social or moral contract among its confreres, similarly, might get luckier. I wish he could come out and spend a day or two at my house to watch the small society that, this spring, is developing among a few new hens that peck in the hedgerows alongside two basking housecats and a dog. The cats are less than a year old and had never met a chicken, and they are psychopathic, calm, cold-hearted hunters. The dog is a herder and an alarmist. A number of protocols have evolved among the three species—the cats’ repression of their (obviously intoxicating) urge to hunt and harry, the cats’ and the other chickens’ obedience to the protective displays of the dominant Barred Plymouth Rock hen, as well as, too, the cats’ affectionate coexistence with the hens, whom they seem to admire somewhat—as all species together dally in the shade, edenically, but keeping an eye on one another. The silly chickens even follow the cats around sometimes, obeying an instinct to be herded. And the dog: his constabulary supervision of the whole scene; his interventions, when a cat forgets his manners and starts stalking a hen; his occasional spurt of playful pursuit. Meanwhile, all afternoon, overhead in the tree branches, perch species of birds who are less domesticated, less socialized according to Homo sapiens’ semiotic and cultural standards. The young male robins and finches and grosbeaks are singing for various well-known practical, seasonal reasons right now, and each is developing his own repertoire of calls and songs, while at the same time learning to imitate and reproduce, roughly, a few of the songs of his neighbor. This is an observation of field ethologists, who up and down the Sierra sit for days in their blinds with their clipboards: at the borders of their territories, wild male songbirds share songs. Ornithologists suppose it could be a form of sociability, conveying sociability’s mixed message of threat and appeal. The upshot is—and here’s the point—those males who learn more of their neighbors’ songs live longer and have more offspring.

That distinction Nagel seems to make so easily—between the “conscious” organism and the “merely behaviorally complex” organism—has been on my mind for days; it’s fascinating; I have to confess I can’t quite iron it neatly flat. He underestimates the feel-good familiarity of culture, and how our consciousness takes shape in the semiotic basket woven around us by our mothers’ voices, among echoing voices of great-great-great-grandparents. He doesn’t allow for how consciousness is an essentially gregarious phenomenon, not an individual’s achievement but a congregant and linguistic phenomenon, whether it’s kindled in a single infant in the family or convivially in the whole race over five million years, within the vast ancient murmurous library of grammatical tongues. Unable to be a gradualist, he insists that consciousness had to appear in a sudden leap, because consciousness feels like such a whole different category of being. And morality, too, according to Nagel, pre-existed us as a kind of Platonic form, into which we are gradually growing, as we discover morality the way we discovered the Pythagorean theorem. No moral relativist, Nagel believes that certain deeds would be wrong whether humans thought so or not, and this structure of morality must have existed independently before conscious minds started musing over it. At the original point where life (self-replicating DNA) is supposed to have arisen from chemicals, he is unsatisfied with neo-Darwinists’ sleight of hand in explaining the Promethean leap, up to cognition and ethics. Something distinctly vitalist happened there, for Nagel. But he can’t specify what. He just knows he distrusts the incompleteness of science’s explanation.


The book’s wider questions—its awe-inspiring questions—turn outward to address the uncanny cognizability of the universe around us. By what vast coincidence does an intelligible logos originate both in our minds and in the cosmos? “Mind,” says Nagel, “is doubly related to the natural order. Nature is such as to give rise to conscious beings with minds; and it is such as to be comprehensible to such beings.” His contention is that these happy correspondences are “fundamental features of the universe, not byproducts of contingent developments.” He calls it a natural teleology—or teleology without intention, as a way of stipulating that God has not designed any of this. “Mind and everything that goes with it is inherent in the universe,” he says. “The intelligibility of the world… is itself part of the explanation of why things are as they are.”

That Mind is inherent in the original universe sounds like an outlier’s view, but he isn’t alone. Not only Thomas Nagel but a considerable small meme of contemporary philosophers and scientists are resorting to teleology, partly as a way of keeping a mythical God out of what seems a weirdly well-designed creation, or just an evidently unnecessary, unwished-for, gratuitous creation. Cosmologists lately (especially since the newest radio-telescopy’s confirmations of the Big Bang’s specific characteristics) have been going back to the idea that the reason this universe exists is that we are here observing it. This is the “anthropic” cosmology, a word proposed in the Fifties by astrophysicist Brandon Carter. The most common version of anthropic cosmology takes the following form:

Among the potential billions of ill-mixed universes that may have been launched over infinite time, most happened to lack the ingredients for the evolution of life. Those universes were duds. This one wasn’t a dud because it has us here to observe it.

Such a formula loads Mind into the front-end of the equation. Nagel, in an aside, dismisses all anthropic cosmology as “a cop-out.” Carter and John Wheeler and a number of other anthropic theorists have opened themselves to accusations of Berkeleyanism: their theories seem to suggest that that Bishop Berkeley’s esse est percipi (“to exist” is “to be perceived”) applies not only at the microscopic level of the quantum (where the observer is necessary to the subatomic event) but also in the expanses of the “quantum event” that was the Big Bang. Here on our planet in the lukewarm middle of the old Big Bang, we observers are indispensable dramatis personae, basking as we do in radiation that continues to reach us at light-speed from that original, ancient pop.


The old sublime campfire question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?,” will always excite the shiver that is the beginning of all philosophizing, because the universe’s default condition should be nothingness. Nothingness is the easier ontological alternative. Infinite eternal nothingness would have the advantage of simplicity, obeying the Least-Work law of physics. It seems clear, however, that things do exist, and the new teleologists’ non-theistic suggestion is: the universe, by existing rather than not existing, has obeyed an a priori, ineluctable requirement of being sufficient, being somehow more fit than a non-existent universe would be, or more entirely inevitable particularly in being cognizable. (Sounds a little like St. Anselm’s old ontological proof of God’s existence, but reheated, as a warrant for anything’s existence.)

This picture of a self-purposed universe blossoming in empty time-space makes me think of a Klein bottle, one of those fanciful geometric objects like a Möbius strip illustrating a topological paradox. A Klein bottle’s neck stretches out and swings around and gropes behind to reenter itself, pass through its own belly, and open its mouth onto its own outer wall: so its outside surface is continuous with its inside surface, paradoxically. As a picture, it seems to embody the philosophers’ teleological universe, whose final goal, Mind, is an end that always abided in its beginning. Like a Klein bottle, the floating, self-decreeing universe’s head is thrust up its posterior, an image to mimic the satiric caricature of all of us deep thinkers, us philosophes, who make so much of Mind. Mind, I have to admit, does seem to me numinous. Maybe it’s a weak-headedness of my own, but frankly, I’ve always been attracted to solipsism as an ontological doctrine, the utterly subjective, almost impolite position that I, alone in my forest clearing, am like Vishnu creator and preserver of the Universe. Solipsism has a terrific logical self-consistency, but it’s a very hard topic to discuss freely. (Just try broaching the topic with somebody. See what happens.)

Nagel may be a patient, steadfast atheist and empiricist, but nevertheless, he wants to avert the “mindless universe” that will result if science is to succeed in its goal of reducing everything to pure physicality. Physical reductionism has had such a complete triumph in the sciences, he admits—and is he being coy or is he just thinking out loud, forlornly?—that his notion of teleology “in the present intellectual climate…is unlikely to be taken seriously.” The problem is, having poked a hole in the Darwinist, physicalist tradition, he doesn’t propose any specific idea to fill in where he’s damaged.

I think he’s simply doing the old-fashioned Socratic work of gadfly, probing for gaps in what science thinks it knows. Gaps might open the way toward a fuller Weltbild and a new paradigm. “These teleological speculations,” he says, “are offered merely as possibilities, without positive conviction. What I am convinced of is the negative claim,” that is, the claim that our universe isn’t just a mindless machine that evolved via random chance. In Nagel’s diagram (or rather, gesture), there are three salient attributes of existence which are too wonderful to be explained away mechanistically—consciousness, cognition, and eternal moral law—and they must have been part of physical matter from the beginning. A renowned philosopher, relaxed in his authority and unashamed to display some decent puzzlement, he makes equivocal confessions like “I am not confident that this Aristotelian idea of teleology without intention makes sense, but I do not at the moment see why it doesn’t.” Well, good luck. To my own sensibilities, the whole project seems like a glance in the right direction. Nagel, in the company of a number of scientists and rationalist philosophers who can’t be comforted by religion, hopes to discover in these teleological gropings a door—a needle’s eye—that might lead to a universe where, absent the supernatural policing of a god, nevertheless sweet reason comes naturally, and so does justice.

Louis B. Jones


*


The “mind,” potent word! I stand by my opinion, argued in the pages of the Spring 2010 issue of Threepenny, that to a considerable degree the celebrated “mind-body problem” is a dispute about the English language. There is no exact equivalent for the term “mind” in French or German (the French esprit is usually better translated as “intelligence,” or alternatively as “spirit”), and we are told by the French brain-scientist J.-P. Changeux that French thinkers are nervous of the “mind-body” question, when phrased in this way. Gilbert Ryle, in The Concept of Mind (1949), insisted that the mind is not a place or receptacle, or a tool, or—really—a thing at all, but he did not quite succeed in laying the Cartesian “ghost in the machine.”

By contrast, the cherished “mind-body” topic makes its appearance in the very first sentence of the philosopher Thomas Nagel’s new book; and his thesis is that “materialism” is simply not equipped to take the full measure of “mind.” To suggest that so hugely significant a phenomenon as life and the mind can be explained, as Darwinians claim, by mere accident—the exploitation of random genetic mutations by natural selection—strikes him as an absurdity. Of course, we have heard this cavil often before, but what Nagel goes on to say is calculated to make us sit up in wonderment. He declares that, though he is personally an atheist, we may have to accept that there is “meaning” and “purpose” in the universe. Teleology may, he suggests, exist without consciousness.

All this, perhaps perversely, has set my thoughts running upon that ill-reputed and incorrigible fellow, the “materialist.” The truth is, we shall not arrive at an understanding of materialism by studying its theories of matter. It is not a scientific doctrine, but rather a polemical and philosophical—you might almost say humanistic—affair, essentially negative in character. It regards it as essential to deny (what religion would claim and was once a great obstacle to scientific progress) that the world is inhabited by invisible and immaterial entities: God, angels, spirits, and souls. Samuel Johnson’s five-word definition of a materialist in his Dictionary, “A denier of spiritual substances,” hits it off very accurately. There lay materialism’s first task. Later, in the nineteenth century, it attacked a different question, the problem of personal identity, one which involved the relationship of the “mind” to the brain.

The article on “Materialism” in the Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought defines it as “The theory that everything that really exists is material in nature, by which is meant at least that it occupies some volume of space at any time and, usually, that it continues in existence for some period of time and is either accessible to perception by sight and touch, or is analogous in its causal properties to what is accessible.” The long article in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy speaks in broadly similar terms. But it mentions that Frege and Popper differentiate between three kinds of things, or “realms.” The first consists of material things; the second of psychological things, like thoughts, feelings, pains, and desires, “including the substantive minds that have these, if there are any”; and the third contains abstract things, like numbers, properties, classes, truths (and perhaps falsehoods), and values. In modern times, it tells us, philosophers have tended to direct their fire primarily against believers in the second realm.

This is nicely put, but there seems all the same to be something seriously wrong with it—indeed, with both those definitions. For they lead to a quite unnecessary confusion, not about the word “matter” but about the word “exists.” Presumably the objection to belief in Frege and Popper’s “second realm,” the psychological one, has been on the grounds that thoughts, feelings, pains, and desires are not material. Nor, of course, are they (though the living beings who have them are thoroughly material). Nevertheless thoughts, feelings, pains, and desires are the main substance and the most familiar feature of human life, and it would seem absurd, it would be positively weird, to deny that they are real. Many things are indisputably real, of which it does not make sense to say that they exist. David Hume goes so far as to state as an axiom that an object may exist and yet be nowhere, and says—rightly, I would think—that “the greatest part of beings do and must exist after this manner.” Language quietly acknowledges the situation and prescribes that, instead of saying that such intangible objects “exist,” we should speak of having thoughts and experiencing or suffering pains and desires. But at all events they are the distinctive features of the human. What would help, one cannot help feeling—and it might clear matters up wonderfully—is if one were to turn things round and reduce the Frege/Popper doctrine to a mere definition. It would then run, “When saying that something ‘exists,’ we shall mean that it has dimensions, occupies some volume of space, etc.” This would be a reminder of the vast and obvious difference between saying that something exists and saying that it is real.

It is a mistake, though a common one, to call Lucretius, the author of the great atheistic poem De Rerum Natura, a materialist, for the term had not been invented in his day. We could call him a “corporealist,” but so was everyone in his time. Neither he nor most people in his day had any notion of the incorporeal. It would bewilder St. Augustine even some centuries later when his mentor St. Ambrose said that, when God or the soul were being thought of, “our thoughts should dwell on no corporeal reality whatsoever.” It would be many years before Augustine could make sense of this.

Materialism came into the world with Descartes, or rather with the profound hostility to Descartes and his “dualism” on the part of the great Thomas Hobbes. (One will better understand the powerful attraction of Cartesian dualism if one phrases it, not as the “mind-body problem,” but as the “soul-body problem”—for Descartes represented his soul as being his ego, his personal identity, and supposed this identity might even survive the death of the body.) Human beings, out of fear, so Hobbes argued—and this would become a basic materialist doctrine—imagine the world to be peopled by “invisible agents,” supposing them to be “real, and external Substances, not realising that they are merely creatures of the Fancy, like dreams and looking-glass reflections.”

In France there had for long been a freethinking tradition, and numerous clandestine writings had been in circulation in manuscript, some the work of hard-up garret-dwellers, others coming from the pen of highly respectable members of the royal academies. It was the consensus among them that only the material exists, the “soul” being a superfluous hypothesis. Matter had existed from all eternity and was, or might be, self-moving, and it had a capacity for feeling and thought. In 1747 there was actually published, though in Holland, a work by the French physician Julien de la Mettrie entitled L’Homme machine (Man a machine), mockingly putting down man’s pretension to superiority over animals. La Mettrie was or had been an admirer of Descartes, whose greatness it had been, he said, to realize that animals were automata—his only error being not to have seen that the same was true of humans. The book, to La Mettrie’s joy, created a considerable scandal, making it necessary for him to take refuge in Germany.

Whether one goes along with the materialists or not, it has to be admitted that they and their slogans make a colorful impression. Jean de Cabanis (1757–1808) theorized that the brain was an organ specifically designed to produce thought in the same way as the stomach and intestines produced digestion. Jakob Moleschott, a Dutch-Italian botanist and physiologist, coined a number of much-quoted dicta: “The brain secretes thoughts as the liver does bile”; “No thought without phosphorous”; and so on. Louis Büchner’s Force and Matter (1855) won him great fame (only eclipsed by the appearance of Darwin’s The Origin of Species four years later), though his book lost him his university post and prompted its reviewer in the Frankfurter Katholische Kirchenblatt to say that the proper place for authors of books of this kind was prison. Materialists, on occasion, were of great service to the progress of science. They were so in the “vitalist” controversy of the early nineteenth century, throwing their weight with great enthusiasm against the vitalists, who held that life was governed by different biochemical laws from organic matter, being sustained by a “vital force” of unknown, perhaps supernatural origin. Vitalism was finally demolished by the great Claude Bernard (1813–78), and it was he (though he did not publicly describe himself as a materialist) who saw the importance of settling the status of the brain, as “unquestionably the organ of intelligence, as the heart is of the circulation and the larynx is of the voice.” Though on the other hand, he wrote, as everyone would agree, “nothing whatever is known at present about the nature of the relation of the brain to thought.” Materialism continues to center itself upon the brain, sometimes showing a (grammatically puzzling) tendency to say that thoughts and feelings are the brain. Francis Crick, of double helix fame, writes provokingly in his The Astonishing Hypothesis of

the astonishing hypothesis that you, your joys and sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will are, in fact, no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.

I have given this hasty little sketch of materialism to bring out the contrast with Thomas Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos. Nagel maintains that we are called on to rethink the concept of “mind” in the widest possible terms, ones involving the whole universe. “The mind-body problem…invades our understanding of the entire cosmos and its history,” he says. If consciousness and perception and reason have a natural explanation, the possibilities must have been inherent in the universe long before there was life, “indeed have existed from the beginnings of time.”

Well, no doubt possibilities are, or begin life by being, endless. But what we are looking for from Nagel is probabilities, and he cannot be said to have provided any. For, with all respect to him (and he can be an original and cogent writer), his argument in regard to the “universe” and the “cosmos” strikes one as fatally unspecific, indeed almost impalpable. His language about the universe is bizarre. He speaks (as we saw) of “our understanding of the entire cosmos and its history”; but, apart from the very latest millennium or two, the universe has no history. The dinosaurs, the drifting of the continents, and the Big Bang are not links in a historical chain; they are, and very properly, called prehistoric. And Nagel’s phrase “a long historical period in the distant past” sins in much the same manner. A place must be found, he says, for consciousness, perception, beliefs, etc. in “any complete conception of the universe”—but who has that? At one point he recklessly asserts that “we are composed of the same elements as the rest of the universe.” It is something one wouldn’t want to bet on.

As for the “mind,” which Nagel holds could not have been brought into being merely by Darwinian natural selection, it has played a magnificent part in English poetry: in Marvell, Keats, Wordsworth, Gerard Manley Hopkins, and so on. But it is not at home in philosophy. The “mind-body problem,” a sort of Indian rope-trick, is a toy which has been teasing and entertaining philosophers for too long.

P. N. Furbank
 

Eric Raymond - a hilarious, heartbreaking, painfully smart satire that guides you through the high dollar swamps of modern industry

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 Eric Raymond, Confessions from a Dark Wood, Sator Press, 2012.



blog.ericraymond.com/

www.tumblr.com/tagged/eric-raymond

Ken here. I don't often laugh, cry, and spit food on my computer screen simultaneously, but this book made that happen. You'll meet Nick, a hapless pawn in the world of global capital brand management consulting. And his girlfriend Sadie Parish, the first domestic suicide bomber. And his boss, emperor of bullshit, Pontius J. LaBar. And PJ's dreaded orangutan. It's a hilarious, heartbreaking, painfully smart satire that guides you through the high dollar swamps of modern industry.


1. The book begins with a section of “Advance Praise.” Among the quoted, all characters from the story about to unfold, is the deceased father of the author (or co-author, we are told), who gives what is perhaps the first indication that the world you have entered is not only darkly satirical, but propelled forward by something urgent and deeply felt. We may not yet recognize this as the complicated love between father and son, but we catch a glimpse of it and it startles:
Oh, so you finally have a book. You must be so proud. Congratulations, son. You know, in the afterlife, books are our toilet paper. I’m saying we literally wipe our asses with books. Go figure.”
2. There is little sentimentality here. We meet Nick Bray at his father’s memorial service, which he likens to a church tag sale. He describes what has been left out of the haphazard displays of the artifacts of his father’s life. An empty table, he tells us, “might have stood for all that was omitted from a memorial, i.e. a few decades of filching undergraduate panties, a pyramid of Miller Lite cans, a tape loop of doors slamming around our house, and the amputated legs below the knee, which had shuffled off this mortal coil six years ahead of my father.”
3. At this memorial, a stranger approaches Nick with a potentially lucrative, albeit mysterious job offer, which he dismisses.
4. Back home, after he is fired from his job at an internet porn company where he writes promotional copy, he is forced to assess his situation. He is aimless. He dresses poorly (consider the white Cuban shirt and slip-on shoes he wears to the funeral). He is broke. He reconsiders.
5. One of Nick’s new coworkers is an orangutan. I am not speaking in metaphor. “Shelby” is an advisor to Pontius J. LaBar, CEO, LaBar Partners Limited. He has his own office, of course.
6. Full disclosure: I consider Eric Raymond a friend and fellow traveler although we know each other almost exclusively through twitter. I had coffee with him once at Four Barrel on Valencia. There was a taxidermied moose head that was later stolen. It was nice: the coffee, the moose head. In this book, there is an unflattering portrayal of a Korean adoptee. I am trying not to hold it against him.
7. I am a Korean adoptee.
8. Friend or no, unflattering representations or no, it is difficult not to be drawn into this bizarre world, to be seduced, as Nick himself is, into a surreal landscape of glittering surfaces.
9. After the limousine rides and the custom-made suits; after the commissioned “superfixie,” the apartment overlooking the city, the DuMol Viogner, Nick is well on his way to his new life of airports and minibars in highrise hotels. Expect jargon-laden client meetings and self-annointed brand experts. Expect furious email messages at all hours of the night from the buffoon Pontius. Paranoia. Buffoonery.
10. What do you do when you open the door to the airplane lavatory only to find your dead father waiting for you? If you are Nick Bray, you ask him for advice and then watch as he flushes himself down the toilet.
11. Did I mention that Nick meets a girl? In the waiting room of the porn company from which he is unceremoniously escorted by security, Nick meets a girl, Sadie, whose life ambition is to be the country’s first domestic suicide bomber.
12. If every story is, in fact, a love story, what is it that Nick loves? He loves poetry. And Sadie. He loves his father.
13. And he loves San Francisco: “Praise Indian Summer in San Francisco. Praise bare bodies in Dolores Park, praise the marijuana truffle man winding through the crowd. Praise the bums debating bum politics on the overlook up on 21st. Praise guys cruising on the high lip with the J-Church snakes up the hill…
Being in San Francisco again was like being amongst a crowd divinely pardoned back into the Garden of Eden.
14. Nick develops a love for poetry. He reads as he travels. He meets one of the poets he has read, Jake Hawkins, working the x-ray machine at airport security. He expresses his surprise to find him here.
He tells him: “I have your book – the new one – in my bag.” And asks: “What are you doing here?”
“I work,” Jake tells him. “You are aware it is a book of poetry?”
The moment is funny it that we locate ourselves on the dreadful security line, the improbability of the encounter, of a poet – even a Yale award winner – being recognized as a kind of celebrity.
15. Nick is, of course, aware that it is a book of poetry and it is moments like these – fleeting moments of connection that offer glimpses of Nick’s interior life – that propel the reader forward in an unforgiving book that might otherwise run cold.
16. We don’t ever hear Jake’s poems, or read them. We see Nick attend a reading at a club. He does refer to one poem called “Ode to a Baggage Handler.” I like to imagine it a villanelle.
17. On Sadie: “Sadie and I played a game in the park. We picked people from the crowd and imagined what they would look like when they got old. She projected the subtle slump of a shoulder into the octogenarian’s humped osteoporosis. I predicted how far the chins would recede, the overbite yellow, the eyelids fall.
Who would have the liver spots among the tattoos gone blue?
“Not me,” Sadie would say and wink.
All the thoughts unasked. Did you own horses? Who were your friends? What role did you perform in your high school play? Do you look like your mom or your dad? Did your hamster die when you were six? Who was your first kiss, your first fuck? What did your room look like? Did you lie on your brother’s blue sleeping bag and stare up at Colorado star fields? Did you pretend to be a cowboy, or did you favor the Indian side?
Some you could guess at. But all of these questions of her past were off limits.”
18. On a business trip to Las Vegas, Nick expects to again encounter his ghost father and he is not disappointed: “My father, despite his career as a tight-fisted literature professor, also had a small-stakes passion for gambling. When I was 21, he took me to Las Vegas for my birthday, a trip which had long been promised since the age of about nine.”
19. His father accompanies him to the roulette wheel, coaches him. “I didn’t make a noise when I won, but even in my stunned silence, passersby began to take notice of the mounting chips and the demonic accuracy of the last chip I placed on the table.”
20. “They love you, the universe loves you,” my father said. “People know your name and you’re leading them to easy money.” He keeps betting as his father instructs. He keeps winning. And his father, angry ghost, is just getting warmed up.
21. Nick steps away from the table, knowing that it’s just a matter of time before he is approached by security. Seeing this moment of vulnerability, his father attacks. He calls him a “quitter,” and shouts at him. Nick walks away from the table, leaving his winnings behind.
22. Later, a celebrity client showers Nick with praise and the moment takes on the weight of the approval earlier withheld. Shaun D. Braun, football star and fashion mogul, says to Nick: “You my boy.”
“My boy. A line from a story my father used to teach ran through me head. That’s the best position they is. I sat in on his classes at times, the days when I entertained the life for myself, the precocious professor’s son slouching in the back row, getting the gospel that it mattered. I could see him behind his own podium, his glasses flashing, the chalk dust on his blazer. Grammar undone in the line drive of the bullet. That’s the best position they is.”
23. No spoilers, but: You can’t go home again. No spoilers, but: In a quietly devastating exchange, Pontius delivers a truth to Nick that only the damned can know. Nick, when he receives it, knows it too.
24. This book is circus and spectacle. This book is haunted by bad bosses and tragic love affairs. This book is watched over by lost fathers. This book says many things, but at the points at which I most loved this book, it was saying this: We move around in the world as collections of all that we have experienced, all we have known. We are connected by invisible threads to all those we have loved, who have loved us. We go after things we think we want, or we don’t. We act on the wounds we have sustained whether or not we acknowledge them. Whether or not we can identify the places from which we are bleeding.
There is no fate. There is no destiny. There is only our choices and their consequences.
25. In the end, there is a very literal end. The curtain falls on circus and spectacle. The plane lands. The taxicabs are summoned.
There is also a beginning. And the author meets himself, another version of himself.
Just as I think we all meet other versions of ourselves when we travel through the books we love best. -
Mary-Kim Arnold

The Write Stuff: Eric Raymond on the Intersection of the Necessary and the Mystery
eric_raymond.jpg
Pontius J. LaBar
The Write Stuff is a series of interview profiles conducted by Litseen, where authors give exclusive readings from their work.
Eric Raymond is a working writer in San Francisco. His novel Confessions from a Dark Wood is now available from Sator Press, and he may be reached on Twitter @pontiuslabar.
When people ask what do you do, you tell them...?
These days I tell people I'm a writer. From there we fall through the tree branches of the usual follow-up questions until the conversation is unconscious on the ground.
What's your biggest struggle -- work or otherwise?
Maintaining faith that the sustained attention required for writing and reading has value within a society that consistently declares it does not. Sometimes I am afraid they are right.
If someone said I want to do what you do, what advice would you have for them?
I would probably assure them they do not. But if they're determined: Avoid debt at all costs. Keep your overhead low. Read widely and constantly. I did none of these things and it's made everything harder.
Do you consider yourself successful? Why?
Insofar that I am able to keep despair at bay and maintain faith, yes. Hard to know about the rest.
When you're sad/grumpy/pissed off, what YouTube video makes you feel better?
Most recently, this Kilian Martin freestyle video in an abandoned water park:
Do you have a favorite ancestor? What is his/her story?
My father's father, Robert "Bob" Raymond has always interested me, because of his indelible marks on my father. My father's attempts to write about him suggest he could be a real bastard, and yet I'm also named after him (my legal first name is Robert, though I go by Eric). He moved the family around a lot, and when my father was 16, his dad was killed by a train. The story goes that he pulled his car into a malfunctioning railway crossing, but there was always a suspicion that he may have committed suicide. I feel like a lot of Bob Raymond may be in me.
Who did you admire when you were 10 years old? What did you want to be?
I admired those kids who knew how to answer the question "What do you want to be when you grow up?" I remember lying every single time I was asked.
Would you ever perform a striptease? Describe some of your moves. Feel free to set the mood.
It is 1 a.m., and we're gorging ourselves in a fried chicken/donut joint somewhere beyond the reach of the health department. It is lit by fluorescent light. We are ruinously drunk; we have foregone napkins for sleeves. Do you honestly want me to take my clothes off?
How much money do you have in your checking account?
It doesn't really matter how much is in there at any given time, because I owe 99 percent of it to someone else.
What's wrong with society today?
Increasing income disparity within an economy which rewards people who create nothing.
What is your fondest memory?
One of them, anyway: I surprised my father on his birthday in 2005 by flying to Florida unannounced and dropping in on the regular Friday night poker game we used to play together before I moved to San Francisco.
What would you like to see happen in your lifetime?
A cure for diabetes. The death of advertising. These may be related.
What is art? Is it necessary? Why?
I know it's necessary, but I don't know if I can define it. Maybe art is the intersection of the necessary and the mystery.
When you have sex, what are some of the things you like to do?
Anticipate heavily.
What are you working on right now?
It's NaNoWriMo right now, so I'm built for speed. I'm ripping off Michael Kimball's episodic style in his incredible novel Big Ray to write a vaguely futuristic Bay Area novel. I'm way behind, but I'll rally.
What kind of work would you like to do? Or what kind of writing do you most admire?
Every time I write I'm in search of the work I would like to do. I have a hard time finding it. I admire unapologetic, voice-driven writing that doesn't sound like it was written by a committee of "the vaguely dissatisfied in Connecticut." (Snark courtesy of Dennis Lehane.)
If there were one thing about the Bay Area that you would change, what would it be?
I would like to see the Upper Haight evolve away from self-parody and nostalgic stoner theme park. If the Lower Haight can figure it out, surely west of Divisadero can.
What's the strangest thing you've ever seen?
The first time I saw my dad's casted legs after his amputations.
What are some of your favorite smells?
Orange blossoms through a car window. Night blooming jasmine anytime. Woodsmoke from a distance. Creosote in rail ties.
If you got an all expenses paid life experience of your choice, what would it be?
Probably a year completely unplugged. That's really expensive now.






Hilda Hilst - If Lispector's psychotic heroines careen towards Mars, Hilst's Madame D, in her flight from the body's 'unparalleled glimmer,' implodes. Her god is too small, too obscene to halt her descent into Hell

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Hilda Hilst, The Obscene Madame DTrans by
Nathanaël and Rachel Gontijo Araujo, Nightboat Books, 2012.


THE OBSCENE MADAME D is the first work by acclaimed Brazilian author Hilda Hilst to be published in English. Radically irreverent and formally impious, this novel portrays an unyielding radical intelligence, a sixty-year-old woman who decides to live in the recess under the stairs. In her diminutive space, Madame D—for dereliction—relives the perplexity of her recently deceased lover who cannot comprehend her rejection of common sense, sex, and a simple life, in favor of metaphysical speculations that he supposes to be delusional and vain.

"If Lispector's psychotic heroines careen towards Mars, Hilst's Madame D, in her flight from the body's 'unparalleled glimmer,' implodes. Her god is too small, too obscene to halt her descent into Hell. This brief, lyrical and scalding account of a mind unhinged recalls the passionate urgency of Artaud and de Sade's waking dreams in which sex and death are forever conjoined and love's 'vivid time' irretrievably lost."—Rikki Ducornet

"Like her friend and admirer Clarice Lispector, Hilda Hilst was a passionate explorer of the sacred and the profane, the pure and the obscene, and shows, in this discomfiting, hypnotic work, just how rarely those categories are what they seem. The translation is excellent—what a rare relief."—Benjamin Moser

Dispatch from Brazil #1: Hilda Hilst Wrote Porn for Children


First up:  The brilliant Hilda Hilst’s The Pink Notebook of Lori Lamby, a work once classified by its author as a “banana” instead of a “book.”  Hilst, according to this interview, thought of the novel as “porn for children.”  Lori Lamby, the 8-year-old narrator whose surname plays off the Portuguese word for lick (lamber), is the decidedly monstrous lovechild of Lolita and Humbert Humbert who writes in diary format about her sexual conquests/exploitation.  The artwork, provided by Millór Fernandez in the style of storybooks, alone suggests Lori’s insatiable appetite and unsentimental education:
Here’s a rough translation I’ve penned to give an idea of how Lori Lamby slides in and out of art, language, pedophilia, and prostitution in a comically (!) libertine fashion:
I’m eight years old.  I’m going to tell everything the way I know it because Mommy and Daddy told me to tell it the way I know it.  Now I have to talk about the young man who came here and Mommy told me now that he’s not so young, and so I lay in my little bed so pretty, all rose-colored.  And Mommy could only buy this bed after I started doing what I’m going to talk about.  I lay down with my doll and the man who is not so young asked me to take off my underwear.  I took it off.  Then he asked me to open my legs and I lay down and I did it.  Then he started to touch my thigh that is really soft and fat, and asked me to open my little legs.  I really like it when people put their hands on my thigh.  Then the man asked me to be quiet as a mouse, he was going to kiss me on my little thing.  He started to lick me the way a cat licks, really slow, and squeezed my bumbum nice.  I stayed really quiet because it’s delicious and I wanted him to keep licking the whole time, but he took out his big thing, the piupiu, and the piupiu was very big, the size of a corn ear.  Mommy said it couldn’t be that big, but she didn’t see it, and who knows if daddy’s piupiu is smaller, the size of a smaller ear, maybe a ear of green corn.
Lori’s father is a writer who, like Hilst in her lifetime, feels marginalized by his lack of commercial success in the face of so much humdrum popular fiction.  Lori herself reflects on this:
I don’t know why stories for kids don’t show the prince licking the girl and putting his finger inside our beautiful little butthole.  I mean, the girl’s.  Daddy could write these beautiful stories for kids with all this, so I went to talk to him but it didn’t work out because he and mommy had fought.  So it went like this:
“Daddy, since you want to make money off the filthy rat Lalau…”
“Don’t talk that way, child.”
“But you’re the one who talks like that, Daddy.”
As Lori’s notebook progresses, her naughty vocabulary expands in defiance of her father’s claim that “a book is not born like a child, it’s all a construction, pyramids etc., and the result of sweat and pain etc.”  She confuses “refined lingua” with the physical referent of the same word (tongue), wondering if a skillful lick is the same thing as a skillfully written sentence.
By conflating words and bodies as the easy commodities they both become, and letting this conflation linger in our open mouths, Hilst takes the sort of debasement traditionally engaged by male writers (Lawrence and Bataille are mentioned) to its (il)logical and self-consuming conclusion.  Rather than trot out a feminist critique that confers on the writer and reader a path to moral high ground, Hilst’s prepubescent erotica shatters all roles.  Even the narrative, exhausted by its shock appeal, tries to undo itself and escape its protagonist’s sex/money-hungry depravity.  Lori Lamby ends with fairy tales written by Lori in what amounts to a potatoesque collapse of genre and gender norms, not to mention the ethical distinctions that the latter invite.  I ended up feeling naked by the end of this uncompromisingly compromised book, having been thoroughly cast as its consumer–or both its predator and prey.

Graffiti of the Pig Boy: Pichação and Hilda Hilst’s The Obscene Madame D

Before embarking on her pornographic trilogy (whose first book I’ve written about as “porn for children”), Hilda Hilst had to meet her calling.   She had to profane the sacred, tearing God out of a birdshit-ridden sky.  The result was The Obscene Madame Dher first work to appear in English via a unique partnership between Nightboat and the Rio-based A Bolha, and co-translators Nathanaël and Rachel Gontijo Araújo.
“What is obscene?” Hilst once asked in an interview.  “To this day nobody knows what’s obscene.  Obscenity, to me, is poverty, hunger, cruelty.  Our era is obscene.”  Hilst’s pronouncement finds resonance in the very mega city where she lived before secluding herself with nearly 100 dogs in a rural refuge known as Casa do Sol.  São Paulo, a city where wealth and destitution brutally clash, happens to be the birthplace of pichação—a practice of class warfare in which young, poor Brazilians scale and spray-paint the facades of monuments, chic high-rises, and government buildings.  As an NY Times article points out, pichação can be fatal.  While defacing structures, gang members not only risk falling to their deaths from dizzying heights but are prone to brawls with rival groups who are also vying for prized buildings.  The drama of these stakes is, to say the least, notable.  The pichador, you might say, is ready to die for his art-crime, itself a visionary execution at once urgent and extravagant.  Because it smears that which is exalted—literally staining upward mobility with the threat of precarity—his weapon bleeds out societal extremes with its own brand of crude, black scarring.
“They compare us to barbarians, and there may be a little truth in that,” offers Rafael Guedes Augustaitiz with perhaps more insight than he realizes.  In fact, this coded writing ravaging the cityscape has ancient roots.  While practitioners of pichação seek toimitate the gothic typography of heavy metal albums, their occult source is the Viking runes of Scandinavia, which originally inspired the lettering of bands like AC/DC and Iron Maiden.  In an unleashing of forces that predate graffiti art, urbanization, and colonial Christianity, pichação creates mutant twins of Brazil’s famed Christ the Redeemer statue.  Its powers are spectral and indecipherable to the powers that be, suggesting as much the dream language of a people to come as that of barbarians, modern and primitive.
I want to argue that Hilst’s book is like pichação as the cry of a similarly expansive consciousness whose rupture, and daring, also invite strange powers.  For me, the narrative traffics in potent outpourings of madness, baseness, and the abbreviation in its title—dereliction.

It’s no coincidence that Hilst claimed to have suprarational abilities.  As documented in this awesome segment on TV, she heard ghosts speaking to her in recorded conversations and on the radio, even making out strings of Portuguese in American music. The Obscene Madame D centers on Hilst’s quasi-double, Hillé, as a hysterical widow whose speech blends with the words of her dead husband and father, her vicious neighbors, and a mysterious materialization of God—the Pig Boy.  While rendered into English as “Porcine Child,” I confess to preferring a straightforward translation, as well as the hyperkinetic lack of indentation found in the original text:
House of the Sow, that is what they call my home now, I am now the wife of that Porcine Child Builder of the World, I open the window chanting howls, I snarl expletives at the company at large, I roll my eyes in their orbits behind the mask, didn’t I tell you that I cut ovals out of the oakum and adjust them to my face?  That I draw in black eyebrows, eyes, white gaping mouths?  There are masks like groins pricked with yellow hairs (cardboard tubes, painted nails), there is a mask made of dung and soot, a mouth full of teeth, there is a disastered remainder of me, a sort of female-individual who is trying to understand the half-light, cruelty—black squares dotted with black—a female-someone who evolves overheard in the midst of people, stares at them, attaches to the aqueous of corneas, to the blasted splendor
Hillé, people find your way of looking more and more strange
what way?
you know very well
it’s that I don’t understand
what don’t you understand?
“I don’t understand the eye,” Hillé responds, then later recalls, “I saw the Porcine Child shiver with pleasure before the All, his limp little hands reverberated in the oily half-light, narrow fingers tendered as high as possible, in search of who?  His twin brother petrified, eyes blind, head dangling over his chest, the body a nacreous, pearled outgrowth.”
As in the disintegrating image on its cover, The Obscene Madame D barely identifies its speakers, invoking consciousness as a whirlwind of voices, body parts, shreds of experience.  As in the art of pichação, meanwhile, the book reaches “as high as possible” in order to confront its opposite:  God blinded and struck with fear, God embodied in the lowliest of species, a pig whose divine squalor rubs off when Hillé wears masks modeled after its characteristics.
Why drag holiness down into a pigsty?  In such descent, I sense a reconciliation of opposites that does not defuse energy but rather doubles it, reproduces it, breeding loving yet terrifying alliances.  This gesture repeats Genet’s identification of violence in a bud bursting forth.  If the indecency of society stems from division–that is, the exaltation of gods of various kinds way above the heathens below—this violence must be forced to fold in on itself.  A “nacreous, pearled outgrowth” of a body is thus born within and beyond Hillé/Hilst/Madame D, showing creation itself to be inconceivable in our world without some kind of obscene thrust.  Without the dirt of a pig, in other words, nothing new can bloom and float to the sun; the pig is the mother substance needed for remaking.
As the italicized ejaculation of the pig boy or his sow mother, the last line of The Obscene Madame D could easily be graffiti on a church wall:  “Deliver me, Lord, from imbeciles and cretins.”  It signals the desolation of the path Hillé forges toward a vision of impossible love, of supernatural commingling.  By drawing from the most basic, intense materials available to them, Hilst and the pichadores thus obey the imagination’s highest/lowest calling, completing total works that are only incomplete insofar as we haven’t yet learned how to live out their promises.  We don’t understand their eyes.


Hilda Hilst (1930-2004) was born in Jaú, a small town in the state of São Paulo, in 1930. A graduate of law from the University of São Paulo, she dedicated herself to literary creation from 1954 to her death. She is recognized as one of the most important and controversial names in Brazilian contemporary literature and received some of Brazil's most prestigious literary prizes.
Fragments

Chaste and sad walls
Prisoners of themselves
Like creatures who grow old
Without knowing the mouth
Of men and women.
Dark walls, and shy:
Silken scorpions
In the nook of the rock.
There are lovely heights
That damage when touched.
Like your own mouth, love,
When it touches me.

Xi Chuan intertwines the mountains and roads of Xinjiang with insects and mythical beasts, ghosts and sacred spirits with chess and a Sanskrit inscription

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Notes on the Mosquito: Selected Poems (New Directions Paperbook)


Xi Chuan, Notes on the Mosquito: Selected Poems, Trans. by Lucas Klein, New Directions, 2012.

 “In the crevices of history, mosquitoes are everywhere,” Xi Chuan writes. Notes on the Mosquito introduces English readers to one of the most revered poets of contemporary China. Gaining recognition as a post-Misty poet in the late ’80s, Xi Chuan was famous for his condensed, numinous lyricism, and for radiating classical Chinese influences as much as Western modernist traditions. After the crushing failure of Tiananmen Square and the death of two of his closest friends, he stopped writing for three years. He re-emerged transformed: he began writing meditative, expansive prose poems that dismantled the aestheticism and musicality of his previous self. Divided into two sections that hinge around this formal break, Notes on the Mosquito offers the greatest hits of a deeply engaging poet, whose work intertwines the mountains and roads of Xinjiang with insects and mythical beasts, ghosts and sacred spirits with chess and a Sanskrit inscription.

“In 1988, when he was twenty-five, Xi Chuan and some friends launched an unofficial literary journal, Tendency. At the time, he was translating Ezra Pound and Tomas Tranströmer, Czeslaw Milosz and Jorge Luis Borges, and his own writing suggests a corresponding sophistication and aesthetic range.” - Robert Hass

“Xi Chuan is one of the most influential poets in contemporary China.” Poetry International Web


“Xi Chuan's surprising poems reach into tight corners of mind and matter, impersonal but intimate, new to be heard but also oddly familiar. An impressive voice — bold and calm.”— Gary Snyder 

Xi Chuan has been famous in China (and not just in China) since the 1980s. Until this year, however, there have been no book-length English translations of his poetry. So reading this new career survey from New Directions and translator Lucas Klein, Notes on the Mosquito: Selected Poems, feels like discovering a strange and exhilarating new region of world poetry. Some notes on what one finds there:
At the start, a tight and concise lyric poetry evoking cityscapes, railroad bridges, mountains, cypresses, and wind. One gets the sense that these cities are real -- Xi Chuan has lived most of his life in Beijing and is nothing if not a Beijing poet -- but at the same time dream cities. He began publishing his poems in the late '80s; his early poems follow the “Obscure” (menglong) poets in their registering of psychological states and social criticisms through stark but mysterious images. The Obscure group -- Bei Dao, Duo Duo, Gu Cheng, Yang Lian, and their comrades -- was the most vital force in Chinese poetry when Xi Chuan began publishing, and it’s natural that their work would influence his. But from the start his style isn’t quite theirs. It’s less emotive, and more oblique in its protest against the Communist Party bureaucracy.
Wind moves in and out of these poems, through windows in a concrete high-rise in Beijing, or through the forest, or through the poet’s mind.
Before the rise of wind the woods were still
before the rise of wind sunlight and cloudiness
could be ignored for having
no raision d’etre
before the rise of wind a man walking through the woods
was a man without memory
a recluse
before the rise of wind it couldn’t be said
whether winter wind
or summer wind was harsher
In 1989, Xi Chuan participated in the student protests at Tiananmen Square. After the state repression, the exile of the Obscure poets, and the deaths of two close friends (also poets) from Beijing University, he wrote almost nothing for two years. In 1992, his magazine Tendency (Qingxiang) was shut down.  He eventually returned to regular writing, but with a radically different vision. While not abandoning lyrical poetry, he began writing sharp prose poem sequences that use earthy, sometimes caustic, language to explore and question Chinese history, literature, and society. Some of the best pieces in Notes on the Mosquito (including the title poem) are these prose poems or poetic essays. The recent “Senses of Reality” and “Thirty Historical Reflections” suites are at once wonder-filled and bleakly funny: they cover everything from wild boars to a Sanskrit-inscribed brick found in an antique shop to the behavior of ghosts during the Six Dynasties:
In the Six Dynasties, ghosts were educated, and could discuss The Five Classics with humans and debate atheists about the existence of ghosts.

In the Six Dynasties, men had successful romances, but the successes were due to ghosts: female ghosts would host banquets in the grave, and what man wouldn’t make an appearance?

In the Six Dynasties, swans were kindhearted, and would pursue a person for five or six miles, just to give back a shoe.
In the Six Dynasties, the tigers were the contrarians, waiting for men to take a piss outdoors so they could bite off their dicks.
Xi Chuan has translated Borges and even written a poem about him, but these prose poems bring to mind another great Argentine: Julio Cortazar in quizzical sketches like Cronopios and Famas.
His poems also bring to mind the Western modernists: urban surrealism, clear images expressed in laconic language, black humor, and dialogues with the dead. But one also thinks of the classical Chinese poets: atmospheres and experiences captured in a few words, a slight shift in mood (a change in the weather, the sight of an inscription on a tree) evoking entire worlds:
An old man with a broom sweeps the street clean.
A middle-aged man paints his door green.
At Allah’s command an ox exits the city alone to wander the Pamirs alone.
A girl returns to her hometown after traveling the world and finds the prisons of her hometown abandoned for fifty years.
Mountains all around, mountains harboring gold and not bandits.
One also thinks of a Chinese wisdom writer as great as Zhuangzi. Xi Chuan has a similarly playful and puzzling mind, embracing the bafflement and ambiguity of the world. Zhuangzi himself makes an appearance in these poems, as do other luminaries of Chinese literature, philosophy, and history: the “grand historian” Sima Qian, the satirical poet Sima Xiangru, the poets of the Tang Dynasty, and even Confucius. These presences are as much a part of Xi Chuan’s landscape as Beijing’s streets, the South Xinjiang mountains, or the huge Chinese plains. From a poem called “Plains”:
the darkness must be dealt with prudently
especially the dog barks and birdcalls traveling too far in the dark
a thousand miles of rainfall, in which someone must be stranded
ten-thousand-mile-away news on a flickering TV
turning around doesn’t mean going home
going home doesn’t mean home is where it used to be

to dream of the plains on the plains is a plain thing to do
to dream of Confucius on the plains is as far from plain as Confucius dreaming of the Duke of Zhou
Xi Chuan is something of a wisdom writer himself. The fact that he plays ironic and theatrical games with his writing is actually in keeping with a great deal of Chinese philosophy (Zhuangzi again). From a poem called “Exhortations”:
Don’t demand too much of the world. Don’t hold on to your sleeping wife while dreaming of high-yield margins. Don’t light lamps in the daytime. Don’t smear people’s faces. Remember: don’t piss in the wild. Don’t sing in a cemetery. Don’t take promises lightly. Don’t be annoying. Make wisdom something useful.
This can’t be taken completely at face value, of course, as Xi Chuan is very far from an exhorter. What unites his lyric poems and his essay-poems is that they all carry a sense of the world’s plenitude -- evoked so gorgeously in a poem like “South Xinjiang Notes” -- and of the world’s puzzlement. The plenitude is itself bewildering (what to make of the Turkic Muslims he runs into in beautiful South Xinjiang?) and the bewilderment has a certain beauty, as in his poem “Discoveries”:
even the Tang Dynasty fell in the end
even dumpsters have people living in them
even indulgent idealists have no clue how to live
even men with sloped shoulders run away from home

even the doctor got gonorrhea but he kept working
even the drunk knew the way home but forgot which door
even birds learn how to keep silent in May
even the living dead will scream out “Save me!”
For English-speakers, Notes on the Mosquito is a way out of our scandalous literary disorientation (literally: “losing the East”), and into the thrilling disorientation of Xi Chuan’s keen, perceptive mind. -Greer Mansfield

In the fourteen-page Author’s Afterward to his Selected Poems, Xi Chuan references or quotes from Tolstoy, Yang Lian, the Zhuangzi, the Indian social theorist Ashis Nandy, Eileen Chang, Leo Strauss, C.T. Hsia, Jonathan Spence, Milan Kundera, Li Bai, Czeslaw Milosz, the 20th-century sociologist Fei Xiaotong, ancient philosopher Han Feizi, Mao Zedong, Foucault, Tang dynasty literati Han Yu, and Goethe. This is not a poet who can be accused of parochialism. Yet Xi Chuan wears his erudition lightly, at least in the context of his verse. This is not to say that the poems do not give a sense of a formidable intellect behind them—they do—but what is striking in the poems is less Xi Chuan’s breadth of reference than his sense of humor, his humanity, and his attention to the smallest details of ordinary life, ranging from bodily functions to rats to the way drizzle soaks through socks.
Xi Chuan was born in 1963, just after the mass starvation of the Great Leap Forward, and was a small child during Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Lucky and talented enough to be one of the few children able to go to school at the time, he later went on to major in English at Beijing University. As translator Lucas Klein explains in his exemplary Translator’s Introduction, in the spring of 1989 Xi Chuan lost two close poet friends, Hai Zi and Luo Yihe, both of whom were also Beijing University students. Following on the heels of that trauma were the events in Tiananmen, which Xi Chuan participated in and suffered from. The pain of his friends’ deaths and the disillusionment he experienced after the government crackdown discouraged him from writing for nearly two years. When he resumed, his style had changed considerably from the Imagist Western-influenced Obscure Poetry exemplified by poets such as Bei Dao, Duo Duo, and Yang Lian. He moved toward a more philosophical and less lyrical prose poetry that contrasts with his earlier shorter, often nature-inspired work. His most recent poems play with ideas of paradox, inheritance, and the past, present, and future of civilization.
These are large themes, and Xi Chuan knows how to write large poems to encompass them. “Six Dynasties Ghosts” begins:
In the Six Dynasties (265-588 ce), ghosts outnumbered people. Humans would dream of evil spirits at night and meet them during the day, the way mice can never escape humans. Life in the Six Dynasties was bizarre: according to The Chronicle of the Netherworld, ghosts had chest hair, armpit hair, and pubic hair. People would fight over food with ghosts. Ghosts would come to blows with ghosts.
In this stanza, we find several of Xi Chuan’s recurring obsessions: history and references to famous historical works; the relationship of humans to the natural world, not in the sense of lovely mountain vistas, but in the sense of the nasty, inescapable symbiotic struggle between humans and their parasite and vermin brothers; and lastly, the ‘unmentionable’ aspects of the human (here ghostly) body. In a Xi Chuan poem, people vomit and piss and fart. He is not so much interested in the shock value, but in the grounding effect these facts have in literary works. The combination of high and low, of erudition and crassness, brings the reader, body and brain both, to the page. In this poem the ghosts are as much people as the people are, still intimately connected to their human pasts through the physicality of their armpit and pubic hair. Ghosts move through these poems just as they do contemporary China, understated, even buried under, but not forgotten. Many of these images are objets trouvé, found in the books of others. Xi Chuan is a world-class noticer, and in particular, he has an eye for the unnerving, the strange, the disingenuous, and the amusing.
In the Six Dynasties, swans were kindhearted, and would pursue a person for five or six miles, just to give back a shoe.
But in the Six Dynasties, the tigers were the contrarians, waiting for men to take a piss outdoors so they could bite off their dicks.
Humor is essential to Xi Chuan’s work, despite the fact that the topics it addresses are often painful. Here is the short poem “The Hospital”:
a dead gray rain falls on the hospital
the nurse’s youth dissolved by hydrochloric acid
some ascend to heaven, some go under the earth
invisible people check up on sickrooms, those of uncertain identity
loiter in the shadows of the hospital’s entryway
I was there, right there, reading Afanti stories
to a dying man (he’d cough ever so often
and sometimes drift to sleep); I was there, right there
trying to get a dying man to laugh
Afanti is a character in traditional Uyghur folk stories, the Uyghurs being a Turkic-speaking people who live mainly in Xinjiang, an enormous mostly desert province in the far west of China. Here Xi Chuan’s juxtaposition of the cute and folksy with the “dead gray rain” and the frightening “hydrochloric acid” demonstrates the need to balance the dark with the light, horror with humor. It is a defense against despair, if nothing else.
But it is something else. When Xi Chuan writes about the lives of the laobaixing, those left behind in the breathless economic advances of the last decade, many of whom live in dense communities of urban poverty, it is this sense of the absurdity of the ordinary that opens the poem up, and makes it genuine and affecting. In “The Neighbors,” he addresses this urban humanscape directly.
My neighbors. I’ve never invited them over for dinner, never borrowed money from them. I promise myself that, if I have a daughter, I will never let her marry any of them, since they’re like family. . . .
But I admit, I don’t care about their spiritual questions, or whether they have any spiritual questions.
My neighbors are eavesdroppers, snickerers, moral monitors. Monitoring the morality of my neighbors I’ve happened upon nobility, but they let me in on rumors to let me in on the zeitgeist.
The zeitgeist emboldened Old Zhang, who rented his apartment to three girls. The three girls wear heavy makeup, the three girls have stomach-aches, the three girls sleep during the day, wash their faces in the evening, and stand on the street at night. . . .
Rats, surrounding my bed at midnight, call me in unison: “Hello, old neighbor!” I tell them all to get lost. Under my roof you play by my rules.
My roof leaks, so all my neighbors’ roofs must leak; power’s out at home, so the power must be out in my neighbors’ homes.
Much is made of the dialectic of Chinese Collectivism versus American Individualism, often premised on the claim that Chinese and Americans think differently about these issues. Yet here we get a view of the individual within the modern collective, that is to say, the cramped, thin-walled, over-stuffed apartment building that is now a ubiquitous sight in the major cities in China. The rats are as much neighbors, and about as neighborly, as the other human inhabitants. The speaker would not let his daughter marry one of his neighbors because they are “like family,” not so much because it would feel incestuous, but because like family, his neighbors annoy him too much to further cement the already suffocating bond. The building gossips are just part of the scene, like the prostitutes, like the power outages. Hanging over the poem, however, is the memory of public shamings and family members turning each other in for anti-revolutionary statements and neighborhood watches that wielded tremendous power over ordinary people. These are the historical remnants that many of the poems in this collection grapple with. Xi Chuan’s approach is often indirect, but he never flinches from his task. He ends this poem with a zinger rather than a moralistic scolding:
For seven days straight I holed up at home without speaking, or humming, or farting, and the woman next door opened the door and came in, just to see if anything was wrong with my life.
I am thrilled to notice that the Chinese original on the opposing page has a typo in the last sentence. Thrilled because it is a rare book today that is printed in full bilingual edition. Notes on the Mosquito is a thick, handsome volume, which befits the quality of its contents. Readers of Chinese will be able to appreciate the poems in the original while marveling at the deftness with which Klein renders them into English. His translation is consistently intelligent, and admirably captures the full range of feeling in Xi Chuan’s poetry. Translation always involves tradeoffs between trying to mimic the unfamiliar and trying to domesticate the foreign, and in general, Klein finds a balance between the two, allowing for a fair degree of strangeness while not sacrificing readability. On a few occasions, he introduces an ungainliness into the English that is not there in Chinese. These moments, such as when ‘Marxist’ is translated as “Dialectical Materialist,” which slow the reader down unnecessarily. Marxism is already a rare enough term in English-language poetry to capture the heaviness of the original line. In another case, in the poem “Twilight,” Klein uses “deceased” as a noun instead of the simpler and more vernacular ‘the dead.’ In Chinese, often all that is necessary to turn a verb into a noun (like turning ‘to view’ into ‘a viewer’) is a simple particle. This grammatical trick is not as available in English, and in this poem, where the speaker is addressing the dead, any choice in English is going to be awkward. The tone of the original is fairly casual, and Klein’s “deceased” gives it a more formal cast, as in the lines: “oh deceased, appear now / all of the living have shut their mouths / where are you, deceased?” These lines sound forced, rather than conveying the mournful if eccentric tone of the original. It is in these difficult moments where the ear of the translator must come into play.
But Klein’s ear rarely fails him. He captures both the music and slightly anachronistic feel of the original Chinese in the early poem “In the Mountains”: “Dusk congeals over the hungry cliff / excess dusk presses onto my tent / sunlight walks by on stones.” Xi Chuan abandoned this youthful style, and Klein—a scholar of contemporary and Tang dynasty literature—not only keenly identifies this and other more subtle shifts, but also manages to convey the changes convincingly, allowing the reader to come away with a sense of the arc of Xi Chuan’s artistic development. He comes up with lines that resound beautifully: “look to life’s last station / when the long-deceased song passes on again and red Persian asters / assemble in the distance like a chorus of birds.” The sound play of “life’s last station” and “song passes on” moving to “Persian asters” to “birds” builds a lovely alliterative scene that in sheer beauty momentarily surpasses the music of the original. So much is sacrificed in translation that a translator must identify and seize these fortuities wherever he can, and time and again Klein does exactly that. Xi Chuan’s verse could not have been better served in English. - Eleanor Goodman 

 The density of his poetry aside, the other trial facing me and any reader at this time is that we have no serviceable nomenclature for what Xi Chuan is doing, particularly his work of the past ten years or so. He is engaged in an unprecedented project to recast literary expression in contemporary China. And we do not know, cannot now know, whether the results of his project eventually will be the idiosyncratic work of one man, or whether he is setting a path, one possible path, for other poets to follow. Xi Chuan exists at a special time in Chinese literary history when form has finally matured in modern Chinese poetry, when the anxiety of influence can be tempered by several generations of earlier modern poets who bore the major brunt of being compared with the illustrious tradition of classical Chinese poetry and when experiments with Western poetic structures have by and large been cast aside. The successes of free verse poets from Taiwan such as Yang Mu, Yu Guangzhong, Wai-lim Yip (Cantonese, but educated in Taiwan), and others have established a solid corpus in the vernacular mode. Obscure poets from China have safely neutralized the once suffocating omnipresence of Maospeak. Through the use of internal rhymes, rhythmic repetition, alliteration and assonance, Xi Chuan is able to forge his work in an environment in which the so-called avant-garde (which to date has not been adequately defined in China) is the norm. Liberated from the twin strictures of classical Chinese and Western prosody, Xi Chuan has become a successful bricoleur, a world poet who interacts with the tradition, engages literary giants of China’s past within his work, and also establishes a dialogue with Western greats such as Homer, Petrarch, Baudelaire, Rilke, Pound, Gary Snyder, and others. His work is the product of a creative dialectics that violates Hu Shi’s admonition to eschew literary allusion while embracing his demand to articulate things in the vernacular. The conflicts that Xi Chuan bespeaks in his poetry are not those of a clash of civilizations, of traditional and modernity or East and West. Rather, they are internal conflicts, conflicts of the soul. His work is completely personal and untranslatable to others, not just linguistically but emotionally. But at the same time, his problems are genuine and are no different than those that give pain to each of us: the death of friends and family, frustration over failure, difficulty communicating to others, weakness and ineffectuality, humiliation, fear, lust, and limitation. “The one with the greatest vision is blind” 最具视觉功夫的人竟然是个瞎子, he flatly observers, “if Homer wasn’t blind, then whoever created Homer must have been” 如果荷马不是瞎子,那创作了荷马的人必是瞎子. And he concludes at the end of the same poem: “Nietzsche the last son of Dionysus, never touching a drop, still went crazy in Weimar” 尼采酒神的最后一个儿子,滴酒不沾,却也在魏玛疯疯癫癫 (109). Genius has its consequences. It’s not a game. - Chris Lupke



Due to popular demand, and as a concession to common sense, we've decided to put poems here on our website — one poet per week.
This week's poet is Xi Chuan, whom translator Lucas Klein, in his introduction to Notes on the Mosquito, describes thusly: "Xi Chuan (pronounced Sshee Chwahn, not to be confused with Sichuan, the province) has not only become one of contemporary China’s most celebrated poets, he is also one of its most hyphenated litterateurs: teacher-essayisttranslator-editor-poet. Eliot Weinberger has described him as a 'polymath, equally at home discussing the latest American poetry as Shang Dynasty numismatics.'"
One of the most fascinating aspects of Xi Chuan's body of work is the very clear distinction between the poems he wrote from 1985-1987, and the poems he's written since 1990. Klein explains:
Xi Chuan in his early writing reflected a belief in an international poésie pure. His poems often demonstrate the exposed structures and urban timelessness of International Style architecture, or else an abstracted landscape that is clearly China yet, at the same time, not. The landscape exists inside a poetics of mythic power.

The high-lyricism of Xi Chuan’s earliest poetry would not last. Because of the government’s suppression of the democracy and workers’ rights movement in Tiananmen Square, in which Xi Chuan participated, 1989 was a hard year for China’s young intellectuals; it was an even harder year for Xi Chuan, as on March 26, [his dear friend and fellow poet] Hai Zi committed suicide (he was twenty-five), and on May 31 their mutual friend and fellow Beijing University poet Luo Yihe died from a cerebral hemorrhage (age twenty-eight), days before PLA tanks rolled in on the demonstrators on June 4.

Xi Chuan barely wrote for two years. Nothing in this book is from 1989, and only one poem is from 1990. By 1991, his style was shifting: a haunting memory replaces Xi Chuan’s earlier timelessness in "Twilight," pushing the modernist lyric beyond its upper limits the way "plains push out from the edge of the city / mountains lift up at the edge of the plains" ('Three Chapters on Dusk'), and 'Bats in the Sunset' raises the question of whether the bat—a sign of good luck, since it is a Chinese homonym for 'fortune' — should be defined by its Chinese associations or its Western ones, via Goya’s El sueño de la razón produce monstros.

When Salute was published in 1992, it was evident that Xi Chuan’s poetry had undergone a radical transformation. His self-contained lyric opened into expansive prose poems that often reflexively observed their own poetic method... including their representation and construction of poetry, metaphor, and language. Rather than undercutting lyricism à la Han Dong, Xi Chuan’s prose poetry allowed him to reevaluate it and examine, rather than take for granted, the interplay between Chinese tradition and a modernity of Western origin.
Below are three poems: one from that first period, and two from the latter.
"The City I Live In"

The city I live in is made of building blocks
with straight streets and smooth public squares,
and row-houses low but meticulously ordered

The city I live in has no people
wind blows through windows a frail, naïve whistle
the rising and setting sun compelling seasons to revolve
there is only dust in the city I live in

If I died, if color and light died,
no hand would come knock down this city
it will exist forever
because in the city I live in there are no people

from "Beast"
The beast, I see it. The beast, fur thick and stiff, teeth sharp, eyes nearly lifeless. The beast, gasping for breath, growling ill fortune, and from its feet, no sound. The beast, with no sense of humor, like a man straining to hide his poverty, like a man ruined by his mission, with no cradle to provide memories, no destination to locate yearning, not enough lies to plead for itself. It smacks a tree trunk and gathers infants; it is alive, like a cliff, and dead, like an avalanche.
A crow amongst scarecrows searches for a partner.

The beast, it despises my hairstyle, despises my scent, despises my repentance and reserve. In a word, it despises that I deck out happiness in baubles and jewels. It squeezes its way into my room, orders me to stand in the corner, and with no word of explanation collapses in my chair, shatters my mirror, shreds up my curtains and all that belongs to my spiritual defense. I beseech it: “Don’t take my teacup when I’m thirsty!” Right there it digs up a spring, which I suppose must be some kind of response.

One ton of parrots, one ton of parrots’ nonsense!
​​​
from "On My Meaningless Life"
88. In a crowd of people some people are not people, just as in a flock of eagles some eagles are not eagles; some eagles are forced to wander through alleyways, some people are forced to fly in the sky.

89. I fall asleep as soon as it gets dark, I get up as soon as it’s light out. I always dream of a doctor with a fever and a mail carrier with a toothache, and then I meet them; so in order to meet myself I must dream of myself, but dreaming of oneself is so embarrassing.

90. Once I had a dream in which a blind man asked about someone. I replied that I had heard of but didn’t know this person. When I awoke, I howled in shock: it was me that the blind man had been looking for!

91. Only when a nail pierced through my hand did my hand reveal the truth; only when black smoke choked me to tears could I feel my existence. Riding sidesaddle on a white horse ten fairies tore up my heart.

92. For this I have changed my name, concealed my identity, wandered lonely as a cloud, resigned myself to fate.
 Posted by Tom Roberge

  

Xi Chuan: Poetry of the Anti-lyric

Contemporary Chinese poet Xi Chuan 西川 (the pen-name of Liu Jun 刘军) is a prolific “hyphenated” littérateur: teacher-essayist-translator-editor-poet. The American writer Eliot Weinberger has described him as a “polymath, equally at home discussing the latest American poetry as Shang Dynasty numismatics.”
Currently a professor in pre-modern Chinese literature at the Central Academy for Fine Arts in Beijing, Xi Chuan had also previously taught English language, and Western literature in Chinese translation. (He was an English major at Beijing University, and wrote an undergraduate thesis on Ezra Pound’s translations from the Chinese). His professional career path follows his poetic development: gaining recognition first as one of the post-Obscure poets in the late eighties, his writing was defined by a condensed lyricism in the Western modernist mode. Today, he writes expansive prose-poems that meditate on awkwardness and paradox at the individual and international levels simultaneously. The main shift came in 1989 — the year not only of the students’ democracy and workers’ rights demonstrations, the crushed June 4th in Tian’anmen Square, but also of the death of two of Xi Chuan’s closest writer-friends, Hai Zi 海子 and Luo Yihe 骆一禾 (the former at his own hand) — after which Xi Chuan stopped writing almost completely for three years. When he re-emerged, his form had changed: he was writing a poetry of the anti-lyric, a poetics of contradiction that deconstructed the aestheticism and musicality of his previous self.
…the reader wants to know not only what Xi Chuan says but how he says it, both his images and his style, both his allusions and his elusiveness.
The three poems included here represent the turning point of Xi Chuan’s developing style, where the modernist lyric reaches, and begins to pierce through, its upper limits, the way “plains push out from the edge of the city / mountains lift up at the edge of the plains.” Later, he would describe his focus on the paradox, or oxymoron, as one poetic reaction to China’s political and economic realities; here, those realities are represented by a power outage and an awareness of our becoming history — and Borges’s annotated “aporia of history” — in which, like Borges, we all become librarians “preserving the order of the universe and books.”
Translation is always a challenge, especially between languages as distinct as Chinese and English. My method was to start by clinging as much as possible to the vocabulary and syntax of Xi Chuan’s Chinese, and then, via visions and revisions, to smooth out the edges between the two languages so that two poems could emerge as one. Overall, a consistent consideration has motivated my translation: that is, the reader wants to know not only what Xi Chuan says but how he says it, both his images and his style, both his allusions and his elusiveness.

Power Outage



A sudden power outage, and I’m convinced
I live in a developing nation
a nation where people read by moonlight
a nation that abolished imperial exams
a sudden power outage, and I hear
wind chimes and a cat’s footbeats upstairs
in the distance an engine stops with a thud
the battery-powered radio beside me still singing
once the power’s out, time turns back quickly:
candles light up the eateries
the fat kid gobbling on crow meat notices
crows gathering on tree limbs
and the pitch blackness before me
just like a seaswell womb
a mother hangs herself from rafters
each room its own special odor
Power Outage. I touch a slipper
but mutter: “Quit hiding, matches!”
In the candlelight, I see my own
great big wordless shadow cast upon the wall
December 1992

Re-reading Borges' Poetry


— for AnneThe precision of this statement emerges from the chaos of the past
this pure force, like the rhythm a dripping faucet
annotates the aporia of history
touching starlight I leave night to the earth
night that licks the earth’s crevices: that forked memory
No Man is a man, No Where is a place
a No Man in No Where has written these
lines I must decipher in the shadows
I give up scouring the world of dust for the author, and lift my head to see
a librarian, negligently, just for his livelihood
preserving the order of the universe and books
January 1997

Three Chapters on Dusk

Clouds send dust drifting off the high-up cranes
crows fly into the immense Russian vestibule
the setting sun repeats itself: beauty, it is in concert with dreams
morning rays unfold against the street, please don’t roll up your sleeves to scrub it away
please, please do not ask me why
I am leaving the light of dawn
someone disappears in a crowd
everyone looks for him
to wish him the best
a gradual tune flies out the chapel’s stained window
around psyche’s edges a desolate prospect
this is the eighth dawn of autumn
a grouse plucks its feathers, lovers gaze across the river
a razor passed to the hand of a son
2
Look to the mountains, look to the houses under the mountains
look to life’s last station
when the long-deceased song passes on again and red Persian asters
assemble in the distance, like a chorus of birds
reigniting an internal landscape
you will look to the first leaf falling in the mountains
oh, the land of autumn growing late
plains push out from the edge of the city
mountains lift up at the edge of the plains
in the heights greeting mountains —
skylights or arching bridge floors —
sunlight caresses the hand of the dead
their white shadows quiver
and your bones are cold; within the grand shadows
a cold wind has been blowing for years
3
Evening blown in on the wind, rattling windows and doors
in a headwind of autumn
I see aberrant turrets, lamps, and squares
like I’d only happened on this evening
a happening of people running through a meadow, a happenstance mindset
hearing a blind man’s haphazard fiddle
evening blown in on the wind rattling souls
how many faces vie to appear, then hurry away hiding
only a pigeon milk white breast glimmers in the wind
I hear music
coming from the psyche’s depths
submitting to its guidance, recollecting in the dark
a ray of light, we become history
that page has been turned
I will write a poem of perfect beauty
I will raise a child of perfect goodness
1991

from Notes on the Mosquito

Beast

The beast, I see it. The beast, fur thick and stiff, teeth sharp, eyes nearly lifeless. The beast, gasping for breath, growling ill fortune, and from its feet, no sound. The beast, with no sense of humor, like a man straining to hide his poverty, like a man ruined by his mission, with no cradle to provide memories, no destination to locate yearning, not enough lies to plead for itself. It smacks a tree trunk and gathers infants; it is alive, like a cliff, and dead, like an avalanche.

A crow amongst scarecrows searches for a partner.

The beast, it despises my hairstyle, despises my scent, despises my repentance and reserve. In a word, it despises that I deck out happiness in baubles and jewels. It squeezes its way into my room, orders me to stand in the corner, and with no word of explanation collapses in my chair, shatters my mirror, shreds up my curtains and all that belongs to my spiritual defense. I beseech it: "Don't take my teacup when I'm thirsty!" Right there it digs up a spring, which I suppose must be some kind of response.

One ton of parrots, one ton of parrots' nonsense!

We call the tiger tiger, we call the donkey donkey. But the beast, what can you call it? Without a name, its flesh and shadow are a blur, and you can barely call it, can barely be sure of its location in broad daylight or divine its destiny. It should be given a name like "grief" or "embarrassment," should be given a pool to drink from, should be given shelter from the storm. A beast with no name is a fright.

A song-thrush does away with the king's foot soldiers.

It knows temptation, but not by a palace, not by a woman, and not by a copious candlelit gala. It comes toward us, so is there something about our bodies that makes it drool? Does it want to slurp up the emptiness off our bodies? What kind of temptation is this! Sideways through the passageway of shadows, colliding head-on with the flash of a knife, the slightest hurt teaches it to moan—moaning, existence, who knows what stuff belief is made of; but once it settles down, you hear the sound of sesame at the jointing stage, you catch the scent of the rambler rose.

The great wild goose that clears a thousand mountains, too shy to talk about itself.

This metaphorical beast walks down the slope, plucks flowers, sees its reflection by the riverside, and wonders inside who it could be; it swims across the river, climbs ashore, and gazes back at the mist on the river, with nothing to discover or understand; it rushes into the city, chases girls, finds a piece of meat, and passes the night beneath the eaves, dreaming of a village and a companion; sleepwalking for fifty miles, knowing no fear, waking in the light of a new dawn, it finds itself returning to the location it had set out from: that same thick bed of leaves, the same bed of leaves still hiding that dagger—what's going to happen?

Pigeon in the sand, you are enlightened by the sheen of blood.

Oh, the age of flight is near!

1992

The Distance

for Akhmatova

there is a snowfield in a dream
there is a white birch in the snowfield
there is a small house that will resound in prayer
there is a shingle that will fall off the north star

in the distance

there is a crowd of commoners as purple as red cabbage
there is a pot of boiled water that was lapped up by animals
there is a wooden chair caught in recollection
there is a desklamp whose illumination represents me

in the distance

words I can't read written on glass
soybeans and sorghum grow on a blank page
a face that makes me put down my pen
when I pick it up again the ink's frozen solid

in the distance

roving clouds of December rise off tree limbs
the train of my soul stops in the cold
on a cold road I see me walking
at a girl's door I cough three times

1994


Poison

What is poisonous is beautiful and dangerous. This sentence could be reversed, so that what is beautiful and dangerous is poisonous. Medusa is a product of such beliefs. In general what is poisonous is not in and of itself a sin: nightshade, the oleander, the cobra, and so on, are all components of nature; but their toxin has been extracted by the apothecary, and so some will succeed with subterfuge while others meet untimely death. But let us speak not of poison's practical applications—it divides poisoner from victim, the one in front from the one behind the curtain; likewise it binds politics and fairy tale, granting death by poison an aesthetic significance. The symbol for poison is the skull; in it is the potential to change both environment and human psychology: a room in which poison has been placed is no ordinary room, and anyone concealing poison is either a demon or an accomplice to one. As for suicide by poison, I'll say nothing. All the explanation I can offer is that before taking poison the suicide splits in two. He poisons himself. Thus every suicide by poison, too, involves the element of subterfuge.

1992
translated from the Chinese by Lucas Klein


Five sections from Thirty Historical Reflections
by Xi Chuan, translated from the Chinese by Lucas Klein
That Person Writing

Eighty wooden slips, lining up with the fate of little old men. Interposed in the slips the seal script writing is difficult to discern, but what it conveys about heaven, the state, war, and the thoughts of the sages remains unchanged. The work of the brush of this anonymous writer looks like the brushwork of Sima Qian or Sima Xiangru. Only at a remove of two thousand years can the customary greatness of his era be perceived! From afar he may yet have glimpsed Sima Xiangru or Sima Qian. He dips his brush in ink, working stroke upon stroke, permitting himself not one false word; writing the aphorisms of Zeng Zi, delighting in his thoughts. He’s nearly convinced that the thoughts he transcribes will be of great use to humanity. These thoughts he protects, these thoughts he transmits. Wittingly or not certain words are altered, wittingly or not he retains his own breath within the views of another. From a humble stenographer, he unwittingly transforms into a minor author beside a great author, like an ant tethering thought’s kite against the wind. Sunlight spilling onto the writing desk, he sneezes. On the street shoe sellers call out to him: “You—you’re the guy who deals in thought!” He writes on wooden slips, in a time before the invention of paper or movable type, and so what he writes is the “one” book (each book so written must be the “one” book). But later, a dead man takes his book underground. The thought that evolved from this book, the thoughts that were transformed from this book, would ultimately reshape the world, but this “one” book, through the slow stretch of time, was no more to be found. And now, even if it were to be brought back to light, those thoughts transformed from it, the thought adopted by the world, could never be corrected. Like a forgery re-entering the site of civilization. And that person writing, it’s as if he had never been born. He is a speck of dust on the earth, disseminating civilization in its limited way.


Six Dynasties Ghosts
In the Six Dynasties (265 – 588 CE), ghosts outnumbered humans. The living would dream of evil spirits at night and meet them in the day, the way that mice are never free from people. Life in the Six Dynasties was bizarre: according to The Chronicle of the Netherworld, ghosts had chest hair, underarm hair, and pubic hair. People and ghosts would fight over food. Ghosts and ghosts would come to blows.
In the Six Dynasties ghosts were educated, and could discuss The Five Classics with humans and debate atheists about the existence of ghosts.
In the Six Dynasties ghosts had powerful magic, and knew the birthdates of each emperor, plus their death dates, and when rebellion would break out under heaven.
In the Six Dynasties, with the help of ghosts, men would travel to faerie and the underworld, and write fiction when they came back.
In the Six Dynasties men had successful romances, but the successes were due to ghosts: female ghosts would host banquets in the grave, and what man wouldn't put in an appearance?
In the Six Dynasties when a female ghost's true nature was exposed, she would turn back into a white egret or swan, or anything white, through which veins would faintly show.
In the Six Dynasties swans were kindhearted, and would pursue a person for five or six miles, just to give back his slipper.
But in the Six Dynasties the tigers were the contrarians, waiting for men to take a piss outdoors so they could bite off their dicks.
Six Dynasties people say, Back in our day, animals turning into people happened every day, but that lugubrious so-and-so Kafka, always making much ado about nothing, wrote about a guy turning into an animal—obviously he got it backwards! Obviously he got it mixed up!

 A Sanskrit Brick from Nanzhao (738–937): after a Vietnamese poet

An antiques shop on Jadestream Rd. in Dali's old quarter. A grey-green brick in the shop from the late Nanzhao era. Eleven lines of Sanskrit on the grey-green brick. The hands that molded the Sanskrit lines. The hands that inlaid the brick into the base of the pagoda. The late Nanzhao monk who could read the eleven lines of Sanskrit. The man or men who brought Sanskrit from India through Nepal to Nanzhao. Buddhists. Buddhists who had or had not achieved nirvana before dying, and the loiterers who couldn't give a damn about achieving nirvana. The questions Hīnayāna Buddhism never encountered when encountering Mahāyāna Buddhism. The pain the emperor of Nanzhao suffered unbeknownst to the emperor of Tang. The dusk of Nanzhao kingdom's demise. The thugs who knocked over the pagoda. The astonished onlookers. 902 CE. From then till now, countless I's have searched for this grey-green brick molded with eleven Sanskrit lines. In this antiques shop on Jadestream Rd. in Dali's old quarter, coming down with a cold and with a runny nose, I pulled the grey-green brick out of the glass case, held it in my hands, and in the end talked the clerk down from 800 to 430 RMB. Just by shifting my hand, I could have dropped it and seen it shatter into shards. But I only had such a notion for an instant. Also present were the poet Song Lin and a spider dangling off a thread hanging from the rafters.

Falcons, Swans, and Pearls

The Emperor of the Liao loved pearls, for which his troops time and again attacked the lands in the north that would later be established as Jin. Pearls were not in fact bounteous in the Jin, but the falcons that made nest and flew over that land were what the Liao soldiers coveted. Time and again, the soldiers of the Liao would bring home falcons, bringing home Jin women while they were at it. Locking the women in their rooms, they set the falcons after swans. Liao soldiers knew the basics of the forces of production: they didn't mind that swans had a more exquisite physique than the women in their rooms, since they knew the swans hungered after the delicacy of mussels. Good thing swans would go after mussels with such aplomb, they'd get the mussels' pearls down in their bellies—sometimes even expelling the pearls in their shit. The Liao soldiers would cast the falcons into the sky and wait for them to bring back swans from the Bohai Sea, when they'd pluck the pearls from their bellies. The Liao teemed with swans, and no one ever felt sentimental about having to kill one or two. Killing swans felt to them the same as killing chickens. The midsize pearls they kept for their women, while the small pearls piled up to trade with the rich hedonists of the Southern Song. They would have to bestow the biggest pearls unto the Emperor, or the Emperor would cut off their heads just as they did to the swans. The Emperor would play with his pearls, and the more he played the more he grew like the Southern Song hedonists. He played the Liao into extinction. When the Jin rose in the north, and sent no more falcons, they also stopped letting their women be kidnapped. The Jin destroyed Liao, to keep from sending more falcons.


King Jöchi Khasar's Land
700 years ago King Jöchi Khasar was granted land,
nothing but grassland stretching to the heavens, nothing but a few grey tiles in the clumps of grass. A strong wind blowing.
700 years ago, Chinggis Khaan and Ögedei's 100,000-strong Mongol horde
launched their blitzkrieg over the Central Asian mountains and the Russian steppe, proclaiming laws and setting up a postal system between Hungary, Austria, and China.
But now,
on the land of Chinggis Khaan's younger brother Jöchi Khasar, nothing but the name of Jöchi Khasar.
Night falls so quickly!
when night squeezes out rain, drop upon drop falling on the steppe, wooden wheels of abandoned carriages turning silently black,
It is time for Jöchi Khasar to take supper. We walk into a restaurant nearby.
Behind the counter,
a poster of the Mona Lisa tacked on the wall, and the smiling face of a 16 year-old Slavic girl.
After I've eaten, the Han woman who runs the place says to me:
"Help this poor girl who can't go to school. Such a pretty girl! She needs to go to Hailar for school, which would cost 3000 RMB for tuition and living expenses. Or else, you could take her with you, back to Beijing, so she could have a bright future."

ILL FORTUNE C 00024
There is a lotus floating in the sky. There is a splotch of bird shit caught by the
          ground. There is a fist that has penetrated his ear. On Sunlight Avenue he will
          be transparent.
The fire in the sky has already been put out, how many lives is this dust on the
          ground? He hears his childhood nickname called, a boy who constantly walks
          into his heart.
In the dawn stockade of his heart is only one chair.
On the bloody battlefield of his heart a chessboard is waiting.
He has been submitted to nine times, been resisted ten, been killed three times, and
          killed four.
Moonlight cast on the scum-covered river, dew washes clean the romantic spirits.
In a carnival, a spirit stepped on his heel. Ill fortune beginning, a guy with
          revolutionary eyes shoved him out of line.
Many years later he lit his first match. “Just like that,” he whispered to the butterfly.
On both sides of the street swept up by butterflies, on both sides of the street that
          had been a field, each compound looks like the family he betrayed, every
          magpie is falling.
The old world demolished right up to his feet, he feels himself becoming
          transparent.
Grief rushes into his temples like the Big Dipper rushing out of rooftops … a
          cough, a dizzy spell, and he utterly forgets the script of life.


ILL FORTUNE O 09734
The province he was born in was covered in rivulets and jade-green rice fields. Agriculture’s cool breeze chilled his
          behind. He requested the gods in the temple to look after him better.
He studied hard, studied until the female ghosts of midnight washed his feet; he
          labored hard, labored until the earth could put forth no harvest.
Venus twinkled low in the sky, the wind took his boat right beneath Venus. With
          the thrill of eloping he opened Nero’s door, but strolling into the majestic
          square his bad breath aggravated Nero.
The other hemisphere’s deities heard his blubbering, the other hemisphere’s
          blubberers received his breadcrumbs. But according to everyone in his
          hometown he was a success: once back in his homeland he set up a limited
          dictatorship.
He put locks on every drawer.
His mouth was full of poison blood.
He imagined all girls submitting to his molestation.
He endorsed a check to the night.
In a transitional period, the small eat and drink their fill. He loosened his belt,
          trading small favors for ovation.
On a winter’s morning he fell dead in his countryside villa, some say it was murder,
          and some say it was suicide.


KING OF CHESS
The King of Chess who was slaughtered on the chessboard by a fifteen year-old
boy, the King of Chess climbing up a mountain alone with two bottles of DDT,
unable to bear a shame not suffered in thirty years, unable to bear a thunder that
hadn’t cracked, wind that hadn’t blown, rain that hadn’t fallen in thirty years.
Called a loner for thirty years he became a loner in the end. Only at the moment of
self-reckoning did he realize the pointlessness of calling it quits, and grow a bit
braver.
Chirping cicadas. Sunset. Or the sunrise of that little boy.
He opened a bottle of DDT.
(A little less for the bugs to drink.)
He rolled his eyes to see the black and white birds in chess formation against the sky.
But he was no longer qualified to play chess: he couldn’t move the birds, the birds moved themselves.
He never guessed I’d snatch the bottle of pesticide from his hand. He thought I was going to usurp his death, or that I
          wanted to die before him, and so couldn’t control his rage.
I said I was another King of Chess overthrown by a boy.
He vacillated for a moment, curiosity dampening his death wish.
“Did the same boy overthrow us both? Is regime change God’s will? Why have we
never met? Why have we had the same experiences?”
We set up a chessboard on the mountaintop.
Each felt he faced himself.
The setting sun continued its sunset. We realized neither of us could beat himself.

Twilight

in the vast expanses of a nation
the twilight is just as vast
lamp after lamp lights up
and twilight spreads out like the autumn

appear, ye deceased
all of the living have shut their mouths
where are you, deceased?
the twilight invites you to speak

some names I will memorize
other names search for their tombs
countless names I have written down
as if I were writing a nation

and the twilight spreads over the earth
the outstretched hand grasped
as twilight reaches the window, where someone
is always rapping lightly at my door


 Dusk

In a vast country
Dusk, too, is vast
Lamps light up one by one
Dusk spreads like autumn

Let the dead step out
And we, the living, seal our lips
Where are you, oh departed
Dusk is inviting you to speak 

Some names will live in my memory
Some will search for a tombstone
The rest will spill from my pen
As if making a new nation

Twilight on the horizon
Extends its hand to be held
When dusk arrives, someone



The Ant’s Plunder

When I stuck out my hand to grab the iron door handle, a hidden ant attacked my right
index finger. I don’t know if it pinched me with its pincers or bit me with its mouth. I
don’t know how it got so strong.
In an instant, it turned itself into a weapon. The pain was so great that I cursed this
neither common nor rare 1.5–centimeter long ant. This may be the greatest
achievement of its life: to cause a man such piercing pain.
Like the filament of a light bulb, the six legs of an ant befit its existence. Its body,
bright yellow in front and brown in back, is filled with liquid, like two water droplets
fused together.
Two water droplets fused together to produce a will to live, a will to live that produces
the pincers protruding from the ant’s head. The ant and the crab both use pincers,
whose only difference is their size.
In stabbing pain, I examine this ant.
In the throbs of pain the ant and I encounter each other. I never thought ―the encounter
between Man and World‖ of which Heidegger spoke would find form between me and
ant. This ant lives to sting me; I live to curse it in pain.
The arc of my life hooks onto the arc of its life, which is kind of significant. Kill it? Easy. But it
knew I couldn’t. It scurried away, flustered, pretending to ignore my curses.


 On False Causality and True Chance in a Dark Room

26. In a dark room, I put my ear to the wall, listening in, but don’t hear anything stirring in the neighbor’s home next door. Then suddenly I hear someone next door with an ear to the wall as well. Quickly I pull my ear back, sure to behave like an upright and proper man.

27. In a dark room, I should not wake from a good dream while my father wakes from a bad one. He reprimands me, and his reprimands are valid; I turn introspective, completely loyal and filial. I tell him my good dream, so he could have his own, but his good dream was already forgotten in the bathroom.

28. After a brush with death an ascetic becomes a philanderer.

29. One handsome young man kills two handsome young men just because they all look the same.

30. In a dark room I have a séance with smoke and mirrors. Some fool really does walk in the door and kneel down before me. I kick him away, continuing my indulgence, when another fool breaks down the door, wielding a butcher-knife to overthrow me.

31. In a dark room, I turn on the radio. Its melodramatic love story awakens my self-pity. Just then a burglar crawls out from under my bed, engages me in a discussion of the meaning of life, and vows right then to turn over a new leaf.

32. An enthusiast of the Analects of Confucius refutes another enthusiast of the Analects of Confucius to a bloody pulp.

33. Du Fu has received too much exaltation, so no other Du Fu could ever win anything.

34. In a dark room, I fawn over a dead man. He was not my ancestor but my neighbor. I create for him a life of glory, his cast-iron face flushed with pink. Many years later, I overeat at the home of his grandson.

35. In a dark room, I paint a portrait of a fictitious girl. An acquaintance says he recognizes the girl in the picture: she lives in the East District, 35 Springweed Lane. I find the place, but her neighbor says she’s just left on a long journey.

36. Faced with an emptied grave the giddy graverobber has nothing to do.

37. With nothing to do the line cook goes back to his dark room.

38. In a dark room, my gold ring, passed down for three generations, rolls onto the floor, never to be seen again. Therefore I suspect that beneath my dark room is another dark room; therefore I suspect that everyone who ever wore a gold ring lives beneath me.

39. In a dark room, some guy comes in the wrong door but tries to make the most of it. He puts down his backpack, washes his face and brushes his teeth, and then orders me to get out. I say that this is my home, this is my lifeline, I’m not going anywhere. And so we start to wrestle in the darkness.

On My Meaningless Life

88. In a crowd of people some people are not people, just as in a flock of eagles some eagles are not eagles; some eagles are forced to wander through alleyways, some people are forced to fly in the sky.

89. I fall asleep as soon as it gets dark, I get up as soon as it’s light out. I always dream of a doctor with a fever and a mail carrier with a toothache, and then I meet them; so in order to meet myself, I must dream of myself, but dreaming of oneself is so embarrassing.

90. Once, I had a dream in which a blind man asked about someone. I replied that I had heard of but did not know this person. When I awoke, I howled in shock: it was me that the blind man was looking for!

91. Only when a nail pierced through my hand did my hand reveal the truth; only when black smoke choked me to tears could I feel my existence. Riding sidesaddle on a white horse ten fairies tore up my heart.

92. For this I have changed my name, concealed my identity, wandered lonely as a cloud, resigned myself to fate.

93. I once demanded of a boss lady at an inn that I be the boss of the inn. To her enduring surprise I also demanded she provide me with room and board at no charge. She asked: “Who are you? Where do you come from?” I said: “I’m just the man who makes these two demands. You choose.”

94. I once found myself astray in a gloomy abode, like a mercenary upsetting its order, like a ruffian arousing ladies’ fears. At this time I could taste a different kind of astray—astray from happiness, I forgot all disorder and fear.

95. I once was caught in a besieged city, and once I ran into an aged scholar. When I pointed out our “plight” and “lonesomeness,” he said his sole concern was the fortune of all god’s children. So I spit into the mouth of the crow.

96. I once asked a magistrate about the key to promotions, and he told me to go back home and be a good little citizen. I asked him: “Do you want to know how to turn stone into gold?” And when he revealed the greed behind his eyes, I said: “I too know how to keep secrets.”

97. If you can sit down then sit down, if you can lie down then lie down. Just to get by, every day I work more than three jobs. But every time I finish, someone takes my remuneration.

98. The wise men say: “To fly intoxicates the eagle.” Wrong, flying does not intoxicate the eagle, any more than walking intoxicates the human.

99. So please let me stay in your room for an hour, since an eagle plans to live in one of my ventricles for a week. If you accept me, I’ll change into any form you wish, but not for too long, or my true form will be revealed.


from “somebody”

Spring stays inside the hat
Autumn stays inside the blouse
Morning stays on the treetops
Evening stays in the shithole
The barren mountain stays on the barren mountain
Jadeite water stays in the teapot
The mansion stays on the map
The poor stay in the gutter
Three pounds of ink stay in the intestines
50 grams of sweat stay in the bloodstream
Spit stays outside the store
Foul language stays on ivory

Lucas Klein on Xi Chuan and translating "Written at Thirty"

Written at Thirty

in my first decade
the moon revealed its silent craters
while under that moon, in the town I lived in
a clatter of exorcismal gongs and shouts in the street
my limping uncle swore in the courtyard
careless I met with a white rooster's kiss
and a girl pulled down her pants in front of me
I ran into a suicide's shade on the stairs
and was instructed: do not be scared
my father lifted me over his head
hail bounced in exhaustion on the road to the commune
I entered an immaculate school and studied revolution

in my second decade
with working crickets of all countries I grew up
together we scorned difficulty, together fell in love with
     violence and moonlight
a tiger appeared at my door
I smelled the scent of flesh
I bunny-hopped to a stranger's doorway
and saw a man and woman preparing their festive attire
I stole, and others stole too
I set fire to sparrows, and others did too
such is life, but I had an outstanding gift
for painting ideals of mountain landscapes
without too many sins requiring forgiveness

some doors shut, some doors were yet to open
my third decade was for travel and study
it made sense to torment myself
I sang for the brow and knees of love
but saw no faerie queens descend on the streets
friends came, wild and vivacious, then vanished
leaving me a shirt and glasses but no way to wear them
the spearhead of judgment called forth catastrophe
as riots of flesh that called forth rainstorms
I shouldered an umbrella and climbed up a hill
a bird searching for someone greeting thunder and lightning
making circles in the
how can you doubt both yourself and the world at once?
you can't stop the rain, can't get a bird to land in your hand
thought's like a knife, a flick of the blade
drenches my spirit in sweat
I drive out thirty contentious philosophers
and say to the shadow who guards me, I'm sorrysalty sweat, salty tears, what else is flesh supposed to taste
     like?
night is like a display of identical rooms
I walk through, pacing
back and forth as if it were all one room. Morning to night
my worries for the future prove I'm ill at ease—
the earth is in motion but I have yet to sense it—

On Xi Chuan and translating "Written at Thirty" 
Xi Chuan (pronounced Sshee Chwahn, not to be confused with Sichuan, the province), one of contemporary China's most celebrated poets, was born in Jiangsu in 1963 with the name Liu Jun, which means "army," reflecting the ethos of the era. Raised in Beijing, where he still lives, he attended a foreign-languages school for future diplomats at a time when most schools were closed, and enrolled in Beijing University (where he gave himself the name Xi Chuan, meaning "West Stream"), to graduate from the English department with a senior thesis on Ezra Pound's translations of Chinese poetry. He teaches pre-modern Chinese literature at the Central Academy of Fine Arts in Beijing—where his art-major students have remarked that they learn more about artistic concept in his classes than in the bulk of their coursework on technique—but before that he taught Western literature in Chinese translation, and before that, introductory English.
Emerging as a poet in the second half of the eighties, Xi Chuan wrote what would become known as "Post-Obscure" poetry in the early heyday of Deng Xiaoping's "Reform and Opening Up" ("reform" in post-Cultural Revolution liberalization, "opening up" to trade with the capitalist West). His early writing reflected a belief in an international poésie pure, often demonstrating the exposed structures and urban timelessness of International Style architecture, or else an abstracted landscape that is clearly China yet, at the same time, not.
The high-lyricism of Xi Chuan's earliest poetry would not last. Because of the government's suppression of the democracy and workers' rights movement in Tiananmen Square, in which Xi Chuan participated, 1989 was a hard year for China's young intellectuals; it was an even harder year for Xi Chuan, as two of his close friends and fellow Beijing University poets died that spring, one from a cerebral hemorrhage at age twenty-eight, and another from suicide at twenty-five. And then the tanks rolled in on the demonstrators on June 4.
Xi Chuan barely wrote for two years. When he began again, it was evident that his poetry had undergone a radical transformation. His self-contained lyric opened into expansive prose poems that often reflexively observed their own poetic method, metaphor, and language. This is a drive he has maintained since; at an open dialogue this past winter at the MLA convention, he said he wasn't interested in writing "good poems," which I take to mean both acceptable to more conservative aesthetic standards as well as simply poems that are too "well-behaved." He says he still writes "good poems" from time to time—just to make sure he can—but mostly, he is interested in writing texts that explore possibilities rather than neat poems that offer one emotion or sensation at a time.
"Written at Thirty" comes from right after Xi Chuan's switch from lyric to expansive prose poem. While it's not prose, obviously, it nevertheless contains the multitudes that any open look at one's biography requires. Other translators have published their versions—both online and in print—but my translation takes advantage of Xi Chuan's explanation to me of what he meant by the line I had earlier translated as "I grew up with the whole world's crickets": he said his teenage years coincided with the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966 – 1976), which also entailed a change in Chinese people's relationship with Maoist rhetoric. Much of his poem, he said, was an attempt to "write through" his upbringing and the language around him. English-speakers being, for obvious reasons, much less attuned to Marxist diction, I rewrote my translation through the final appeal of The Communist Manifesto, to translate the line as "with working crickets of all countries I grew up."


A Personal Paradise


If this reality is the only reality, then you can only call it “great.” Just as the great sun is the only sun, yellowing the local zodiac.

If you thought that wiping out autumn would wipe out sorrow, then you’ll be doubly disappointed: this idea is no less idiotic than slaughtering people to wipe out hunger during famine.

Life: an excuse against life; it seduces people smelling nothing but fragrance in fragrance; it predicates insanity on the omen of neurosis.

The street dirty yet quiet, changing its name so often it’s nearly forgotten itself, may the great things it bears break over small things.

Great things and small things dissolve into nothing, while unresolved music vainly creates a spaceless paradise.

Let me count the ways of paradise: from that of the Monkey King to that of Hong Xiuquan is a flight of two hundred thirty-two years, from that of Hong Xiuquan to that of Chairman Mao is a flight of twenty-nine.

The card-player threw down a King of Hearts, since he didn’t have an Ace of Hearts.

Five boys with running noses stand around the pool table: even lofty entertainment gets played mundanely.

Chairman Mao’s paradise befits the appetite of the poor; in Hong Xiuquan’s paradise there’s only him wandering around; but Monkey King’s paradise attracts both children and delinquents.

The only reality is a great reality. So-called happiness is just decreasing your vocabulary without decreasing your songs. Each day the little man who comprehends this hangs his stockings to dry while humming a tune.

Paradise lost, as it should be lost, committed to rote memory on page one thousand two hundred forty-six of the Dictionary of Modern Chinese.

Paradise lost, as if the head of a pin lost its elemental pax et lux. Making the creator of paradise labor in vain.

So, could it be, when you are absolutely thought-free, that you just happen to be passing through your own paradise? One thousand times you deny that you are your own distance.

from The Scenery      Friends

Zhang is having company, Li and Wang come together. Li orders. We eat like our lives depended on it.

Between all the toasts and refills we talk about recent events, from SARS to the bird flu to foot-and-mouth to mad cow disease. The animals have gone crazy, attacking kamikaze-style, but we pretend we’re sober.

We sigh that it’s passé to sigh over idealism being passé. We sing songs of the old days together, vigorously singing the ideas of a new era.

Wang pays the bill, and I say thanks.

The three of them get bloodshot eyes.

I say thanks. The three of them push back their chairs and crowd around me. I sense they’re up to no good, but can’t remember when I offended them.

Zhang says: “Let’s go!”

I say: “What are you doing?”

Li punches me.

I say: “What are you doing?”

Wang kicks me.

I say: “What are you doing?”

Zhang looks on, then spits in my face.

I say: “What are you doing?”

They beat me black and blue. Finally they’ve had their fill.

Sitting on the ground I can’t stop asking, “What are you doing?”

The three of them say in unison: “What do you think we’re doing?”


from Flower in the Mirror, Moon in the Water

  Companion

I still don’t know who she was.

I still don’t know if she walked into my yard and opened my front door in search of me or someone else.

She climbed onto my bed, sleeping through my insomnia, like a white candle that had lost its flame.

Holding her felt like crossing a mountain.

The half-moon shone onto my forehead through the rectangular window, like shining on a public square through a ghostlike haze,

and at least that night I never spoke freely,

I didn’t want to make her angry.

At least that night I barely breathed,

Because her heavy breathing made clear she was lonely and weary.

Oh, no, there is no “her” whose loneliness or weariness could be made clear by heavy breathing.

No night on which I barely breathed, or I wouldn’t be alive today.

I never make anyone angry.

I never speak freely it’s not my style.

I have in fact strolled through public squares, but never felt any ghostlike haze. I only allow the full moon to shine on my forehead through round windows.

I’ve never crossed mountains, never even imagined it.

And I never have insomnia, even if a white candle were dripping wax on my eyelids.

So I don’t know who “she” is, that much is certain.



What the Tang Did Not Have

Translated by Lucas Klein

All products of modernity aside, the Tang didn’t have, well, let’s count: in the Tang there wasn’t this, in the Tang there wasn’t that, uh, in the Tang there weren’t any Thinkers! In the Tang there were emperors and beautiful ladies and palaces and armies and officials, there were astrologers and the moon and the clouds and poets and minstrels and dancers, there were drunkards and hookers and revolts and stray dogs and wilderness and ice storms, there were the poor and the illiterate and national exams and nepotism… but in the Tang there were no Thinkers. How could that be? With no Thinkers, there could be jade and gold splendors; without Thinkers, everyone was worry free, especially the Emperor. Free to play. In the Tang, they played up the great Tang, poets played up their great poems (only after the middle of the dynasty did poets start to furrow their brows). There were so many poets in the Tang, it was like there hadn’t been any before the Tang! Not that in the Tang they thought that poets could take the place of Thinkers, but just that in the Tang there really weren’t any Thinkers. For anyone now who dreams of taking us back, let me just warn you: prepare your thoughts — either give us a second Tang dynasty without any Thinkers, or else give us something that isn’t the Tang.

So in the Tang there were no Thinkers, which shows in the eyes of Han Yu, who loved to rack his brains — well, Han Yu got himself all worked up. Han Yu considered himself some kind of Transmitter of the Great Moral Way, but he was envied by no one, because in the Tang they just didn’t think there was anything great in ranking as a Thinker. Let him go make his noises, let him build up his cerebral cortex, while we build up our lower bodies! But Han Yu was so serious. Han Yu supposed, perhaps there is a Creator, else how could the mountains and waters embody the majesty of their logic? Han Yu supposed, bugs being the outcome of rotten fruit, that humans must then have crawled from the rupture of Yin and Yang’s cosmic order. But hearing Han Yu spout his nonsense, no one didn’t burst out laughing. Just leave him be. Leave him be. Han Yu opposed the reception of the Buddha’s finger bone, so why shouldn’t Han Yu just leave the capital? Han Yu went to the Chaozhou riverside, where ten crocodiles mocked him and called him stupid. In his rage, Han Yu posted this warning by the river: Within seven days all you crocodiles must pack up and return to the sea, and anyone who dares disobey shall be killed without a further word! The crocodiles stuck out their tongues and dispersed in a huff, leaving Han Yu just a little bit more relaxed.

– from Thirty Historical Reflections


Drizzle


it’s not fur—it’s mold—mold on stones mold on bread
it’s drizzle
it’s drizzle that makes clothes grow moldy the spirit grow moldy—this is the decay drive
making wood sprout mushrooms making gums grow cankers—the very same force
making love grow mold—love couldn’t it use a bit of mold?
making the lyric grow mold—only this manifests the moldless lyric—the middle-aged lyric
mold’s just mildew—my mom said it’s a fungus—my dad said
mold on the shingles on the street after 11:00 p.m.
the tick-tock of the clock—
the hoarse voice the rain speaks in—
growing criminals loiterers waverers—these are the effects of drizzle
a wet woman—

eighty days of drizzle—not too long
eighty days of drizzle enveloping 120,000 square miles of land and sea—not too broad
a wet woman miserable and alone—
it’s drizzle that soaks shoes that drenches socks—freezing feet
and then the water pushes into our bodies
from bottom to top up into the brain—and all a vastness once there
drizzle falling on vast seas—cargo ships sailing to Asia—raining on Japanese courtyards
some grow old in China—
raining on factories far from the coastline water’s nonstop drip-drop—food prepared in an age neither fair nor foul
an age neither fair nor foul producing notions neither fair nor foul—
some die
the unlucky the unwilling migrate to the cities—where they don’t know a soul
rich and poor both get moldy
but the rich don’t worry—they can throw away whatever gets moldy—aside from themselves
a fair economy and a foul economy both get moldy
but the fair economy knows how to make money off mold
those things that can avoid the drizzle avoid mold
curses of the indignant—

a swelling of interior life—
seagulls and crows huge in size
cucumbers at the grocer’s huge in size—is it from all this drizzle?
hinges swelling—the sound of opening doors—dogs barking madly
the drive of dogs barking madly which is the drive of footsteps upstairs
which is the decay drive—the thanatos drive
manifest in the drizzle that is mold
the bald man with no hair but mold—this too is a new life
mildew and then a new life—
in the drizzle—
this is the force of drizzle, look—

Victoria, 2009


Answering Venus (45 fragments)…excerpts


1.

night is the sleep of seven wax moths

dawn is the singing of five mermaids

noon is the scratching of three field mice

dusk is the shadow of a crow

12.

I placed seventy-two iron chairs in a meadow

facing seventy-two stars in the northern sky

My point was; seventy-two sages have left us

14.

in sudden loneliness

someone who rarely worries can’t help but sob

30. POUND

lonely Ezra Pound peels a tangerine

when the moon soundlessly slips through the Atlantic sky

Ezra Pound broods on the whole of humanity

33.

when my life is a mess

my watch is particularly precise

34.

Crows resolve the problems of crows,

I resolve my own problems.

37.

no one has yet tested the pencil

to see how many words it can write

Mikhail Shishkin - a shining example in their classrooms that great Russian literature is not dead: Life is a string and death is the air. A string makes no sound without air

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Mikhail Shishkin, Maidenhair, Trans. by Marian Schwart, Open Letter Books, 2012.



Day after day the Russian asylum-seekers sit across from the interpreter and Peter—the Swiss officers who guard the gates to paradise—and tell of the atrocities they’ve suffered, or that they’ve invented, or heard from someone else. These stories of escape, war, and violence intermingle with the interpreter’s own reading: a his­tory of an ancient Persian war; letters sent to his son “Nebuchadnezzasaurus,” ruler of a distant, imaginary childhood empire; and the diaries of a Russian singer who lived through Russia’s wars and revolutions in the early part of the twentieth century, and eventually saw the Soviet Union’s dissolution.
Mikhail Shishkin’s Maidenhair is an instant classic of Russian literature. It bravely takes on the eternal questions—of truth and fiction, of time and timeless­ness, of love and war, of Death and the Word—and is a movingly luminescent expression of the pain of life and its uncountable joys.


"Maidenhair is as a whole a success, a potent, encyclopedic exploration of the art of storytelling. (...) Shishkin possesses an acute sense of the length of time he can spend in artful, fantastical language, and knows when he instead needs to tell a story that is easily comprehensible. His balancing of multiple narrative styles is perhaps the greatest feat of his narrative. For all that Shishkin does to craft a profound, beautiful work of literature, a potentially subpar translation occasionally disrupt the reader." - Grace E. Huckins


"Shishkin boldly manipulates his various materials (.....) Despite this potentially dehumanizing perspective, Shishkin finds faith of sorts in the next iteration of the story. A curiously beguiling, if exhausting, novel." - Publishers Weekly


“Briefly describe the reasons why you are requesting asylum,” comes an order in the early pages of Mikhail Shishkin’s Maidenhair. The response begins, “There was a voivode by the name of Dracula in the Orthodox land of Wallachia,” and continues with a story of Dracula’s cruelty, first to a pair of foreign ambassadors, next to his own soldiers, and finally to a crowd of peasants, for whom he threw a luscious banquet, then “ordered the building locked, surrounded with straw, and set on fire. And the fire was great, and all in it burned.”
This stunning response reveals the logic of Maidenhair, the first of Shishkin’s novels to be translated into English. Although Shishkin’s prodigious talent has been recognized for many years in his native Russia, as well as in Germany and France, until now English readers have only had access to “The Half-Belt Overcoat.” That story, translated by Leo Shtutin, appeared in the Read Russia! anthology published earlier this year, and was, to my mind, easily the best in the collection. Maidenhair more than lives up to its promise; beautifully translated by Marian Schwartz, it is a fierce book from a sharp and generous mind.
There are, roughly, three narrative lines which structure the novel: in one, a nameless interpreter (Shishkin’s alter-ego), who works with asylum seekers in Switzerland, writes letters to his absent son, “Nebuchadnezzasaurus.” In another, two voices of unknown or unstable identity engage in a series of questions and answers. In the last, a Russian singer named Bella Dmitrievna records her life, and most of the twentieth century, in diaries which the interpreter will eventually read when he attempts to write her biography. With these three strands, Maidenhair weaves its tangled braid, although contained within it are also a dizzying array of historical digressions, philosophical preoccupations, parables, letters, jokes, and literary allusions.
I hesitate to describe the book as “universal” lest this imply that its themes, or its treatment of them, are banal; they are not. On the contrary, they are wonderfully inventive. So when I say that Maidenhair is universal, I mean that it wants to constitute a universe — or perhaps a map of the universe that is the same size as the universe itself.
Maidenhair operates in an epic time that makes little or no distinction between a story and a life, and in a pagan cosmos that allows the world to be continuously created, destroyed, and created again. Whether the creation and destruction take place in word or in flesh is inconsequential; it amounts to the same thing. For Shishkin, everything is of one substance, and so what we encounter are not new stories (for there are no new stories), but rather variations on a theme: translations, interpretations.
Despite its breadth, the novel is a closed system, and everything and everyone in it is ultimately an incarnation of something else. The interpreter — also referred to as “the biographer,” “the teacher,” and once, “the thief” — is a troubled echo of a person, constantly finding himself, like the nymph in Greek mythology, with a breaking heart and an inability to speak except through other people’s words. He substitutes history and legend for the stories of his own life: his letters to his son are mainly spent recounting ancient battles; to describe the dissolution of his marriage, he casts his wife as Isolde, and her former lover, who died in a car accident, as Tristan. “You’re mixing everything up!” the imaginary figure of his teacher shouts at him, “You always mixed everything up! You’re a bungler.”
And indeed, everything is bungled. Characters wander in and out of each other’s stories, distinguishing features migrate from person to person, ancient Greeks are confused with Chechens, and refugees demand asylum because Dracula once lit a great fire.
But this is only because they are all caught up in the same, non-linear river of time, perpetually re-enacting the same stories. The interpreter finds his counterpart and double in Bella Dmitrievna, who, like him, has lost a lover and a child, and who, like him, is an interpreter. Even in her own writing, Bella has become a vessel for the words of others. “I am sound, word, and gesture,” she writes, quoting her acting teacher. In fact, she is almost always quoting someone, as is the interpreter, as is nearly everyone in the book. If the text is, as Roland Barthes says, a fabric of quotations, then it is for Shishkin the fabric of the universe. As the asylum seeker asserts: “We are what we say.”
“All our Russian disasters come from our contempt for the flesh,” Bella writes later. Although she is only parroting a comment she has not entirely understood, the sentiment is not made entirely in jest. Maidenhair is largely about the problem of writing, or at least the problem of narrating, and what saves it from being self-indulgent is precisely its rebellion against contempt for the flesh.
Shishkin has an animist mind; there are beautiful moments of minute observation scattered unexpectedly throughout the novel: speculations on the writings of beetles, for example, or about snow or grass. Everyone in Maidenhair is a writer or a storyteller, but writing and storytelling are not sacred activities; or at least, they are no more sacred than anything else that comes out of life. It was the detail of the finger in the wound that made the Resurrection credible, Shishkin writes; holiness is not in words but in words andfingers, words and insects, words and whales. Writing is no guarantee of immortality, nor, perhaps, is it important.
Shishkin has been described as the heir apparent of the great Russian novelists, and indeed, there are times when he seems to have taken the best from each of them. From Tolstoy he has inherited a sense for the epic; from Dostoevsky, spiritual acuity and a social conscience. He takes Nabokov’s remarkable linguistic flexibility but none of his arrogance; like Chekhov, he looks on humanity with humor and compassion. Shishkin’s Baroque turns of phrases seem written out of necessity and joy rather than pretention; he respects his readers, he delights in language, and he does not need to show off.
Dare I call him a happy Russian? Though Maidenhair is laced with political brutality and sorrow, it nevertheless embodies a kind of inner freedom, a clear-eyed belief in the value of life. With tender determination, characters urge each other to love and be happy, not because they wish to deny or even to combat suffering, but simply because they recognize that no feeling is final. Suffering is guaranteed, so we must make sure that joy is as well.
“Everything is always happening simultaneously,” Shishkin writes. “It’s a matter of time zones.” The reader may approach the end of the novelwith an increasing sense of déjà vu, and that is no accident. Everything starts to converge, or rather, we finally become aware of the convergence that has been there from the start.-

“Mikhail Shishkin’s Maidenhair is the type of novel that professors of Russian literature can hold up as a shining example in their classrooms that no, Russian literature is not dead (nor has it ever been), while those who might not know their Pushkin from their Shishkin can read and enjoy Maidenhair as a standalone work of literary brilliance; while at the same time the notoriously fickle American readers who might have read Anna Karenina when Oprah’s Book Club made their recommendation or stumbled upon and enjoyed Master & Margarita can sink their mindsteeth into Marian Schwartz’s incredible translation of Shishkin’s novel and marvel in the fact that Maidenhair harkens back to the great classic Russian novels of ideas in every way.”
Contemporary Russian literature all too often falls into a ghettoized section of world literature that keep fans of translated and international literature from fully enjoying the best works of the last twenty years. One problem is a tendency for Western sources to focus on the political elements in a Russian text that inevitably denigrates the quality of the literature itself. At the same time, too many scholars of Russian literature place contemporary Russian literature into a different ghetto altogether, with the predominant sentiment in American universities being that great Russian literature died once upon a time with Bulgakov or Pasternak. This fact is, of course, 100% not true. Both of these problems keep Russian literature from its proper place in discussions of world literature. We appreciate so many of the Russian classics as above politics and existent outside of but wholly influenced by the passage of historical time, while their themes are inherently but subtly political as they discuss the contradictions and distortions in the daily realities of the Russian society that combine to make the stories so timeless and powerful.
Mikhail Shishkin’s Maidenhair is the type of novel that professors of Russian literature can hold up as a shining example in their classrooms that no, Russian literature is not dead (nor has it ever been), while those who might not know their Pushkin from their Shishkin can read and enjoy Maidenhair as a standalone work of literary brilliance; while at the same time the notoriously fickle American readers who might have read Anna Karenina when Oprah’s Book Club made their recommendation or stumbled upon and enjoyed Master & Margarita can sink their mindsteeth into Marian Schwartz’s incredible translation of Shishkin’s novel and marvel in the fact that Maidenhair harkens back to the great classic Russian novels of ideas in every way.
Since his first novel came out in 1994, Shishkin has won Russia’s three most prestigious literary prizes: the Russian Booker, the National Bestseller, and the Big Book. Despite his prodigious and award-winning talents, Maidenhair is his first novel published in English, and will be formally released on October 23, 2012 by Open Letter Books. Shishkin’s former day job was as an interpreter in Switzerland; and he splits his time these days between Zurich and Moscow – both facts play in to the characters in Maidenhair. He has previously taught for a semester at Washington & Lee University in Virginia, and is returning to the USA in spring 2013 to teach a seminar at Columbia and to give talks across the country relating to Maidenhair. The international nature of Shishkin himself plays in to the narrative structure of Maidenhair, as his characters inhabit positions across the globe and throughout history all at once; the émigré Russian writer of the past has given way to the globalized Russian writer of the 21st century, wherein borders are insignificant, the author is at once entirely Russian and at the same time entirely a global citizen.
At its core, Maidenhair is a novel of ideas that reads like a 21st-century Tolstoy, concerned with the big questions of life, death, love, and everything in between:
…here, in the trenches, people never talk out loud about the main thing. People smoke, drink, eat, and talk about trivial things, boots, for instance… (251)
Maidenhair is a novel that talks about the main things constantly: faith and spirituality; the importance of enjoying fleeting moments of beauty in the face of death; throughout, the quest for love, affection, and human ethics touches on every character, and make themselves apparent in philosophical dialogue, mythological references, and spiritual ruminations:
Life is a string and death is the air. A string makes no sound without air. (150)
Maidenhair is at the same time, like the great works of Russian literature, above politics and timeless. Its narrative grace and the power of its ideas would feel every bit at home in literary salons alongside Tolstoy and Chekhov 1902, though it was written a full century later.
To discuss the plot of Maidenhair feels vulgar. It is hard to describe and seemingly banal. But as Zakhar Prilepin (another incredible contemporary Russian author who is awaiting his first published translation in America) discussed at a recent Read Russia event at Book Expo America, the plots of the greatest works of Russian literature are all exceedingly banal: young man kills a pawnbroker and an investigation follows; a young woman cheats on her husband with a young officer. What makes these stories original is not their plot but the presentation of the author’s ideas and their critiques of social mores that exist at once across the globe. So it is with Maidenhair. The plot is, in fact, rather banal; four narratives are interwoven throughout the novel: stories told by Russian refugees seeking asylum in Switzerland to a Russian interpreter working for the Swiss government; the interpreter’s trips to Italy and his subsequent estrangement from his wife and son; letters written by the interpreter to his son, addressing him as an emperor of a far-off made-up land, all starting out with, “Dear Nebuchadnezzasaurus!” and incorporating elements of historical and mythological texts the interpreter is reading on his breaks from work; and diary entries written by an Isabella on whom the interpreter was supposed to write a biography, who the not-so-average Western reader might not know is the famous Russian singer of the first half of the 20th-century, Isabella Yurieva*.
The interpreter is the only character that ties the four narratives together. The reader lives inside the nameless interpreter’s head, with the narratives combining throughout as a mixture of things that he is reading at the time (a lot of mythology and classical history), things he is working on (including the diary entries and the extensive Q&A sections with asylum-seekers), and things he is doing (trips to Italy, writing letters to his son). The style is confusing to discuss, but easy to read, because Shishkin repeats the themes of humanity’s interconnectedness throughout history and fate.
You just have to understand destiny’s language and its cooing. We’re blind from birth. We don’t see anything and don’t pick up on the connection between events, the oneness of things, like a mole digging its tunnel… (268)
Rather than discuss the plot structure and the “action” in the book, so as not to give away any of the brilliance in the text, it must be said that Maidenhair is a novel not to be understood (to use Shishkin’s own quote), but to be felt at every turn of the page, a novel to be processed as the narrative progresses, though the further you read, the less time matters, and you find yourself living inside a narrative world where everything is connected, and everything is happening all at once:
Before I just couldn’t understand how all this could be happening to me simultaneously, but I am now, loupe in hand, and at the same time I’m there, holding him close and feeling that I’m about to pass out, dying, I can’t catch my breath. But now I understand that it’s all so simple. Everything is always happening simultaneously. Here you are writing this line now, while I’m reading it. Here you are putting a period at the end of this sentence, while I reach it at the very same time. It’s not a matter of hands on the clock! They can be moved forward and back. It’s a matter of time zones. Steps of the dial. Everything is happening simultaneously, it’s just that the hands have gone every which way on all the clocks. (497)
Shishkin has declared in Russian-language interviews that Maidenhair is a novel about everything, and in more recent novels he attempts to solve humanity’s crisis of life and death. Maidenhair is no different.
This is what I believe: If somewhere on earth the wounded are finished off with rifle butts, that means somewhere else people have to be singing and rejoicing in life! The more death there is around, the more important to counter it with life, love, and beauty! (328)
Everything in the book makes sense together, even when reading and the narrative shifts from the singer’s diary in the 1920s to the interpreter’s mystical Q&A session with a refugee to Rome and to letters, everything is connected to the greater whole of what Shishkin is attempting to create, an entire universe of beauty, of yearning for love, of life in the face of death, of the history in everything, all tied in to the much greater questions of God’s role in everything:
The divine idea of the river is the river itself. (24)
The title of the book is emblematic of Shishkin’s themes of God and love at the same time: maidenhair is a type of fern that grows wild in Rome, the Eternal City that plays such a central role in the novel. Yet in Russia, maidenhair is a house plant that cannot grow without human care and affection:
For us, this is a house plant, otherwise it wouldn’t survive, without human warmth, but here it’s a weed. So you see, this is in a dead language, signifying something alive: Adiantum capillus veneris. Venus hair, genus Adiantum. Maidenhair. God of life. The wind barely stirs. As if nodding, yes yes, that’s true: this is my temple, my land, my wind, my life. The greenest of grasses. It grew here before your Eternal City and will grow here after. (500)
Even the epigraph to Maidenhair is so significant to the work that it deserves to be quoted, for it contains the essence of what Shishkin is up to:
And your ashes will be called, and will be told:
“Return that which does not belong to you;
reveal what you have kept to this time.”
For by the word was the world created, and by the word shall we be resurrected.
–Revelation of Baruch ben Neriah. 4, XLII
The theme of the word is one of the big themes that recur throughout Maidenhair in each narrative, with the importance of the recorded dialogue in the interpreter’s mission or in the diary entries of Isabella. The themes are complex and deep, but the sentiments expressed in them, the emotion of the characters that come through in the text, are all human and completely relatable. The most important themes that are discussed throughout the work include God (faith and spirituality), fate (and the individual), time (and time/space), war (across time and history), history (or the power of memory), diaspora (especially interesting as Shishkin spends much of his time outside of Russia, yet remains a quintessentially Russian writer), intertextuality (as a narrative and rhetorical style, and for the novel’s use of text-in-text-in-text), Russia’s role in the world (and their view of themselves in the world), the role of art in human society (the power of beauty to transcend the mundane day-to-day), migration/immigration (and the connection to paradise myths), mythology (of all stripes), Rome (after all, it is the Eternal City, so emblematic of humanity’s Eternal Problems) . . . The list could go on forever, the themes are huge, the book is a page-turner, not in the sense of plot-twists, but in the sense that every page contains a new revelation.
May I make one recommendation to you, the future reader of this brilliant novel? If so, please be an active reader while you read this book: keep a pen in hand, Post-It notes at the ready, or your e-book highlighting function at the ready, because every single page in this book contains ideas encapsulated in perfect quotes that you will want to revisit, along with the entirety of the novel, time and time again.
Maidenhair is the first Russian book of the 21st-century to appear in English translation that can be truly counted as an instant classic in the broad field of world literature, capable of being taught in university classrooms and discussed in book clubs for centuries to come. Every individual, every emotion, every idea that humanity has ever generated and will forever generate is encapsulated in the 500 pages of Maidenhair. With its perfect combination of style and substance, Maidenhair might just be the book you’ve been waiting your entire life to read. - Will Evans
 
“Have you understood your rights and responsibilities and that no one gets into paradise anyway?” Peter, a government official, is the man who decides the fate of the men and women seeking refugee status in Switzerland. His formal, matter-of-fact interview style (Name? Age? Reason for requesting asylum?) obscures Peter’s true aim: he’s really just trying to uncover lies. For the petitioners, it’s a harrowing experience. How can you convince anyone of the truth when the only evidence you have is your word? Any other corroborating materials—documents, the testimony of loved ones—you’ve had to leave behind. What if the “reason for asylum,” the story you tell the ever-skeptical Peter, is all that remains?
Mikhail Shishkin’s third novel, Maidenhair, attempts to answer this and a host of other questions on the nature of life and death, love, war, and God. It is an ambitious novel that defies easy summary. Events in the lives of two characters—a Russian interpreter who works with Peter, and a singer from the early twentieth century—serve as jumping-off points for page after page of the author’s lyric, stream-of-consciousness prose. The writing is often so tightly packed with literary allusion and verbal trickery that it makes googling every second sentence a constant temptation. The book follows a kind of dream-logic that holds together only when you stop trying to work out what’s going on. Whatever meaning exists is sensory and associative, like the flickering stuff of memory. Here’s an example passage, chosen more or less at random:
That’s how to slide away from time, from Herod, downhill on frozen manure. Eyes watering in the cold, night clouds overlapping, the track sparkly, snake-bodied. There aren’t so very many people on earth, in fact: on resurrection day it’s really going to fill up. That’s how I remembered that room: winter in one window, and branches of flowering lilac in another nudging a cloud. Bottles along the tracks, but no message in any of them.
This moves on, in the same dozen-page-long paragraph, to merge seamlessly into the interpreter’s memories; these recollections consist of events from his own life, horrifying tales from the asylum-seekers, and half-remembered snippets of ancient history and myth. Speakers and subjects change without warning, and just when you’ve gotten completely lost, you half-recognize something—an object, a name, a place—but can’t quite remember why. The curious effect throughout these passages is that you are bombarded with stories and experiences that, though you’ve not encountered them before, feel familiar. The intellectual sensation is like having some impossibly elusive word on the tip of your tongue.
Shishkin presents large sections of the book in an unusual question-and-answer format. This begins as a transcript of the interviews Peter and the interpreter conduct with asylum-seekers, most of whom escaped (or claim to have escaped) from the wars in Chechnya. After a while, the roles of questioner and answerer merge: “And once again question-answer, question-answer. It’s like talking to yourself. You ask yourself the questions. And answer them.” The questions start to become longer—and more revealing—than the answers
The only discernable plot exists in the notebooks of Isabella, a young girl from Rostov who dreams of becoming a famous singer. The book includes sections of her diary entries, small islands of much-appreciated realism. Her observations are often banal and self-pitying (“I have such ugly hands!”).  But as she grows up and survives war and revolution, she arrives at a coping mechanism that Shishkin will take up later: “The more death there is around, the more important to counter it with life, love, and beauty!” For Isabella, this is a philosophy of convenience: “I want to sing. It’s not my fault that my youth came in time of war! I won’t get another youth!” In the novel as a whole, however, Isabella’s justifications raise the question of whether there is zero-balance relationship between good and evil, life and death, love and hate. Can the bad be “countered” by the good?
Shishkin is often seen as a kind of hybrid between Lev Tolstoy and James Joyce. He uses experimental forms to probe the kinds of earnest, what-is-the-meaning-of-it-all questions that have been out of fashion since, well, Tolstoy. And, much like War and Peace, Shishkin’s Maidenhair is a novel about everything: it explores the workings of the world, history, memory, and mankind’s interaction with the divine. This novel is an attempt to create and explain everything in existence.
In Russia, Shishkin’s books are known for being at once difficult and extremely rewarding. As an extraordinary prose stylist, Shishkin has license to be unconventional simply because the text itself is so beautiful. The danger in translation is obvious: the more the English falters or fails to enchant, the closer the novel approaches complete unreadability. Marian Schwartz’s spectacular translation, which is far more than a bulwark against this eventuality, triumphs in its own right. The long passages of constantly shifting voices and registers come off effortlessly. The only part of the translation that seemed odd was the faithful replication of the Russian footnotes for foreign words and phrases. While it is the convention in Russian, what is to be gained by explaining things like “Herr Fischer” in a note (“Mr. Fischer [Ger.]”) for English-speakers?  But these are extremely minor infelicities.  And they pale beside Schwartz’s overwhelming accomplishment.
Maidenhair is likely a work of genius—as many in Russia and elsewhere believe—and the key to understanding the novel must lie in Shishkin’s descriptions of beauty in the everyday.  Take this passage, where the interpreter observes his sleeping lover: "Where did the girl swim to at night, one arm forward, under the pillow, the other hand back, palm up and you so wanted to kiss that palm but you were afraid to wake her up?" I could quote hundreds more like this. The mistake in interpretation is to try to add these moments up to create a grand, overarching message. In the end, the value resides in the descriptions themselves, in the stories and words. That is where salvation lies:
Resurrection of the flesh. Out of nothingness, out of the void, out of white plaster, out of a dense fog, out of a snowy field, out of a sheet of paper there suddenly will appear people, living bodies, they rise up to remain forever, because they can’t vanish, disappearing is simply not an option; death has already come and gone. First the contour, outlines, edges. Period, period, comma makes a crooked little face. Cross-out. The man stretches from this crack in the wall to that spot of sun. Stretches from nail to nail.
Let’s hope this is not wishful thinking. If Shishkin is right about the power of words to resurrect the dead, Maidenhair has all but secured his immortality. - Christopher Tauchen

 Maidenhair seems like an unusual novel, first offering one thing then another, and certainly not offering some story with a nice arc from beginning to end. The protagonist is known only as 'the interpreter'. He lives in Switzerland and is employed as a translator for Russian-speaking asylum-seekers (and the occasional prisoner) when they deal with the authorities. Years earlier, when he was still living in Russia (where he was 'the teacher'), he had been hired by a publisher to write the biography of long-lived singer Bella Dmitrievna, born in Czarist Russia and surviving well past the downfall of the Soviet empire; the project collapsed, but long excerpts from her reminiscences and diaries -- the raw material he was to use -- are included in the novel. There are also the letters he writes to his son, whom he calls his Nebuchadnezzasaurus, as well as some episodes from his own life.
       Maidenhair consists of a variety of life-accounts. The biggest chunk is devoted to Bella's life, but there are also transcriptions of many of the interviews with asylum-seekers where the interpreter is the middle-man (neither posing nor answering questions, and yet an essential conduit). The Swiss official the interpreter works for, Peter Fischer, is the: "Master of fates", determining what becomes of the asylum-seekers. As he explains about the interrogations:
It's about clarifying circumstances. In order to keep them out of paradise, we have to ferret out what really happened. But how can you of people become the stories they tell ? You just can't. That means it's all very simple. Since you can't clarify the truth, you at least need to clarify the lie.
       The stories Peter and the interpreter hear are often horrible -- yet clearly, too, the asylum-seekers are manipulating the facts or in some cases even simply inventing stories which they know will make their applications more likely to be accepted. Doubting Peter has seen most of the tricks, and sees through most of these -- but Shishkin presents these encounters largely simply in Q & A form, with little embellishment or interpretation: the stories as given.
       Early on an asylum seeker explains:
Those speaking may be fictitious, but what they say is real. Truth lies only in where it is concealed. Fine, the people aren't real but the stories, oh the stories are ! [...] What difference does it make who it happened to ? It's always a sure thing. The people here are irrelevant. It's the stories that can be authentic or not. You just need to tell an authentic story. Just the way it happened. And not invent anything. We are what we say. A freshly planned destiny is packed with people no one needs, like an ark; all the rest is the floodgates of heaven. We become what is written in the transcript. The words.
       Indeed, the focus is on the stories -- and so, for example, the interpreter also has little sense of what become of these people after their interviews, regardless of the outcome: the people are reduced to these brief life-summaries that they have tailored for themselves (for this specific purpose).
       Maidenhair presents this array of life-stories, that range from appropriated ones to the ones people fashion for themselves out of their own facts. The interpreter is desperate for stories: he constantly whinges in his letters to his son that he hears so little from him -- i.e. complains that he doesn't have the son's own narrative, allowing him to form a better picture of the distant boy. Foolishly, too, he would occasionally look into his wife's diary -- and find there the alternative narratives she toyed with, as she clearly never entirely got over the loss of her first love in a tragic accident. Aside from Bella's diaries and reminiscences, the interpreter also retreats into historical accounts -- adapting them to his own reality: stories from Xenophon, Tristan and Isolde, Daphnis and Chloe (which comes up in one of the interrogations), and the like.
       The interpreter meets a former teacher while in Rome, and she complains to him:
You're mixing everything up ! You've always mixed everything up ! You're a bungler.
       Maidenhair displays that confusion -- yet the bungling is as revealing as any ostensible clarity.
       Bella wonders in her reminiscences, looking far, far back:
     But why do I remember it ? Who needs to know about a nonexistent number in a nonexistent cloakroom ? After all, no one is going to hang my coat, the hand-me-down from my sisters, on that hook. And never again in winter after classes will I go down to the cloakroom and pull on the detested thick trousers under my school dress and tie my hood before setting off for home. My home doesn't even exist. Nothing I once had now exists. No one and nothing.
    Or maybe it does. Here it is, before my eyes, the auditorium on the second floor where the windows' reflections can snake so over the parquet floor.
       Shishkin is fascinated by the concept of the narratives we create for ourselves, whether entirely imagined, or based on what we think is memory and fact. Yet he doesn't ram that idea down readers' throats; he merely offers it here, in many variations, but also allows the stories themselves to be spun out. It makes for an unusual novel -- unusual in the sense that it is unlike what one has encountered before, and unlike what one has come to expect. It expands, in a small but significant way, our understanding of what the novel can be and do -- quite a remarkable achievement.
       A big, odd novel, well worth experiencing.

       Note that the German edition of Maidenhair comes with nearly two-hundred endnotes, while the English version offers little more than footnotes that translate phrases and the like that are in other languages (although one also finds the odd lone explanatory footnote 20: "A reference to Gogol's 'Diary of a Madman'") -- and additional foot- or endnotes might have been helpful with regards to some (or many ...) of the references. (Oddly, too, for all the translated German, Latin, French, and Italian names and exchanges, the shout: "Eloi ! Eloi ! Lama sabachthani ?" at the book's closing remains unfootnoted or translated; is that really such a given ?) - M.A.Orthofer


Russia has one of the world’s great literary traditions, which for many is defined by bearded sages who write philosophically and morally committed mega-tomes. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn fit that mold, and not uncoincidentally was the last Russian author to attain global fame.
Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, American audiences still expect Russian writers to conform to the dissident vs. tyrant stereotype. Contemporary Russian prose is far richer than that, and since 1991 all kinds of writing have blossomed.
One of the most acclaimed authors is Mikhail Shishkin, a multiple-award winner at home and in Europe, whose novel Maidenhair has just been published in an elegant English rendering by translator Marian Schwartz.
The first thing to stress about Maidenhair is that any attempt at summarizing the novel’s extraordinary complexity will fail miserably. “Day after day the Russian asylum-seekers sit across from the interpreter and Peter — the Swiss officers who guard the gates to paradise — and tell of the atrocities they’ve suffered, or that they’ve invented, or heard from someone else.” So reads the first sentence of the publisher’s blurb, and while technically true it makes the book sound like a worthy, potentially tedious exercise.
In fact, the most important information is contained in the subsidiary clauses — that many of these stories are untrue, or legendary. For although the Swiss officers’ Q&A sessions begin in realistic mode, they rapidly mutate as the interrogations roam across time and space, blending myth, history, hearsay and memory. The identities of the speakers become blurred, as if the stories themselves and not the speakers control the narrative.
Shishkin also blends in other modes of writing. For instance, his narrator writes letters to his son, “Nebuchadnezzasaurus.” At first they discuss school and history before the writer details the breakdown of his relationship with his son’s mother. As the novel progresses, Shishkin incorporates the diaries of a real-life Soviet-era singer into the text.
Thus Maidenhair exhibits an extraordinary multiplicity of voices, eras and styles. It is this, not politics, that has made Shishkin an occasionally controversial author in Russia. His allegedly demanding style, his use of found material and even his residence in Switzerland have provoked and alienated critics, with one even claiming that he would “eat his underpants in public” if Maidenhair sold more than 50,000 copies — which it did in the first 12 months following publication. Sadly, the boxer shorts were not ingested.
Maidenhair is neither dry nor difficult. It is a delight to read. Yes, the book addresses the Russian experience, but it is not post-Soviet exotica. Shishkin has spoken of a desire to return Russian literature to its place in world culture, and he addresses themes that affect everyone — love, loss, war, illness, guilt, fear, death — without ever becoming trite or banal.
In short, Maidenhair is the best post-Soviet Russian novel I have read. Simply put, it is true literature, a phenomenon we encounter too rarely in any language.- Daniel Kalder

 I love novels like Mikhail Shishkin’s Венерин волос– the title means, literally, Venus Hair, and Marian Schwartz is translating it as Maidenhair for Open Letter, for the fern the name denotes – that seep into my thoughts and occupy my mind so much that any other reading, whether a newspaper or another book, feels like an intrusion. I’ll try to explain without giving away too much… I enjoyed Maidenhair’s unexpected twists and transitions so was glad I didn’t know many specifics before I began reading.
If forced to summarize, I’d say Maidenhair is an omnibus of life – or maybe Life – that presents full ranges of pain and joy, simplicity and complexity, truth and fiction, love and war, and, of course, Mars and Venus. Maidenhair is relentlessly literary, with references to mythology and history that cross timelines and borders, but it is also relentlessly readable, even suspenseful, if you’re willing to accept its flow. I’ve heard complaints about Maidenhair’s naturalism but I think the book would felt terribly empty without it. In summary:
И всегда так было: кому-то отрубают голову, а у двоих в толпе на площади перед эшафотом в это время первая любовь.”
“And that’s how it’s always been: at the same time someone’s head is being lopped off, two in the crowd, on the square in front of the scaffold, are in love for the first time.”
And that, dear readers – along with attendant marriages, births, bust-ups, ambitions, aging, and finding balance in the world – is how I see the crux of Maidenhair. A richly stitched, multi-layered homage to the coexistence of love and death. (NB: Without Woody Allen.) One other thing: Maidenhair also reminds that we, along with the stories we live and tell, repeat, like doubles. Shishkin reinforces the importance of our written stories in several ways. Characters mention written records and repeat old stories (I’m not telling). And the interpreter visits the remains of St. Cyril, co-creator of Cyrillic, in Rome, because those letters mean so much to him. Rome, as Eternal City, by the way, plays an important role in Maidenhair. So do belly buttons.
Yes, Maidenhair lacks a single unified plot and its story threads, knitted together by history, chance, and archetypes, sometimes wander. A lot, which can make the reading challenging but very rewarding. Two characters anchor the novel: a Russian speaker who interprets immigration interviews for Swiss authorities and a female singer named Izabella. We read Q&A sessions, we read of the interpreter’s family problems, and we read Izabella’s intermittent diaries, where we witness her growth from gushing teenager to a wife resigned to a husband’s infidelities.
Though the book’s structure and histories may sound complicated, despite familiar tropes, even Shishkin says the core is simple. Shishkin says in an interview in Contemporary Russian Fiction: A Short List: Russian Authors Interviewed by Kristina Rotkirch, that Maidenhair presents the concept “that life is not only in Russia, life is not only fear and is not at all to be feared – life is to be enjoyed.” At the 2011 London Book Fair, Shishkin likened Maidenhair and Взятие Измаила(The Taking of Ishmael)to conversations he hadn’t had with his parents. I heard Shishkin say that before I read Maidenhair,and I found the thought particularly moving after I read the book and felt the cathartic effect of its portrayal and cataloguing of the kindnesses and brutalities that life -- and thus our parents -- give us.
With difficult conversations in mind, here’s another line that struck me in its emblematic simplicity. It’s from a letter written by Izabella’s boyfriend, a soldier in World War 1:
Это я с тобой разговариваю обо всем на свете, а здесь, в окопах, вообще никогда не говорят вслух о главном – люди курят, пьют, едят, разговаривают о пустяках, о сапогах, например.
“I can speak with you about anything in the world but here, in the trenches, nobody ever talks out loud about the main thing – people smoke, drink, eat, and speak of trivial things, boots, for example.”
Of course boots are pretty important to a soldier, but his meaning is clear: the minutiae of life are fine but death, the underlying main thing, is off the list. Things probably aren’t so different for civilians.
After staring at Maidenhair’s spineon my shelf for more than a year, a bit afraid of it after hearing its reputation for difficulty, I’m happy I read straight through without researching too much as I read. It’s not that I felt lazy: I think it was important to accept the book’s flow – Maidenhair has such a mesmerizing flow that one friend likened it to a fountain – so I could appreciate the cumulative emotional effect and heady surprises of all those drops, lives, histories, people, stories, and words that Shishkin piles on. Though I picked up plenty of references, I know I missed nuances (and more) because of my lopsided knowledge of history and classics, but I’ll save a detailed analysis of Maidenhair’s shards of history, mythology, language, and, yes, Rome for another reading.
Also: Maidenhair won the National Bestseller prize in 2005.
Level for Non-Native Readers of Russian: Close to top difficulty, though some portions, particularly the diary, are easy reading in terms of bare vocabulary.- lizoksbooks.blogspot.com/

Understanding is Not the Most Important Thing: Shishkin, Schwartz, and Post in Conversation

By Katherine Sanders

 
At the end of Book Expo America events on June 7, readers gathered at McNally Jackson Books for a Bridge Series discussion with Russian author Mikhail Shishkin, his translator Marian Schwartz, and editor Chad Post about Maidenhair (being released in October by Open Letter), a groundbreaking novel that traces both personal and collective histories through fact and fiction.  Shishkin and Shwartz started the discussion by reading from the first chapter in both the original Russian and the English translation. It is mesmerizing:
Question: Briefly describe the reasons why you are requesting asylum in Switzerland.
Answer: I lived in an orphanage since I was ten. Our director raped me. I ran away. At the bus stop I met drivers taking trucks across the border. One took me out.
Question: Why didn’t you go to the police and file a statement against your director?
Answer: They would have killed me.
The format of this conversation, and many like it throughout the novel, no doubt come directly from Shishkin’s own experience working as a translator for Asylum Seekers within Switzerland’s Immigration Department. The book is filled with these interviews as well as diary entries from a Russian singer living in war-torn Russia in the early twentieth century, and letters the protagonist writes to his young son whom he nicknames “Nebuchadnezzasaurus.” Shishkin has lived in Germany and spent many years in Switzerland, but he was born and attended school in Moscow. Fans of his work talk about his unique approach to the Russian language, and perhaps this comes from his conscientious distance from the motherland. Shishkin himself said from an early age he felt that “the Russian language is my enemy.” He didn’t relate to the “great, mighty Russian language” taught to him in school and, as a writer, he tried to bring what he termed “dead words” to life.
One way Shishkin brings his prose to life is by filling it with the voices of many characters. Translator Marian Schwarz talked about the challenge of recreating all these voices in English. She admitted that when she first started the project she received a more-than-forty-page document of explanatory notes from Shishkin himself to aid with the translation, but “even this wasn’t enough.” Considering not just the voices, but the various registers within these voices, along with allusions, neologisms, palindromes, and what Schwartz called a “fantasmagorical group monologue,” translating Maidenhair was no simple work. She talked about recognizing early in the process that translating this book would mean not just bringing it to a new language, but recreating its artistry in a new language. “I had to find a way to make English do what he does with Russian,” she said.
It was clear that Shishkin and Schwartz had a high level of trust for each other. In another interview about having his work translated, Shishkin has said, “I would compare the situation with the theater—like a director, a translator must feel completely free. The translation is like an adaptation for the stage, an interpretation.” Shishkin not only gave Schwartz a dynamic text to translate and supplementary text to support that translation, but also his total trust. As Schwartz noted, she often had to make difficult decisions, even cutting a sentence or passage altogether if it just didn’t work in English, which Shishkin fully supported. The overall effect is a stunning work in English that is sensitive to characters, voices, and emotions, and despite being over five hundred pages long, is constantly engaging.
A draft of this translation was delivered to Chad Post, Director of Open Letter Books, who immediately fell in love with it. Maidenhair includes a combination of letters, diary entries, official reports, interviews, and stories wrapped up into a mosaic-like, yet seamless, narrative. Post echoed Knizhnaya Vitrina, a Russian book reviews publication, in saying, “this is the kind of book they give the Nobel Prize for.” Post is a translation enthusiast, having worked at Dalkey Archive Press before founding the University of Rochester’s Open Letter Books more than five years ago. The press’s mission is “to increase access to world literature for English readers” and Post knew immediately that Maidenhair would open up not only contemporary Russian literature to new readers, but give them an unforgettable reading experience. Post described the process of reading the book as sometimes ambiguous. The reader is left “not always knowing what is going on,” but the overall aesthetic creates an instinctual coherence along with a sense of searching and wonderment.
Shishkin summed up this feeling another way when he said, “Understanding is not the most important thing.” He talked about the phenomena of being in love, “you don’t know how it works, you just love.” He explained that he had the chance to read his mother’s diaries from when she was a teenager living in the 1940s and 1950s in Russia. At first he was shocked and disappointed that there were little to no references in those entries to the important historical events that were going on at the time; instead she wrote about her everyday life and her ongoing hope of finding love. Shishkin soon came to realize that her writing wasn’t from a simple naïveté, but a seeking for love in dark times—“seeking beauty in a world filled with destruction.” This in turn led him to write Maidenhair, “a book about human warmth.”
This human warmth was felt at McNally Jackson as guests lined up to purchase advance copies of the book and have Shishkin sign them. People seemed reluctant to leave. One of my favorite moments during the evening was when Shishkin told a story about a man who was imprisoned and drew a picture of the ocean and a boat on the wall of his cell. He drew it with great care and detail until it was completed. Then one day the guards realized the prisoner was no longer in his cell and the drawing had disappeared too. “Reading is part of my struggle for human dignity,” said Shishkin. And maybe this is more important than understanding—human dignity and warmth; and we can expect an abundance of both from the pages of Maidenhair.

PW Talks with Mikhail Shishkin 

By Olga Ro 

One of the most prominent names in modern Russian literature, Mikhail Shishkin, will have his novel Maidenhair, translated by Marian Schwartz, published by Open Letter Books at the University of Rochester in October.
It is thought that literature is becoming more and more shaped by fashion and molded by consumerism. Against such a landscape, what prospects do you foresee for Russian literature?
Russian literature is marked by one overriding tradition, that is, never compromise and never become subservient. Any writer who is too concerned about marketing issues and who starts writing a novel by calculating its readership ceases to be a writer and becomes a slave to the market instead. You cannot simply go out and join some kind of “ism” and write according to its rules. You cannot give birth to somebody else’s child, but only to your own. Writing is always a ritual, an application or repetition of a magic formula. I call it magic for I never know how it works, and it all seems like chemistry to me. Only when my book is finally in print and gains reader approval do I know that I have found the right recipe. Then the next time I have to start all over again, right from scratch. In Russian literature these days there are a number of strong and talented writers out there, but who defines its contemporary face will only become clear in 50 years’ time, say. At the moment we all stand as a group at the feet of Tolstoy.
You’ve been translated into 20 languages. This year your books have made a breakthrough into the English-speaking world with Maidenhair in the U.S., and British Quercus has bought the rights to Letter-Book. Is this an opportune moment for quality contemporary Russian prose?
In general publishers are afraid of serious literature in translation. There is a real risk of investing significant amounts of money into projects with unclear sales prospects. A good publisher is not the one who only publishes mass market bestsellers, but the one who is also able to turn quality literature into bestsellers. Translations into English are long overdue, and literary agents and book fairs have certainly played a very significant role in this process.
Your books use allusions and linguistic experiments. Do you think that your style presents a challenge for translators?
I have always been intrigued by the legend of 70 independent people who translated the Bible into Greek and they each produced an identical text. My experience is quite different: a sample translation of Letter-Book made by three independent translators had no single phrase alike. This does not mean to say that the translations are good or bad, it is simply how it is. I can only help the translators with an overall understanding of a Russian text and then I have to leave them alone to struggle with their own language.
What should an American reader be prepared for when picking up Maidenhair? What is the book about? Where did the idea come from and how much of your personal experience does it reflect?
When people open Maidenhair they see some of their own life set out before them. It is not simply about some exotic Russian problem but about a human being, a knot of entangled human lives and corresponding destinies. It is also all about my life. My experience as an interpreter for refugees in Switzerland at their “Ministry of Defense of Paradise,” as we could call it, is woven into the novel. Even though there is much cruelty in the narrative, the novel is really about humanity and love, both of which help to overcome violence. The title of the novel, Maidenhair, is taken from the name of a fern, Adiantum capillus veneris. This fern grows like a weed in the Eternal City of Rome, the setting for the end of the novel. In Russia this type of fern is a houseplant that would perish without human love and care. My novel is about love and care in its various guises.
Will there be a promotional tour in the U.S.A. coinciding with the release of this book? Will you be coming to BookExpo 2012?
Yes, I have been invited to New York for BookExpo, there will be galleys, and there are planned readings and presentations in various cities. I know and I love the U.S.A. for I have visited quite a number of times, and on two occasions I have taught a semester at a university.

A virtuosic translation of Shishkin’s ‘Maidenhair’
A virtuosic translation of Shishkin’s ‘Maidenhair’
Shishkin started “Maidenhair” more than a decade ago, but had to rewrite it when he moved to Switzerland where he “translated words into destiny.” Source: PhotoXpress.

Many people say Mikhail Shishkin is Russia’s greatest contemporary novelist. He was the first Russian writer to win all three major literary awards. His work is rich and complex; his style is uniquely textured and allusive. His 2005 novel “Maidenhair” appears this month in Marian Schwartz’s virtuosic English translation. His latest, “Pismovnik,” will follow next spring.
“Maidnehair” is published on October 23rd 2012 (November 8th in U.K.) by Open Letter Books, University of Rochester]
Shishkin said in a recent speech at Oxford University that an author is “a link between two worlds.” The hero of “Maidenhair” is – as Shishkin himself was – an interpreter for the Swiss immigration authorities; this character is also an interface between realities. The novel opens with a reference to Xenephon, which the interpreter is reading during his breaks, and then plunges into a series of interviews with asylum seekers, often from Chechnya, recounting horrors; “I lived in an orphanage since I was ten. Our director raped me.”
Both questions and answers morph into a series of evocative monologues, interspersed by memories, letters to the interpreter’s son, or extracts from the diaries of a Russian singer of whom the interpreter was once meant to write a biography. Her personal loves and tragedies give the novel a human core.
“Maidenhair” is not light reading. The interlocking narratives fuse and fragment in this literary masterpiece, whose ambitious goal encompasses the recreation of language in order to express truths about love and death, loss and happiness. One idea that weaves its way into each of the stories is that “whoever can be happy right now, should,” that pain and joy are connected: “True enjoyment of life can only be felt if you’ve known suffering.”
Whole pages without paragraphs catalogue the minutiae of personal recollections, the details of life that mean nothing and everything. There are references to detective novels as the narrator tries to infer the truth from tiny clues.  The “Maidenhair” of the title is a fern that grows wild among the Roman ruins the interpreter visits with his wife. This delicate, green weed “grew here before your Eternal city and will grow here after.”
It is one of many recurring images that come to signify so much, like the disappointingly muddy River Tiber, representing reality: “You have to love that Tiberian world!” the interpreter’s re-imagined teacher tells him towards the end. She also criticizes the novel’s key stylistic feature: “You always mixed everything up!” The ancient Greeks are one thing, the Chechens another, the teacher tells him, but in Shishkin’s tale, they become aspects of united human experience. Soldiers and lovers tell their stories: “And there will always be war for tomorrow.”
Shishkin started “Maidenhair” more than a decade ago, but had to rewrite it when he moved to Switzerland where he “translated words into destiny.” It has less in common with self-conscious postmodernism than with the fresh experiments of the early twentieth century. Shishkin’s work has been described as “refined neo-modernism”. His dense, lyrical prose suggests the influence of “Ulysses”, but Shishkin objects that “Joyce doesn’t love his heroes”; in “Maidenhair” love is the crucial answer to most of the hundreds of questions.
In another image from the novel, a prisoner carefully scratches a boat on the wall of his cell until one day he steps into it and sails away. Art can change and restore reality: “Unless life is transformed into words, there will be nothing,” Shishkin said in Oxford. After a century of “decrees from above, prayers from below” and the prison slang that rose to fill the vacuum, “the language of Russian literature is an ark, an island of words where human dignity is supposed to be preserved.”
It’s a huge mission for a writer and there is sometimes an unbearable intensity as the metaphors sprout and writhe throughout the novel. But however difficult they are, to read or to summarize, it is hard to wish the five hundred breathtaking pages of “Maidenhair” any less than they are.

Suzanne Scanlon - A series of fragmentary tales about Lizzie on a journey through psychiatric institutions: Language ruins everything: thought and impressions and each particular sensation

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Suzanne Scanlon, Promising Young Women, Dorothy, a publishing project, 2012.

A series of fragmentary tales tells the story of Lizzie, a young woman who, in her early twenties, unexpectedly embarks on a journey through psychiatric institutions, a journey that will end up lasting many years. With echoes of Sylvia Plath, and against a cultural backdrop that includes Shakespeare, Woody Allen, and Heathers, Suzanne Scanlon’s first novel is both a deeply moving account of a life of crisis and a brilliantly original work of art.

“Suzanne Scanlon enters the inverted space of grief and near-madness with courage, intelligence, and wit—and with a small, sharp light for us to follow.” - dawn raffel

“About ten lives occur in this very short novel. One swiftly becomes the background of the next, then that one looms up fast and for a moment you think oh this is the life. And it is ending. I like the swift consciousness with which Suzanne Scanlon orchestrates all of it and even more I admire the true (and maneuvered) intimacy that holds me here on the page despite the fact that inside and out of this volume of Promising Young Women there are so many of us, lives, and women and female writers. You wonder if we matter at all and Suzanne Scanlon says in a multitude of quietly intelligent and felt ways that we do, helplessly, all of us do, no matter.” - eileen myles

“In pitch-perfect prose, Suzanne Scanlon has given us wonderful Lizzie—smart, brave, and, at the same time, so scared stiff by her young life that that she winds up on a psych ward run by Dr. Roger, whose specialty is 'troubled, pretty girls.' Promising Young Women digs deep and speaks to us all about how we compose our individual lives in the wilds of modern times.” - elizabeth evans

“If Scanlon had employed the strategies of conventional realism, these troubling but utterly convincing stories of life in and out of psych wards would be mere bathos. Written through the liveliest sort of formal invention, they acquire real force and authority. The reader is driven before the story like something driven before a wave. And that is a deeply pleasurable feeling.”curtis white

“The voice, or voices, in Suzanne Scanlon’s Promising Young Women are sly, tragic, knowing, wounded, and brave. This wholly original novel is a wonderfully refreshing addition to the many stories that tell us the news of women’s grief, rebuilding, coming to terms.” - mary gordon


The promise of the young women of this debut novel-in-fragments has little to do with education or career; it’s that, despite their diagnosis as “Hypervigilants/Super-Sensitives,” they might get better and get out of mental hospitals. But before that, there’s life on the ward (and snippets of life before and after), as reported by our guide, Lizzie, both of the “Long Term Ward” and not of it: a “Classic Depressive,” she’s tried to kill herself, but having recognized the dangerously seductive quality of the “liminal state” of mental illness and the risk of becoming a “career patient,” she somehow makes it to the other side. We don’t hear much about how she does that, although Lizzie’s self-awareness is clearly part of it. Scanlon, an actress and academic, is more interested in depicting the way the drugs get stronger, time elapses, and a young, bright female, a cutter, a burner, a binger, anorexic, or screaming or refusing to talk, starts to think of herself as “sick or mad or mentally ill.” Lizzie’s likable, as are her wised-up fellow passengers on what they call the S.S. Roger—and if we’re less invested in her and more in the depiction of this specifically female milieu where having read Sylvia Plath and Girl Interrupted doesn’t protect against the effects of “complicated grief” or its cure, that may be Scanlon’s intent. Agent: Malaga Baldi, the Baldi Agency. - Publishers Weekly

The moment I opened Suzanne Scanlon's Promising Young Women on the beach over the summer, a young couple not far me started arguing. The girl told the boy he had been unsympathetic, not in his actions, but in his words. And then I heard her (belly ring, cut-offs, killer figure) offer this: "I'm sorry that I said that, because I don't think I said that at all." I still hadn't read a word of Scanlon, and before I could, I wrote down that young girl's sentence at the bottom corner opposite the first page. I had no idea how fitting it would turn out to be, like a preface.

Scanlon's main character, Lizzie, does not trust language: "Language ruins everything: thought and impressions and each particular sensation." But it becomes clear it's only her own she doesn't trust. In the opening chapter, she is a patient in a psych ward, an event that happened "a long time ago." Her doctors require her to write: "Writing in the notebooks filled me up and calmed me down: the world was something I created. Which made it less terrifying. Even if the words were not my own. Especially if the words were not my own." From the beginning, Scanlon (and her protagonist) are aware of how language (not ours, but others') manipulates reality - we are so tuned into the worlds of Others that we lose ourselves. Or we can't figure out why our reality is not like the one in the book, on TV, the stage, in the dark theater. In one chapter, Lizzie goes on a two-page rant about Friends: "I wondered how all the patients could watch the Friends without feeling completely betrayed and deeply sad and even more alone than they must already feel." Scanlon's narrative involves a postmodern, end-of-twentieth-century Jenga tower of allusions.
To add to that (dis)allusion layering, Lizzie is an aspiring actress, spending her time pretending not to be a character, but the way the character was played by another actress, such as Shelley Winters, or Meryl Streep, or Patti Smith in "that Sam Shepard one-act about a lobster." Eventually she's asked to read not for a part she wants, but for another, a woman who slurs and has difficulty standing (very Lizzie-esque). Her director's direction: "Just don't act." It's an important moment in the narrative, because what these Promising Young Women seem to be struggling with is how to have a voice in a world that doesn't have a part for them to play. Or, how, in a "very post-Cuckoo's Nest, but also even post-Girl Interrupted, which maybe hadn't been published yet," everything seems to be post-something. And where can a girl find an identity in that?
Scanlon illuminates the way young women struggle to find their reflections in contemporary culture and society (pre-ABC Family Network). Here's how far Lizzie goes: There are (at least) thirty allusions to writers (Chekhov, Stein, Plath), actors (Streep, Winona Ryder, Marilyn Monroe), books (Beloved, As I Lay Dying, Walden), and films (Heathers, Crimes and Misdemeanors, The Misfits). In a small-sized book of only 160 pages, the literary-pop-theoretical roulette can be dizzying. On a narrative level, the use of allusions can be justified by Lizzie's love of the language she trusts: "not her own." Yet there's another level, perhaps of a writer who has yet to separate her world from her character's. For a reader, it can be like a game of Jeopardy! in which you pat yourself on the back for catching an allusion, "My mother is a fish." ("Who is Vardaman?"), but not one crosses the complexity border to intertextuality.
Beyond the allusion-laden narrative, Scanlon's prose is experimental. Her work is a collection of vignettes that alter in point of view, structure (lists, sections, dream sequences), and time (then and now and before then). One of my favorite chapters, "Girls in Trouble," is metafictive ("Here is the rising action." "Here is the climax.") and in second person directed to (Lizzie's?) boyfriend: "You won't call her your girlfriend, even after she calls you her boyfriend." I see these second-person narratives often enough that I have labeled them "ironic instruction narratives" because they invariably explain in a "how-to" something no one would want to (or should) experience. Overall, the altering points of view create a persona sleight of hand akin to Abigail Thomas's Safekeeping: Some True Stories from a Life. It's as if the character is unable to commit to a self or perceives the self as Other ("Who is Hegel?").
Perhaps it's clear now that I have been unable to commit to calling Scanlon's work anything beyond a narrative. The Dorothy Project, the independent press that published Promising Young Women is described on its website as being "dedicated to works of fiction or near fiction or about fiction." While Promising Young Women is labeled as a novel, it reads like a memoir. Beyond biographical overlaps (both Scanlon and her protagonist attended Barnard, acted, performed in a revival of Hatful of Rain, lived in New York City), the voice is immediate, intimate, the work more essayistic, searching. Yes, fiction can do all of this, too, but I'd call Scanlon's work both "near fiction" and "about fiction." Or maybe, like that young woman on the beach ("I don't think I said that at all"), Scanlon allows Lizzie to rely on words that are "not her own." - Jill Talbot

“I am terrified by this dark thing
That sleeps in me;
All day I feel its soft, feathery turnings, its malignity. “ —Sylvia Plath, “Elm” (in Ariel)

This wasn’t like in the movie Heathers, which had come out a few years earlier. We watched it over and over again. It was something we did. Back then, I hadn’t read Ariel. In the movie, Ariel is a punchline; Sylvia Plath is a joke. This was before I’d learned that Sylvia Plath was real, not a joke.—Suzanne Scanlon, Promising Young Women

Suzanne Scanlon’s Promising Young Women is a novel-in-fragments that doesn’t wear its influences and inspirations lightly. The author’s note acknowledges that the book uses lines and images from The Bell Jar and Leo Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilych, and although there is one significant chapter/story towards the end that refers to the latter, the book is largely haunted by the spirit of Plath.
Promising Young Women quietly and discreetly echoes The Bell Jar, but is also in conversation with it. If Plath’s only novel was a searing and caustic portrait of white middle-class female sadness in the ‘60s, then Scanlon’s debut is a sensitive and troubling portrait of white middle-class female sadness in the ‘00s. The book as a physical object—published by Dorothy, the Publishing Project—is very much like the women Scanlon writes about: it’s beautiful and elegant, with a lovely cover that somehow evokes melancholy without revealing too much. Intensely personal and pared down—the stories in this book are moods, feelings, thoughts, and experiences observed in close detail—Promising Young Women looks back at The Bell Jar and seems to say, Dear Sylvia, Everything has changed but nothing, really, has changed.

Promising Young Women

“The other thing was that I’d discovered I was a cipher.

‘I am an empty thing. A fragmented mutating subject.’

‘No, you just feel that way,’ they told me.

‘What’s the difference?’”
Language is a trap for Lizzie, yet writing calms her down because “the world was something I created.” Scanlon’s use of language is so light and deft, almost given to aphorism—there were so many short phrases and pithy quotes that I had to keep scribbling down in a notebook—but it becomes clear that for Lizzie (and perhaps for everyone who ever needed to write), language can be harnessed, modified, manipulated, and writing can be salvaged as a form of power.
As Helene Cixous writes in Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing, “To begin (writing, living) we must have death,” and Lizzie is, in fact, always thinking about her mother’s death, even when she’s not. Lizzie’s destabilisation doesn’t happen on the page; her life is one long process of destabilisation, aided and abetted by the institutions of the psychiatry industry. On the page is where she rearranges the pieces, or sifts through the detritus to make sense of her world by creating new or different worlds. In one of her dreams, for instance, Lizzie sees herself in a group meeting, speaking up in a way she never actually does in her waking life:
“‘There is an instability of knowledge!’ She has raised her voice now; she is nearly screaming. ‘It’s terrifying!’ The group leader lifts an eyebrow, looks around the room. The others don’t say anything. In the dream she is articulate and focused. She is all language and all voice, in a way that she never was.”
My favourite segments from the book include “Girls in Trouble”, “Constant Observation”, and “All That You Aren’t But Might Possibly Be”. These stories are experimental exercises in metafiction, a play on conventional storytelling forms that places the reader on unstable ground: Just who is doing the talking here, you wonder, just who is telling this story?
Promising Young Women is filled with a multiplicity of voices, which seems fitting considering that Lizzie goes on to become an actress (much like Scanlon herself). Acting, like writing, becomes for Lizzie a way out of her own voice, or maybe a way into the voices of others, or perhaps just a way of having all the voices in her head speak their lines and have their say, which is probably why Oscar Wilde is quote in the book: “I love acting. It is so much more real than life.”
Like Plath before her, Scanlon is merciless in interrogating how promising young women are produced, reconfigured, and then recast as troubled young women by institutions heavily-invested in ensuring that “career patients” continue to exist. “Career patients” is a term that Lizzie discovers is part of the bureaucratic-speak of psychiatry: it refers to people who “were hooked on their illness, on the idea of being sick, on the idea of suicide.”
In a chapter that references James Joyce’s “The Dead”, Lizzie has an epiphany: “The recognition that she was becoming a career patient. That she had to stop trying to kill herself. Or that she had to kill herself. But that she could no longer live in this liminal state and spend days or weeks in woodsy hospitals where everyone spoke in acronyms and watched Friends. That this was far worse than death.”
Scanlon isn’t explicit about the connections between capital and psychiatry, the veritable industry of exploitation of pretty, young, sad women—but her earliest, foundational experience of institutionalisation is onboard what she calls the “S. S. Roger”, a ward created by a man who specialised in fixing—or perhaps (un)fixing—promising young women such as herself, and how much of this “promise” is located in a young woman’s physical appearance and exteriority; how much of value is accrued to the appearance of beauty. “You are attractive. That matters,” Roger tells her, and that this meant that she was worthy of investment: “That I had enough going for me to make it worth it for them to bother.”
Scanlon’s constant references to pop culture and books and films—“Ugh” is a clever chapter that begins with a Molly who “refused” to get out of bed, a bedroom Bartleby—underpin even the most complicated passages in a book that only comes up to about 155 pages. Essentially, it’s A Portrait of a Young Woman Shaped by Pop Culture. Scanlon isn’t just interested in showing how a young American woman of the 21st century relates to, and mediates, much of the world through the stuff she’s heard, and seen, and read, but also in how art is shaped and made through this mediation, a sum of all things that have touched you and stayed with you throughout your life.
The formal invention and stylistic sophistication of Promising Young Women allows Scanlon to show how this is done: early on, Lizzie meets a fellow patient who jokes about her attempt to drown herself by attributing it to “a bad day”; later on, Lizzie succeeds in an acting class where she has to play a woman who sticks her head in the oven by incorporating this line. It’s a quiet but illuminating insight into the process of creation; a bit of a cliché perhaps, but true all the more because of it: life feeds art, art feeds life, and skulking around at the edges is death, always death.
I cringe a little to talk of hope, because I’m never really sure where hope is meant to go, but the meaning of accumulated affects, feelings, and experiences are pretty much summed up in the book’s ending note, where Lizzie recollects a few of her favourite things. As such, I would say that Promising Young Women ends on a hopeful note, but the sadness has found no resolution. The problem of emotions still has not been solved:
“What she did not know was that Prozac would lead to Zoloft would lead to Ativan would lead to Mellaril would lead to Halcion. Would lead to hypnosis and shocks and lots groups named with acronyms. She did not know that the week would turn into a month or that the month would turn into an interview with Roger, who ran the famous Institute. It all just sort of happened. She did not know there would be consequences. No one spoke of stigma—and jot just societal stigma, the kind you internalize, the kind Woolf internalized, which wasn’t romantic after all—the way you come to think of yourself as sick or mad or mentally ill. Loony or bonkers or someone with emotional problems. Which is how they put it these days. As if. Aren’t all emotions problems? she wondered.”
Some of the promising young women, like Lizzie, might “make it”, somehow, but many do not. And what of the unpromising, the ugly, the poor, the not-young; the countless many on whom the bell jar descends over and over? The only thing that seems to be certain is that the Rogers and the institutes of the world will continue to proliferate. - Subashini Navaratnam


Promising Young Women by Suzanne Scanlon. This book consist of a series of narrative fragments, somewhat like Denis Johnson’s Jesus’ Son, and like the Johnson book it has one foot in the realm of short story and the other in the world of the novel. There is one character, named Lizzie, and we follow her through a shifting, non-chronological account of a time earlier in her life when she was so severely depressed she was institutionalized in the Rockland State Psychiatric Institute. Yet the book, despite the similarities with Jesus’ Son, is by no means a copy of that novel. (I’m not saying this as a criticism of Johnson, whose work I love, but as a criticism of the countless Johnson-like stories and books that came out after Jesus’ Son and that all too often felt like pale imitations of that earlier work.) The pieces that make up this book give a wonderful account of being young and creative and out-in-the-world for the first time, and, to me at least, the best parts are those that relate how Lizzie maneuvered through her world before and just after institutionalization. In “Mount St. Helens,” we get a glimpse of Lizzie as a young girl watching her mother slowly die in a hospital; in one of my favorite stories (or chapters), entitled “All That You Aren’t But Might Possibly Be,” we see Lizzie in the first weeks after being released from Rockland, trying out for a part in a play and getting hit by a car in the process; and in “Am I Blue?” we see the narrator in her dorm room calmly swallowing pill after pill, her tone no more emotional than if she were writing a term paper. In fact, “Am I Blue?” is the last story in the book, and the implication is that this is the suicide attempt that leads to Lizzie winding up in Rockland. Because it closes the novel, it gives the entire book a circular feel, as if time has secretly been tugging us backward through the narrative.
Another element I like about this book is how it openly wears its influences on its sleeve, and yet never in a coy, Gosh-I’m-smart manner. The moving ending is a clear reference to the famous ending in Woody Allen’s Manhattan, where Allen’s Isaac Davis talks about his list of favorite things while speaking into a tape recorder. In Scanlon’s scene, Lizzie and her friend Dread make a list of their own favorite things shortly after meeting each other in Los Angeles. The fact that Lizzie references Allen elsewhere suggests that she had internalized Allen’s film, or rather that she uses Allen’s narrative to frame her own narrative. Scanlon has Lizzie do the same with Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Illych in the chapter “The Other Story.” Here certain elements from the Russian novella (the syllogism on mortality, the black sack) are re-employed by Lizzie to speak about her mother’s death. But no grand statements about authorship, etc., seem to be implied. Rather, Scanlon’s use of Allen, Tolstoy, Plath and others, suggests that we all pick up narratives here and there, and that we use these narratives to create our own. Art is always infused with life, and vice versa. By having art intermingle with life so casually and subtly, Scanlon’s use of outside narratives (Allen’s, Tolstoy’s, etc.) is more subversive than those novels and stories that have their sources displayed with bright neon letters since those bright neon letters windup reinforcing the divide between art and life even as they claim to undermine it. Scanlon’s book takes place in a space that is already beyond the poles of authenticity and inauthenticity. - James Pate


from Promising Young Women : Heather  

This wasn’t like in the movie Heathers, which had come out a few years earlier. We watched it over and over again. It was something we did. Back then, I hadn’t read Ariel. In the movie, Ariel is a punchline; Sylvia Plath is a joke. This was before I’d learned that Sylvia Plath was real, not a joke. Heathers made suicide glamorous but also made fun of the glamor. What I remember most is the way Winona Ryder said I don’t really like my friends. It was perfect: sexy and sad. It was how we all felt back then.
This Heather wasn’t a Heather, though. She wasn’t a Veronica, either.
And this Heather wasn’t Scandinavian, though when I think of her I always think of Bergman, of the grainy film in black and white. The actress. The nurse. I first watched it while visiting Dread at Sarah Lawrence. He locked me in one of the library viewing rooms. You have to see this, he said.
For the rest of my life, the men I loved or would love—it was always this way:
You must read/see/listen to/think about this.
And I would. Read or watch or listen or think. It was one way of becoming the person I wanted to be.
Heather was pretty in a simple way, what people think of when they say wholesome. Which is a word I hate. The kind of girl all the guys wanted to date in high school. Which was not me. Heather was a cheerleader and her boyfriend was a football player. Joe.
Heather didn’t talk. That was her thing. She’d been in the hospital a year and a half and hadn’t said a word.
I found her absolutely riveting.
Heather walked. There wasn’t far to go so she’d walk the halls, the corridors, up and down over and over again. Daily.
It is a way of dying, not talking. I hadn’t realized.
Those first weeks I spent my days mostly just watching Heather walk up and down the halls of the Unit, her thick brown ponytail swinging as she walked. She had a body like Marilyn Monroe’s—the large, round gorgeous body of Monroe in The Misfits. Which is my favorite. I hid my body under my sweatshirts; Heather wore tight t-shirts and short shorts. She was utterly uninhibited, except for the not-speaking part, I guess. She walked with perfect posture and because of this I associated her with a sort of freedom that felt impossible.
This association, of course, said a lot more about my relationship to my own body than it did about Heather. Who knows how she felt about her desired body? Did it feel like something separate from herself, as it did for me? I didn’t think so. It was her voice that needed disciplining. Her body—that was something else, something alive in a way she would not be.
Heather always wore her Walkman as she walked. She listened to Mary J. Blige.
Walking is thinking, Gertrude Stein wrote. But for Heather, I’m pretty sure walking was not thinking.
Every day I sat on the vinyl couches watching Heather. One day, as she passed, she smiled at me. Just for a moment. She then looked straight ahead again, her chin up, her posture straight. I can still see her walking, her effortless grace. Most of the women on the S.S. habitually slouched or tried otherwise to make their bodies disappear. To take up less space. Heather didn’t have these hangups; only her voice had come to seem like too much of herself in the world.
I admired her for it. Language is a betrayal, after all. Or so I believed in those days. Or so I still believe.
One day I worked up the courage to ask Heather if I might join her.
“Would you mind?”
She shook her head.
I smiled, blushed. I ran to get my own Walkman and running shoes. I joined Heather, who was waiting by the nurses’ station.
We walked the halls of the S.S. Lyle. It became a regular thing. Day after day on the floor of the ward, we walked together and alone, side by side, not talking; each wearing our Walkman as we walked from one end of the women’s dorm to the other: down the main hall and past the nurses’ station, past the smoking room and the kitchen, past the elevators and the television room, all the way to the men’s dorm in the south end of the ward—which wasn’t really a dorm at all but rather a designated space spanning about four rooms, though there were never more than two men on the ward at any given time–toward the back hallway full of doctor’s offices and meeting rooms. We followed this route, back and forth, for an hour or more each day. When we reached the eastern end of the hall of the women’s dorm, or the eastern end of the hall of north offices, we’d stand for a moment in the bright sunlight that hit that window most intensely and then pivot around, taking the step that set us back again west, toward the elevators, the kitchen, the Aides station, the front sitting room where few patients or visitors ever sat.
That light coming through the window always reminded me of something hopeful and sad, some hard-to-place thing.
It was one way of passing time.
Walking is thinking, I wrote to Dread.
I thought walking was walking, he wrote back, from Prague.
“This is a good addiction,” Lyle told me approvingly, “it may be compulsive, exercise can be addictive—but it has positive results, so we want to encourage it.”
Heather had been a cheerleader, I was a pom-pom girl. One thing we knew how to be was pleasing. Without realizing it exactly, we sought the approval of authority figures, which, in the context of the S.S., meant the approval of doctors, nurses, staff.
Everyone on the ward was being observed, of course; some just found this more gratifying than others. It was maybe more complicated than that, but easy enough to spot: girls who were used to getting attention. Maybe too used to it. Maybe we didn’t know what to do without it.
Heather listened to a variety of music, most of which I didn’t like. I liked Tori Amos.
“She’s too whiny,” Heather said one day, and then smiled.
It was the second full sentence I heard her say.
We could only agree on Madonna. All of the white girls on the ward loved Madonna, Les noted, except for her. She was proud of it.
It meant something, Les declared, all that Madonna love, without explaining what she thought it meant.
I told Mary, my favorite, that I didn’t care what Les said; Madonna made me happy, at least in a momentary superficial way.
“You’ve got to take what you can get in this world, doll. There’s not much more to it than that.” Mary would say, laughing. I loved that laugh.
Lyle believed in certain things. I wondered if Heather believed in Lyle’s belief. I wanted to ask her. But it wasn’t possible to have a conversation with Heather, and that in itself became extremely comforting to me. As much as possible, I wanted to live within Heather’s world of silence.
But the thing about Heather: she got better.
This was especially notable because very few women aboard the S.S. Lyle made anything like linear progress during their stay. Even Denise O’Byrne, discharged after three years, had the same defensively angry expression and tendency to violent outburst that she’d always had, at least that’s how it seemed to me and the other patients. Iris Hernandez cut her thin arms just as regularly, if not more often, as her discharge date approached. Heather—who was neither violent nor a cutter—was different. She came in silent, stone-faced, removed; over the years, she blossomed. She smiled, laughed—at first a little, and then later as a regular thing. She started talking. She told jokes. And then she talked a lot. She even talked about how she had gotten better–the rest of us were far too nervous to acknowledge something like this, even if it was true, for all sorts of deep-seated and complicated psychic reasons. Also because mostly we didn’t believe it was possible to get better. Heather did, though. She still had her bad days, her bad moods; but, for the most part, Heather changed. She wasn’t happy, exactly, but she was there in a way she hadn’t been for years. Looking at her; well, you almost believed in the place.
I can’t say how it happened and it turned out that I hadn’t even seen Heather at her worst, since she’d been there over a year already when I arrived. At her worst, so Annie told me, and Heather agreed, she didn’t even smile. She wouldn’t have noticed me watching her, wouldn’t have acknowledged another human being. At her worst, she was pretty much gone. Which is why her mom had driven her down to New York City from their inconveniently located home in rural New Hampshire to meet with the famous doctor who a friend of a friend had heard good things about. He sounded like just the doctor to treat Heather, the friend told Heather’s mom.
And Heather was pretty, the friend said. She’d heard that his hospital specialized in treating pretty young girls.
Heather’s mom was skeptical (and frankly a little wary of a doctor who focused on curing pretty girls) but Heather’s not talking had scared the hell out of her, really. She had no idea that her daughter could do such a thing. It revealed a power she didn’t think her child possessed. She didn’t think she herself possessed that power, to be honest. There was a small part of her—she didn’t tell Lyle this—that envied her daughter. She only remembered the small part when Heather did it (stopped talking); she remembered her own desire, as a young girl, to shut everything out, to refuse, to say no.
Thank you, but no. I’d prefer not to.
She couldn’t do it, of course. It was impossible. Her own mother wouldn’t have noticed even if she had done it, likely. And so she had gone along with it all, had married Heather’s dad, had two children, had left Heather’s dad and managed to raise the two children on her own, without much help. Rarely did she stop to consider it all now. She didn’t have time. And so when her daughter—pretty, sweet, a cheerleader with a nice enough boyfriend, a football paper who first spotted Heather cheering on the sidelines—refused to talk, she was brought back to that time, that younger version of herself, that moment when the thought had occurred to her, too: the thought that she had a choice, that it was all a choice.
She’d read an interview with Meryl Streep, her favorite actress, some months earlier. Streep was asked how she would spend her perfect day, if she had the choice.
“If I had the choice,” the actress replied, “I wouldn’t do anything. But I don’t have a choice.”
Heather’s mother had been moved by that, deeply moved to realize that her favorite actress of all time felt the way she herself did, at least some of the time, when it came down to it. And that’s what she wanted to tell Heather (but never would, because you can’t tell children such things, they have to learn it on their own):
“I don’t have a choice. And neither do you.”
And so when I started walking with Heather, it was already happening. There was a change underway. As I walked and looked daily to the light that showed me a way while also forbidding it, something in Heather was shifting. As I became more aware of what the light forbid, Heather remembered the power of a smile. The day she first spoke to me, who hadn’t yet heard her voice, she laughed and then said,
“I’m going to tell Joe not to come anymore.”
I took off my earphones then. I looked at Heather. Joe visited every Sunday, usually with Heather’s mom and brother. The two of us, who were technically women, walked down the hall, looking straight ahead. As we passed the Aides station, William, just coming on shift, held up his hand. Heather slapped him a high-five and as she did, let out another laugh that could be described as carefree. Which is another word I hate. William smiled. We kept walking, down and around the nurses’ station and then back into the girl’s dorm, until we reached the end of the hallway where the midday light shone hard against the thick barred windows.

Amber Sparks - families reconstruct themselves, mothers fashion babies from two-by-fours and nails, boys make a mother out of leaves and twigs and wishing; a wife sets her house on fire in revenge, a young girl plots to kill the ghosts that stalk her, a dying man takes the whole human race with him

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Amber Sparks,May We Shed These Human Bodies, Curbside Publishing, 2012.

ambernoellesparks.com/
May We Shed These Human Bodies peers through vast spaces and skies with the world's most powerful telescope to find humanity: wild and bright and hard as diamonds. Here is humanity building: families reconstruct themselves, mothers fashion babies from two-by-fours and nails, boys make a mother out of leaves and twigs and wishing. Here is humanity tearing down: a wife sets her house on fire in revenge, a young girl plots to kill the ghosts that stalk her, a dying man takes the whole human race with him. Here is humanity transforming: feral children, cannibalistic seniors, animal wives - a whole sideshow's worth of oddballs and freaks.


"Sometimes all it takes is a few sentences to knock you off your rocker. Or at least that’s the case in Sparks’s debut collection, which packs 30 short short stories, each its own modern fable, into one handsome book." - Flavorwire

"There was Aesop, Thomas Bulfinch, Edith Hamilton, Angela Carter--and now there is Amber Sparks with a new take on the fable. May We Shed These Human Bodies is a clever, scary, and charming debut collection full of great imagination." --Michael Kimball

"In May We Shed These Human Bodies, Amber Sparks proves herself not only a fine writer but also a high scientist of imaginative bliss: This is a collection of marvelous inventions, each one a wonder-machine propelled by fairy tale and dream and humor and hope, ready to carry us off into new adventure." --Matt Bell

"I always love a book that makes me fear for the writer's sanity. I'm over here praying for Amber Sparks." --Ben Loory

"Sparks's debut story collection swirls with a Tim Burton-like whimsy. Ghosts nurse babies ("As They Always Are"), Death visits Earth as a New England prep ("Death and the People"), people evolve from trees (in the title story), and a girl, born in the land of the dead, is sent to Earth accompanied by a protective group of ghosts ("The Ghosts Eat More Air"). "You Will Be the Living Equation" describes a teenager's attempts to cope with a friend's suicide. This is much-traveled ground, but the story's poignant insights are enlivened by the element of the supernatural and a second-person narration. The collection's 30 stories, most no longer than three pages, are modern fables in which epiphanies replace moral lessons and tales unfold with Grimm-like wickedness. While the book's shorter, more fantastic pieces are often little more than exercises in imagination, they provide an unnerving atmosphere in which the longer stories can languish and offer the primal enjoyment of not knowing what will happen next. As this energetic collection shows, Sparks isn't afraid to take chances." - Publishers Weekly 

As its title suggests, May We Shed These Human Bodies (Curbside Splendor) by Amber Sparks is a collection of stories that is grounded in reality, but often has a hint of the surreal, the supernatural, woven into its fabric. The power in these stories comes from the awareness that a life is at a tipping point, and the assignment of emotional weight to everyday events we typically ignore. Just out of sight, behind the curtain, in the shadows, strange things are happening—dark moments that echo our secrets and lies.
Many of the stories utilize lists and numbers to condense great yawning chasms of time, place, and horror into compact observations that leave us dented and eager for repair. Take this passage from “The Chemistry of Objects,” which elevates a common canister to sinister and far-reaching proportions:
“Exhibit 5WW: Metal Canister. Discovered at Majdanek, 1944.
The casual observer may, at first glance, mistake the canister behind the glass for a dented coffee can. The label is almost entirely gone, the faded gold paper clinging in shreds to the flaking, rusted metal. But if the visitor looks closely at the largest shred they may make out a group of small black letters, gone indigo with age and sun. Giftgas! the letters shout. How funny it sounds, like a children’s party favor. How exciting! A handful of bright plastic packets. Laughing gas tied off with curled satin ribbons.
But the letters do not shout in English, and the contents of the canister were never meant to be merry. The word is German. The English translation: poison gas. This can is not a coffee can, and it has never contained beans or laughing gas or party favors; it has instead poured pellets of gas into sealed chambers through special vents, smothering those inside. Polish Jews who’d never seen the sea, drowned in their own blood.”

What Amber Sparks does so well here is conjure up a memory of genocide by merely staring at a canister in a display case. To one person the meaning and graphics are merely an amusement, a bit of history, one moment in a sea of other moments. But to many others this object is horrific, emblematic of a greater evil in the world, one that cut a wide swath of destruction. And this is how she pulls us in and tears us apart—by using history, mythology, magic and the unknown to tell us her fables and dark truths.
In one of my favorite stories in the collection, “The World After This One,” Sparks tells us the story of two very different sisters. Esther is the reliable one, the conservative and worrisome sister, while Ellie is the wandering beauty, lost in her thoughts, lost in the world, connecting in whatever ways she can. This touching story about family is accurate in its depiction of how siblings relate. One day you’re defending your sister, saving her from the wretched grip of a dark and violent world, and the next day you’re dispensing judgment yourself—questioning her actions, yelling at her for being irresponsible and aloof. Take this moment from early in the story:
Once, when Esther was in college, she told her father she was going on a Youth Ministry camping trip. Instead she drove the three hours to the city, picked up Ellie and took her to the shore for a week.
Ellie grew obsessed with the slot machines. On the beach, she gave her room number to several strange men. Esther had to keep answering the door in the middle of the night and explaining to seedy men with goatees that her sister wasn’t well.
Why would you want to sleep with all those people? Esther had asked her sister, exasperated and sad. Ellie had smiled. In just two days of sun her hair had gone nearly white and a big chunk of it fell over her eye, making her look like a sunburned Veronica Lake.
I’m allowing them to become gods, she had explained helpfully. Esther has not taken her anywhere since.”
There is a gentle and gracious wisdom in the words of Ellie, even if she is naïve and a victim in the making. It’s unclear which is worse—taking these chances that are sure to lead to trouble, or separating yourself from the world so that you can never get hurt?
There are insights in these stories, moments where Sparks sheds light on a wide range of emotional truths, leaving us nodding our heads, searching for breath, trying to quiet our beating hearts. In “You Will Be the Living Equation” we touch on the subject of loss and pain and the kinds of people that approach us in our grief. The first kind sympathizes and offers up their own memories of grief. This is the second:
“The second kind will sit with you in silence. They will have nothing to say, because they will understand that pain is not something that can be shared or solved, that pain is not a checklist or a questionnaire. They will understand that pain is not only loss, is not only sad, is not only one thing and not sometimes another thing altogether. That pain is not quantitative, but that it can be marked off with chalk lines on a cell wall just the same. That pain is not a landscape, and yet we carefully map its roads, its quick peaks, its long dips and even the smudges on the page that obscure intention or effect. That pain is not psychic, but that it does sometimes offer a moment of brief, bright clarity.”
And isn’t that so true? This is such a concise and brilliant observation. And whether Sparks it talking about loss and grief, or the way that a child’s hand tucked inside your own can fill your heart with peace and love—we are constantly rewarded with moments of depth, and consideration for our own frenetic lives.
I’m always drawn to the darker aspects of life, because I find it interesting to see how people deal with conflict and chaos, how characters reveal their true nature in these accelerated moments of anxiety and despair. Amber Sparks is not afraid to step into the darkness and paint bleak portraits of consequence and pain. Take this passage from “When the Weather Changes You”:
“You have them, she said, her voice surprisingly deep and strong. You have them in your heart, too. Just like me. Her face was purple and mottled, and her mouth collapsed into itself like a rotten fruit.
hat, Gramama, I asked, trying not to get too close. The sour smell of death was in the bedclothes. What do I have in my heart?
Ashes, she said. Your heart is full of ashes.”
And this:
“After a while, it became common to see strange snow angels here and there. Dead children splayed in dreadful poses, wingless and blue and covered in ice. The crows would circle in frustration, bewildered by the slow rate of decomposition and decay, unable to peck at the eyeballs hard as glass.”First, this is a horrible thing to say to your great-granddaughter—unless of course, it’s true. Then it’s something of a gift, isn’t it? But the second paragraph, the crows pecking at the frozen eyes of the fallen children, it’s a powerful image, haunting and disturbing, stealing a moment from our childhood, these snow angels, and turning them into angels of death.
In this powerful debut collection of short stories, May We Shed These Human Bodies, Amber Sparks has written a surreal love letter to our past histories—placed a message in a bottle and dropped into a raging sea, so that our future loves may hear what we have to say. Maybe these notes will declare our steadfast loyalties and maybe they will be riddled with dark threats and doomsday predictions. Either way, they will certainly not be meek. - Richard Thomas

“Death and the People,” the opening story in Amber Sparks’s new collection May We Shed These Human Bodies, ably sets the tone for the book that it follows. A group of bored mortals encounter Death and, en masse, set out for the afterlife. They spend their days there in a listless approximation of their terrestrial lives, occasionally frustrating the celestial agents around them; they watch as Earth proceeds through eons of change, struck by its relative emptiness, its majesty, its lush desolation.


Sparks’s work is irreverent yet carries with it an epic scope. And it doesn’t hurt that she knows how to get the reader’s attention — “Death and the People” becomes a sort of circuitous creation myth, albeit one where frustrated deities and video game consoles play a role.
In these stories, Amber Sparks hits the sweet spot between cosmic and irreverence, between comic and philosophical. The title story, in which a group of former trees laments their newfound humanity, elucidates a number of familiar bodies and states, yet makes them seem dynamic. It doesn’t hurt that Sparks uses the first person plural very effectively — rendering a sense of community that’s both all-encompassing and yet somehow alien.
When you think you have the book figured out — when you come to a work featuring an aging Paul Bunyan, say, which seems almost emblematic of a particular school of slipstream writing — you then proceed to “The Effect of All That Light Upon You,” with its (literally) visceral imagery. In it, bodies are reshaped, and minds are pushed towards an uncertain place between madness and transcendence. The counterfactual family history of “When The Weather Changes You” also impresses, as does the endlessly rewritten logic of “The Ghosts Eat More Air.”
The last word of this collection’s title gives a hint as to why it stands out among a number of its reality-bending compatriots. Sparks has intelligence aplenty on display, a talent for humor, and the ability to blend mythical resonances with contemporary anxieties. But her fiction is also rooted in the tactile and the physical, and it’s that quality that makes these works truly haunting. - Tobias Carroll

Fitting almost 30 stories into fewer than 150 pages, Amber Sparks packs her debut short story collection full of surprises. It’s tempting to call these stories fables, not just because of their length but because of the author’s simple, lyrical writing style and often fantastic subjects. But the collection is as wildly diverse as it is imaginative, with Sparks touching on domestic tableaus and the fallout of violence as frequently as she does magic bathtubs, feral children and new myths for the origin of Earth and its people. Short as these stories are, it can be tiring to read them all in one sitting. Fortunately, her range of subjects and unique take on each narrative make them strong enough to stand on their own.

The real challenge of the short-short form is fleshing out the characters. Sparks’s vivid details always leave an impression, such as a daughter pursued by ghosts her whole life, some leaving a “long narrow burn mark” on her arm as they skid past her skin. But that girl and many of the other characters in Bodies are often archetypes—sometimes nameless ones: the father, the baby, the hero. When Sparks finds more mythical motivations for their actions and dispositions, such as the isolated family cursed by a great-grandmother who leaves their hearts “full of ashes,” they feel even harder to relate to. That’s when the stories blur together. But at their best, Sparks’s shorts take just a couple of pages to push your imagination to consider the unseen, otherworldly ways our planet might work. In exploring everything from small family dramas to the supernatural, she makes all of it feel possible. - Jason Crock

Amber Sparks has a knack for saying a lot with very little. The short stories in this collection range anywhere from a few paragraphs to a few pages long, and yet they tell their story more clearly and more entirely than some novels I have read.
This book popped up on my radar way before the review copies were available. And the wait was almost excruciating. Curbside Splendor teased us with the book cover, which is lovely, and shared blurbs by Amelia Gray, Ben Lorry, Michael Kimball, and Matt Bell, all of whom I've read and adored. That's always a good sign. And the title is just amazing, isn't it? May We Shed These Human Bodies. I envisioned people unzipping their skin, letting it fall off their shoulders and puddle down around their feet, as their robot-like inner spirits step out and shine like ghosts.
While I didn't find a story quite like that one in the collection (you have to admit, that would have been a cool one), I did discover a bunch of excellent tales about ghosts, of both the motherly and haunting kind; twisted spins on Peter Pan and Paul Bunyan; a nursing home full of cannibals; a city that longs to travel; trees that become humans; and a magical, mysterious bathtub.
The one I enjoyed the most happened to be the very first one that I read - Death and the People. It's the story of Death, who has come to Earth to collect a soul. But the people of Earth have grown tired of Death sneaking in and stealing the ones they love, one by one. So they stand their ground and bully Death into taking them all. It's a wily, cunning little tale that kick starts the collection and sets the bar incredibly high!
Amber weaves a wicked web with her words, saying what needs to be said without spending a lot of effort, trusting that her audience will have no choice but to be sucked in. And sucked in, I was. Her stories read swiftly, sting fiercely, and then retreat quickly to make room for the next. Each little world she creates breathes hard and fast and lingers with us long after we leave it behind.
I'd be very interested in seeing what she can do with a full length novel. - thenextbestbookblog.blogspot.com/ 

The first Amber Sparks story I read, or recall reading, was in NY Tyrant a couple years ago. “These are Broken, Funny Days” ends after about half a dozen paragraphs, before a full page has passed, but not without doubly surprising the reader. There’s the first surprise of Sparks’ excitedly strange, unpredictable plots (in this case the mystery of the speaker’s current situation) and the second surprise—that the story she captures rings so familiar and true. By the end of “These are Broken, Funny Days,” I found myself chuckling at the wonderfully precise complaint of the knife-wielding narrator: “Blood smells bad.” Because blood totally does.
Now, Amber Sparks has a book, May We Shed These Human Bodies, out this month from Curbside Splendor. It came as no third surprise that I found with each story a new shock, something unexpected. After the first sentence, there’s no telling where a Sparks story might take you, and there’s definitely no telling what that first sentence might be.
Sparks gives us the canon—from the initial story of Death as a kind bureaucrat dealing with overcrowding, to magical bathtubs and fairytales and heartbreak and sibling rivalry, May We Shed These Human Bodies does exactly what its title seeks, and leaves us surprised and unskinned, clutching our hearts. -Joseph Riippi

You wrote a book. And it’s a beautiful book. How’s it feel to hold it in your hands?

It feels wonderful! I mean, I’ll bet you remember that moment. I bet every writer remembers it forever. Ever since I was little, I’ve loved books and the idea of one of them being mine, with my name on it—it’s like a totem or something, it’s a magical feeling. And of course Curbside and Alban Fischer did such an amazing job with the book. It really is beautiful, isn’t it? I nearly passed out the first time I saw the design, it was so perfect.

One of the things I love about this collection is that, from story to story, your narrators change remarkably. It’s not the same voice every time. Like “To Make Us Whole” or “All The Imaginary People Are Better At Life” seem closer to what I imagine The Author’s Voice might be like. But then you carry us away into something much more magical and surreal—like “The City Outside Of Itself” or “Death And The People.” Is there a perspective from which you prefer to write, or that you find more exciting? What kind of story do you like to write?

I get bored easily, and so I don’t like to write from any one particular voice. Sometimes it’s more surreal, sometimes a normal human being. Often my narrators are sane but just barely, which is always very interesting to me—people living in that tipping point. I like to change it up a lot. Certainly the voice on stories like “All the Imaginary People” is closest to my own voice, and sometimes if it’s a more personal story, that’s the voice I really have to use. But for fairy tales, for fables, for larger tableaus, I prefer a third person omniscient, a god-like narrator. I think it gives the story a telescopic, mythic quality. I also use a lot of second person. Second person works nicely for me when I want to create a bit of distance between a very emotional subject and a very logical, cool narration. For instance, in “You Will Be the Living Equation,” the subject is a boyfriend’s suicide, but I wanted to look at the problem in an almost mathematical way, and I think that second person helps to facilitate that. Otherwise I’d have been stuck in the character’s own emotional mess.

Even in the shortest stories, characters can take long, transformative journeys, and that gives a fairy tale-ness to many of these stories. Feral children, monsters, bathtubs that spit out copy-versions of ourselves. (“If You Don’t Believe, They Go Away” stands out as a particular favorite). What is your own relation to fairy tales? Do you actively seek to engage with that medium in your writing?

Oh, absolutely, I do. When I was very small, my dad gave me a book that he’d had as a child, a book of fairy tales and tall tales, anything from Perrault to stories from Arabian Nights to Aesop to Johnny Appleseed. And I must have read it a thousand times. When I was a little older, my favorite book at the library was Hans Christian Anderson’s collection of fairy tales. I love the logical absurdity of fairy tales, as well as their almost natural cruelty. I would say that I have a very logically absurd mind, and I don’t know if this is why I was drawn to them, or if they shaped me, but the way I think dovetails very neatly with the way fairy stories are written. There are very specific formulas, and things have to happen a certain way, certain characters must do and say certain things – and yet within that tight framework you can make anything in the whole world happen. Anything your brain can summon. That’s something that I’ve always tried to write, and of course, examining that logical absurdity is the sort of meta conceit behind “If You Don’t Believe, They Go Away,” as well as “As They Always Are.”

In “The Poet In Convalescence,” you describe the “fingerprint” as “A map you make yourself, quadrant by quadrant, inch by inch…Here there be monsters.” How much of the book draws on the personal for you? Which of the stories would you say contains the most “Amber”?

Oh, well, probably all of the stories contain a lot of me. Unlike many writers, I tend not to write anything that’s very much like my real life, partially just because my real life is quite dull on paper. But my sensibilities, my personality, is all over these pages, fingerprints everywhere. If my book were a crime scene I’d be screwed. Most of my characters are an awful lot like me: neurotic, hypochondriacs, terrified of death, dreamers rather than doers, people who are generally on the outside looking in. I suppose that of all the stories in the book, the title story is the most personal, oddly – yes, the story about the trees that turn into people. Because I think if there’s one thing that I think about more than anything else, it’s the fact that I always feel like such a failure as a human being – and I feel like we all fail at being people. It explains why we destroy ourselves and fail other people so badly, too. I wrote that story to try and explain why maybe we all suck at being alive, when every other animal and plant and virus and living thing seems to be so good at it. Well, except for pandas. Pandas are evolution’s little joke, even more than we are.

I know you just had a launch party in Chicago for the book, and you’re coming to New York for the Franklin Park Reading Series this fall, which is always a wonderful evening. Any other readings/touring planned?

Yes, a ton of stuff! After Chicago I’ll be in Minneapolis and Ohio and Indianapolis, and then later this fall I’ll be in New York and Baltimore and DC and Providence and Atlanta and maybe Boston, too. I get freaked out just thinking about it! Oh, and there was a change in the Franklin Park thing – I’ll be there in January now, but I’ll be in New York for the Salon Series (with the awesome Paula Bomer!) in October. So much stuff. It’s up on my site, too, if anybody’s interested, at http://ambernoellesparks.com/readingsevents/.

Lastly, I hadn’t read “These are Broken, Funny Days” in awhile, but remembered it as I sat down to write about your book. Any reason you chose not to include it in the final?

Yes, which was really hard because it’s one of my favorite stories. But there are a bunch of stories that didn’t make the final cut because, while the book doesn’t have a theme per se, I found that it had a very hopeful, transcendent quality, even the very sad stories. Everyone felt like they were all trying so hard to be better people, to be better at life. And of course, the narrator of “These are Broken, Funny Days” is a serial killer who relishes what she does. So it just didn’t quite work anywhere in the collection. But I’m working on a second collection now, so who knows? Hopefully there will be room for it there. This next collection is a bit darker in tone, I can tell already. The humans are definitely failing.




The Rejection Group is actually thinking of poets and poetry as worthy of satire and critique in art. Rimbaud is translated. Wittgenstein and Ashbery are mapped. And all assaults are full frontal. Even the bumper stickers make an appearance

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http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-BlMEp7fopek/TbA1Aj7Jn7I/AAAAAAAABmA/DbKfLVWo5gA/s1600/Hab.bmp

WHO

The Rejection Group.
It was an anonymous group for a while. Then Kent Johnson outed himself. Then he was (maybe) kicked out of the group. And now they’re back. The Rejection Group appears to contain five members that are tagged in the chapbook only by their initials:
CB
KG
KSM
VP
KJ
More specifically, though, The Rejection Group is not longer anonymous. The museum is open: TRG was a six-month experiment in collaboration, involving Kenny Goldsmith, Christian Bok, Vanessa Place, Kasey Silem Mohammad, and Kent Johnson.
WHAT
5 Works
In fine, handsewn production (with two different color-versions of cover) from Habenicht Press.
This is the first book by the Rejection Group (a second, larger collection, mostly translations from Rimbaud's Illuminations, is in preparation).
19 pp., $7 each. Copies (A-Z), signed by all five authors, available for $20 each.
WHERE
http://habenichtpress.com/?p=696
WHEN
While supplies last.
WHY
Good question. Thank you for asking.
HOW

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The Rejection Group performs a necessary function. “Poets, hi.” it begins. “We’ve had it,” it continues. Uncomfortable things, impolite things, TRG writes, “never quite made it into your experiments.” Therefore, “Sometimes one just has to start from scratch.”
“Our poet,” in TRG's fusion, is a drover, it seems. And TRG is actually thinking of poets and poetry as worthy of satire and critique in art. I take this as a positive development, a positive project. Rimbaud is translated. Wittgenstein and Ashbery are mapped. And all assaults are full frontal. Even the bumper stickers make an appearance:
WHAT WOULD FRANZ WRIGHT DO?
LANGUAGE POETRY: IT’S NOT YOUR FATHER’S IVY LEAGUE ANYMORE
MY OTHER POEM’S A HYBRID
A thesis for the project, of sorts:
“There can be no sovereign music for your prefab amps and your cautious pride.”
Don't say I didn't warn you.   In fine, handsewn production (with two different color-versions of cover) from Habenicht Press.
This is the first book by the Rejection Group (a second, larger collection, mostly translations from Rimbaud's Illuminations, is in preparation). - jjgallaher.blogspot.com/


Five Works by The Rejection Group (Habenicht Press 2011)

“To conclude, the worke of the most mysterious Rejection Groupe is so universall, as either in one place or other, any mans mind may therewith be satisfied. The which I adventure (under pretext of this promise) to present unto all indifferent eyes as followeth.” — from the opening statement titled “The Printer to the Reader.” This handsome chapbook houses a handful of strange and appealing pieces, opening with a quote from Bhanu Kapil and ending with something about Wittgenstein and John Ashbery. In between, there’s a piece called “79 Poetry Bumper Stickers,” which include gems like: “DON’T BLAME ME, I DIDN’T GO TO IOWA” and “POET-LAUREATES: THE OTHER WHITE MEAT” and even a little nod our way “HTMLGIANT: LOGROLLING IN SKINNY JEANS SINCE 2008.” About this chapbook, John Latta did a review/write up worth reading. - christopher higgs

Newnicht Chaps

Very limited number of all five chapbooks available for $15, plus shipping (specify in order whether you want white or black Rejection Group cover)
[N.B., as of 4.22.11, Sarah Peters and JodiAnn Stevenson now sold out]
Set of remaining three chapbooks (5 Works, Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, Five Windows Light the Cavern’d Man) available for $10, plus shipping
[N.B.: As of 1.11.12, Sir Gawain is sold out.]


The Rejection Group (white cover), 5 works, 19pp, saddle-stitched,
 

The Rejection Group (black cover), 5 works, 19pp, saddle-stitched,
 

Sarah Peters, Triptych, 3pp, hand-sewn,


JodiAnn Stevenson, Houses Don’t Float, 4pp, hand-sewn,



Brooks Johnson
, Five Windows Light the Cavern’d Man, 3pp, hand-sewn
 
David Hadbawnik, Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, 3pp, hand-sewn

The Rejection Group’s 5 Works


Tree

How odd, what oddity, how fervently and alarmingly odd, that just at the point of terminal brain-buggery, fatigue’d by the miasmic vide of all things “scriptural” (that’s you, poet-dumpling!) and disgust’d by the seemingly wholesale celebratory hoo-hah surrounding the murder and dumping of a man (“any man’s death diminishes . . .”), I ought to read, back to back, two inimical (and complementary) indices of la poésie comme but rébarbatif? Qua? Hein? Okay. Poking around in The Little Review-editor Margaret Anderson’s 1930 autobiography (My Thirty Years’ War), I find, toward the end, Anderson talking about the changes writers undergo in putting themselves into books: “I’d give all of Ulysses for the letters Joyce wrote the Swiss government when he lost his luggage in that country. Interesting letters. Joyce really wanted his luggage.” A judgment mounting (by a trail of celestial fire) to the story of the “tall Englishman” A. E. Orage’s monumental (“And then he added the five words that have changed my outlook upon life”) remark:
Act, said Orage, don’t be acted upon.
Leading to the shutdown of The Little Review (“The artist organism is preëminently the acted-upon organism”) and the bold “farewell editorial” call’d “Lost: A Renaissance” written by co-editor Jane Heap. Excerpt’d:
      No doubt, all so-called thinking people hoped for a new order after the war. This hope was linked with the fallacy that men learn from experience. Facts prove that we learn no more from our experiences than from our dreams.
      For years we offered the Little Review as a trial-track for racers. We hoped to find artists who could run with the great artists of the past or men who could make new records. But you can’t get race horses from mules. I do not believe that the conditions of our life can produce men who can give us masterpieces. Masterpieces are not made from chaos. If there is confusion of life there will be confusion of art. This is in no way a criticism of the men who are working in the arts. They can only express what is here to express.
      We have given space in the Little Review to 23 new systems of art (all now dead), representing 19 countries. In all of this we have not brought forward anything approaching a masterpiece except the “Ulysses” of Mr. Joyce . . .
      Self-expression is not enough; experiment is not enough; the recording of special moments or cases is not enough. All of the arts have broken faith or lost connection with their origin and function. They have ceased to be concerned with the legitimate and permanent material of art.
      . . . The actual situation of art today is not a very important or adult concern (Art is not the highest aim of man); it is interesting only as a pronounced symptom of an ailing and aimless society.
Damnable stuff, and percipient. Heaved then I one tremendous sigh and turn’d to the curious object call’d 5 Works, by The Rejection Group (Habenicht Press, 2011). Only to read, in a tiny and franticly anecdotal piece call’d “A Life of Wasted Philosophy” (skimming no little satiric cream off Ashbery’s “My Philosophy of Life”—“Just when I thought there wasn’t room enough / for another thought in my head, I had this great idea— / call it a philosophy of life, if you will. Briefly, / it involved living the way philosophers live, / according to a set of principles. OK, but which ones?”—that one.) Excerpt’d:
Just when I went to read “My Philosophy of Life,” by John Ashbery, to jam its minerals down into my thought, there was a newsflash, on TV, or what do they it, Special Report, you know. To boot: that a new work by Wittgenstein had been found, post-Investigations, an old-fashioned set of principles by which to live a life, a work, that is, that renounces the path of Philosophy. Is that great or what?
. . .
Might there be an outward structure of astonishment, as a rain forest is the structure of a long, geologic pattern of climate? asked Wittgenstein, for no apparent reason, as was his custom. Well, let’s consider this and work our way up, said Russell, sniffing, feeling a thought coming on. For instance, take the sentence, My perambulator is inflected with dice throws and swans. To what outward condition might this correspond? Oh come off it, Russell, said the portly Moore, with not a little irritation, hitching up his trousers, that is perfectly absurd. Absurd! No, not quite, Moore, said Wittgenstein. It is not quite absurd: It depends on what we mean by inflect, don’t you see. One could say, for example: I jam the Poetry down the sorrowful throats of my swans. Now, you might furrow your brow; but what if Poetry were the name of the lubricated pellets with which I fatten my fowl for Christmastime?
. . .
And later that night, weeping with embarrassment and sorrow in his rooms, Wittgenstein realized that Philosophy was over, that it was no better than poetry, beyond logical remedy; now it was time to find the principles by which a simple and good life could be lived. Yes, he had wasted most of his life. But what is done is done, as his terrible, glowering father, the great Steel Emperor of Vienna, was in the habit of saying. And so he closed his eyes, and resolved to write the lost book.
“Is that great or what?” (In my twitter-mimic.) Odium and disgrubblement at the ubiquity a poetry that merely serves to fatten the goose that is Poetry (“that’s you, poet-dumpling!”) See, in “Welcome Back,” the repeat’d direct addresses to the “Poets”:
We’ve had it with your strutting and grovel, your refusals to wipe the habiliments after use; we’ve grown weary of your wet seductive wear, your affected grunts and awful smells, not to mention all the wedding parties in chunks on the passes of the Kush—they never quite made it into your experiments, it seems. That is why we are closing the whole area for cleaning and remodeling. Sometimes one just has to start from scratch.

Come back in fourteen billion years.
A completely annihilatory position in direct reaction to the murderous tendency of so many of “our” (“seductive” “affected” “awful”) “experiments” to be no more “a pronounced symptom of an ailing and aimless society.” Damnable stuff. How’s that Ammons poem go? “Spit the pit in the pit / I told the cherry eater . . . but / if you come to impossible / productions on / absent trees, get out the / bulldozer and shove the / whole thing over smooth.” (“High Surreal”) In “Coronita de Rimas, Or: The A-Effect”:
                                                                                                Now, unfazed

By betters, oblivious to keener ears, sometimes we sing just to show
We are bright than other people. When we do, we can’t really know

What we are singing, and everyone is very glad when we stop!
Think: Do the birds sing to show they are brighter? No, they do not.
And in The Rejection Group’s “Fable” (“a translation from a translation by John Ashbery of Arthur Rimbaud”), the final line “Wise music is missing from our desire” gets render’d:
O, poets, you in your playhouse palaces of clouds, we speak as the most guilty amongst your kind:

There can be no sovereign music for your prefab amps and your cautious pride.
I detect an echo of O’Hara’s great exordium to the gods in “For James Dean” “Welcome me, if you will, / as the ambassador of a hatred / who knows its cause / and does not envy you your whim / of ending him.” Here, too, there is—in the pronoun chicanery—a cool undaunt’d admitting that “I speak as one whose filth / is like his own . . .” No shunning the culpa. “Act . . . don’t be acted upon.”

Conjecture regarding The Rejection Group identity. Eliciting an involuntary snore. And redoublement of the actual. “Joyce really wanted his luggage.” The usual tom-toms of the frontier electronick’d say the noted cons Bök and Goldsmith and Place join’d up with flarf-daddy Mohammad and engineer of the fickle (and moralist) Johnson, an inimical consort, and dubious. Though: in a stark notice append’d to the pamphlet (“The Printer to the Reader”) is writ how one “Master C. B. . . . hath cunningly discharged himself of any responsibilitie for this texte”; how “a message from K. G. . . . doth with no lesse clerkly cunning seeke to perswade the printer, that he (also) had no hande in its making”; and how—in the printer’s (presumably David Hadbawnik) terms—“I am not privie to any declaratione at this date from K. S. M., nor from V. P., nor K. J.,” whom he decries as “most notorious persons, too” and “assumed in some quarters as the Authores.” The printer does (rather pugnaciously, I’d say) point to something “the venerable C. D. hath recently informed us, namely”:
’Tis come a time when affixing one’s signature to an alien text be in no wise remarkable, and we fain to arrive at the next frontier of proprietie, when the institutions of poetry shall be agonized by scriptores conceptiones signing for others under texts the which themselves have not written.
A statement with alarming propinquity to that found in one of the end-notes to Craig Dworkin’s “The Fate of Echo” (being an introduction to the anthology of “conceptual writing” Against Expression): “Signing a text that one hasn’t written will surely become less remarkable, and the next frontier of propriety will materialize when conceptual writing antagonizes the institutions of poetry by signing for others under texts that they have not written.” Alors,who’s zooming whom? The reader decides. (If there’s one thing language writing’s zip’d up into our compunct, it’s this: the reader decides.) So: “. . . as the venomous spider will sucke poison out of the most holesome herbe, and the industrious Bee can gather hony out of the most stinking weede: Even so the discrete reader may take a happie example by the most vicious verses, although the captious and harebrained heads can neither be encoraged by the good, nor forewarned by the bad.” (“The Printer to the Reader”) A sentence with ominous proximity to that found in a printer’s remarks prefacing George Gascoigne’s 1573 A Discourse of the Adventures passed by Master F. J.:
And as the venomous spider wilt suck poison out of the most wholesome herb, and the industrious Bee can gather honey out of the most stinking weed, even so the discrete reader may take a happy example by the most lascivious histories, although the captious and harebrain’d heads can neither be encouraged by the good nor forewarned by the bad.
5 Works: a veritable tourbillon of identities, introducing “23 new systems of art (all now dead), representing 19 “writers.”


Margaret Anderson, 1886-1973
(Photograph by Berenice Abbott)


Jane Heap, c. 1927
(Photograph by Berenice Abbott)


5 Works
(Cover by Carrie Kaser)
isola-di-rifiuti.blogspot.com/
 
 
The Rejection Group

Welcome Back

          “You are an interesting species.”
          --Alien addressing Jodie Foster, through a holograph of her character’s dead father, toward end of the movie ‘Contact.’

          “Poets, hi.”
          --Bhanu Kapil


1.


Poets, hi.


The whole gymnasium is encrusted in sweat: the stationary bikes, the bolted rowers, the track that comes back to its start, the dead weights. The apparatus Donne hung from like a milk-pale bat, the medicine ball Dickinson rolled for measureless black--dross, these, in lichen and scum, for all your encrusted sweat.


We’ve had it with your strutting and grovel, your refusals to wipe the habiliments after use; we’ve grown weary of your wet seductive wear, your affected grunts and awful smells, not to mention all the wedding parties in chunks on the passes of the Kush--they never quite made it into your experiments, it seems. That is why we are closing the whole area for cleaning and remodeling. Sometimes one just has to start from scratch.


Come back in fourteen billion years.


Don’t tell us you can’t.


Good luck. It won’t seem long.




2.


Poets, greetings.


The whole classroom is encrusted in tears: the maps and the globes, the desks and the gowns, the gradebooks and the paddle. The dunce hat Lorca wore on his crown, serene and glowing in the falangist armoire, the chalkboard where Akhmatova dug sonnets with her nails--clumps, these, of goop and mold, for all your encrusted tears.


We’ve grown hound-tired of your infant treading, your little gasps just above the fluid line; we’ve had it with your teacher-pet cries, your conniving praises and calculated slights, not to mention all the children of the Congo, waving their little shoulder stumps in puzzled hurt--they never quite made it into your experiments, it seems. That is why we are closing the whole area for suction and purification. Sometimes one just has to start from scratch.


Come back in seven million reincarnations.


Don’t tell us you can’t.


Good luck. You won’t even notice you’ve been gone.




3.


Poets, yo.


The whole convention hive is encrusted in gob: the programs and IDs, the Power Point remotes, the cash bars in predestined cells, the infinite exhibit of secreted wares, which extends for miles underground. The car of contents Creeley careened down the long, formal dark, the bluish enfants Césaire swathed in cotton wrap--glutinous, these, in glop and crud, for all your encrusted gob.


We’ve burst our coop of hens and hogs with all your clucks and squeals, midst your habits of feigning nonchalance; we’ve sprung a gush in the seabed sump of our sufferance for your googling and oh-so-tip-toe wont, not to mention all the circumcised little girls cowering in those nice post-colonial spots, they never quite made it into your experiments, it seems. That is why we’re boarding up the whole area until it’s choked with vines thick as twenty minotaur thighs. Sometimes one just has to start from scratch.


Come back when half of all the sentient beings in all the universes have been saved.


Don’t tell us you can’t.


Good luck. Just lie back and enjoy it.




4.


Poets, howdy.


The whole writing retreat is encrusted in cum: the porch and the cane chairs, the four-posted beds and the lamps, the deer on the grounds, the moleskin and the cup. The garret stairs Celan climbed, trailing his Heidegger cocoon, the oven where Plath baked her glowworm scones--encased, these, in glaciers of slime, for all your encrusted cum.


We’ve lost our patience with your masturbatory élan, your wild and ecstatic bleats; we’ve had it to the scalp with your self-regarding blab, your recycled tricks and your gossip-fueled ways, not to mention all the people self-tearing their throats in Gaza with gurgling despair--they never quite made it into your experiments, it seems. That is why we are closing the whole area for scrubbing and quarantine. Sometimes one just has to start from scratch.


Come back after ten thousand great extinctions, not counting the next asteroid.


Don’t tell us you can’t.


Good luck. It will seem like a nap.




5.


Poets, wake up.


The whole Field is encrusted in time: the golden towns and the holograph böökes, the hovering raiment and the flowering drinks, the wormhole forms and the five-dimensioned bidets. The black chips pressed to your ears look super, it makes us recall that ancient shot of Spicer listening to the incunabulum, do you recall it now. The point is that quark and lepton are massed anew, melodically, in your skulls; look at you here, sheathed in dimensionless edge of Wave, forward and back, in Dream of Category of Mind, which is leading edge of aforesaid unfathomable Wave, you are quite the catch. One day we hope you will write of this, puzzling how it is you got back to where you are (though you really never left), not forgetting vast Humor and Pain is much the engine of it. We have waited for your tiny spots of light to wink and blink, for the faint beep of your incandescent phones and morphs, for the shy sign of your repentance. We foretold your weeping and yearning, the nub of your esoteric drive, and your hair extended back to glistening points three feet behind your heads; we foresaw your new modes of lyric wreathed to the cusp of nameless Being, modes inside Being bearing you forth, or whatever, we’re getting carried away. Forgive us our enthusiasms, but it’s true. We mean we saw you poised so patiently for redemption there. Sometimes one just has to start all over again. That is why we are reopening the whole Field for repopulation by your obsidian desire.


Welcome back after all these eons; bring the radiating language of your ridiculous, miraculous brains back tomorrow, too.


Don’t tell us you can’t; this is probably your last chance.


You are an interesting species. Chase the hornéd horse with all of your might into the sun. 

Azareen Van der Vliet Oloomi - a mind churns on itself, while reality, if it is reality, comes rushing at it with a strange stutter, everything a bit lost, a bit off, and ready to be ground up further by the uncertain perception of the narrator

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Azareen Van der Vliet Oloomi, Fra Keeler, Dorothy, a publishing project, 2012.

A man purchases a house, the house of Fra Keeler, moves in, and begins investigating the circumstances of the latter’s death. Yet the investigation quickly turns inward, and the reality it seeks to unravel seems only to grow more strange, as the narrator pursues not leads but lines of thought, most often to hideous conclusions.
Read an excerpt here.
“Obsessive/delightful, Fra Keeler subtly elaborates on life’s details, its ordinary lunacies. Azareen Van der Vliet Oloomi’s observations are droll and often hilarious. Her novel’s incidents pile up and on, tilting and shifting under the weight of language’s bizarre disturbances. Fra Keeler is wonderfully imaginative, the work of a terrific young writer.”lynne tillman
“Azareen Van der Vliet Oloomi is the descendent of writers as brilliant and disparate as Max Frisch, Alain Robbe-Grillet and Per Petterson. Fra Keeler is a compelling and humorously associative meditation on how ‘one lives against one’s dying,’ and how that living will be in contra-distinction to all that explains that death on paper after its fact. Would that more book groups read books of this complexity and intelligence; discussion would reach on into the wee hours!”michelle latiolais
“In Fra Keeler a mind churns on itself, while reality—if it is reality—comes rushing at it with a strange stutter, everything a bit lost, a bit off, and ready to be ground up further by the uncertain perception of the narrator. This is a book by turns funny and strange, but always entertaining.” brian evenson

Van der Vliet Oloomi’s debut novel turns out to be a surrealist triumph despite a jerky entry into the narrator’s world. An unnamed man purchases a house with one thought in mind—to investigate the death of its former owner, Fra Keeler. Upon moving in, however, his investigation becomes hindered by his own tangled thoughts. A clearly unreliable narrator, the character nonetheless draws the reader deeper into his mental labyrinth, as snippets of a possible truth shine through as from a blinding streak of lightning on a dark night. Lurching toward an understanding of Fra Keeler’s death, the protagonist wrestles with issues of sanity, madness, life, death, and happiness. This short but substantial novel both celebrates the process of thinking and offers cautions about the perils of our inner monologues. A rare gem of a book that begs to be read again. - Publishers Weekly

Publishing for publishing’s sake was the last thing Danielle Dutton had in mind when she founded her independent press called the Dorothy Project three years ago. “Starting a press simply to add to the piles and piles of books in the world (or just in my house) wasn’t interesting to me,” Dutton said via email.
“I’ve long admired presses that seem to carve out a specific niche all their own, such as Dalkey Archive (where I worked for four years before starting Dorothy), or Siglio (a press out of L.A. that focuses on work at the intersection of art and literature, and which, incidentally, published my second book).”
To that end, Dorothy follows a disciplined model: two books a year with the goal “to seek out and publish writing that takes risks, that surprises and challenges and delights us as readers; to have a tightly curated list; and to work to create beautiful book objects.”
The focus on quality over quantity has had good results. “We’ve been incredibly lucky so far for a new small press,” Dutton said, citing “good coverage” for the press itself and many reviews. “I’m very thankful for that, and I wonder if reviewers and editors have been intrigued by our constraint-based plan (only two books per year, all the same size, mostly written by women). We’re doing something specific, and maybe that is, for better or worse, an ‘angle’ by which to approach us.”
Well-known, experimental writers such as Ben Marcus have taken notice: for The Millions’s 2011 “Year in Reading” series, he recommended the Dorothy Project’s reprint of Barbara Comyn’s Who Was Changed and Who Was Dead. Future projects will include the final book in Renee Gladman’s Ravicka trilogy, and a collection of stories by Amina Cain.
The two books Dutton selects each year are intended to form a contrast. “This year’s two books — Suzanne Scanlon’s Promising Young Women and Azareen Van der Vliet Oloomi’s Fra Keeler — both deal with madness. Both are debut novels from younger American women writers. But stylistically they’re worlds apart, and the fact that they came together as a perfect pair was somewhat accidental.” Both go on sale this month.
Fra Keeler begins as an investigation by an anonymous, male narrator into the mysterious death of the title character. The first scene shows him buying Keeler’s house from a realtor.
(Certain) events of the unfriendliest category are now unfolding. I cannot put my finger on these events; I cannot pinpoint the exact dimensions of their effect. The truth is, I haven’t been the same since Fra Keeler’s death. Some deaths are more than just a death, I keep thinking, and Fra Keeler’s was exemplary in this sense. And it is the same thought since I left the realtor’s office: some people’s deaths need to be thoroughly investigated, and, Yes, I think then, Yes: I bought this home in order to fully investigate Fra Keeler’s death.
We’re not told what the narrator’s relationship is to Keeler, why he needs to go so far as to buy the man’s house, or where he came up with the money. These omitted facts — carefully ignored pieces of character- and plot-information — belie how much this narrator depends on the momentum of his thoughts to keep his story moving. The manic energy in the language sustains a careful, unsettling tension that’s central to the plot and the novel’s meaning.
We soon learn that this man is a keenly intelligent person suffering not from grief over Keeler’s death, but extreme curiosity and paranoid fixation. After telling how he moved into Keeler’s house, he suddenly stops to say, ominously, “Things creep up on us when we deny their existence. …I must retrace,” and then he dives into a flashback that takes up the bulk of the book.
In terms of plot action, he accepts a package from the mailman, makes a phone call, looks out the window, drinks water in the kitchen, goes for a walk in the nearby canyon (the valley of death?), and visits a neighbor. Meanwhile, he muses on causation and the nature of time, sits in a canoe he finds in the time-traveling yurt that’s appeared in the yard, and later decides that all of humanity’s perception of time is a “purified lie.” Headaches and dizzy spells come and go. He grows suspicious of an old woman in the neighborhood, then sees her face — or his own mother’s face — in a dream, accusing him of throwing acid at her.
Van der Vliet Oloomi’s spare, clear language sets this novel apart from other fiction about mental illness. The controlled tone adds complexity to the narrator’s unreliability as we maintain an immediate awareness of who he is versus what he’s telling us. Well-placed surreal scenes are also described plainly, and then mocked sometimes, as in this moment where a cactus turns into an old woman:
I spotted a cactus a few feet away. The stems were bowing down toward the ground. Not like a light bulb, I thought, this cactus, and I walked one full circle around it. It is a green mass of death, I thought. I stood there for a while, the cactus occupying the whole space of my brain, just as the sky had occupied it a moment earlier. I mused over the shape of the cactus until a chubby, toothless old lady formed in its place. She stared at the horizon. She said, “Take a good look, because this is me now, this is me as I am dying.” I felt a second pang go through my chest. I didn’t know if it was the cactus talking, or the old lady. Weren’t they one and the same, hadn’t they emerged from the same entity? Then, I thought, what rot, the things in one’s head. Because images just appear, an old lady out of nowhere, where the cactus had been. One minute, and then the next, what is the use of these things?
He’s a kook with depth. As a person, he comes across as witty and self-effacing, not powerfully cold and psychotic. He later comments on why madness may be necessary in life, and makes moral judgments about other people’s behavior. Naturally, these aspects humanize him and elicit our sympathy and it doesn’t hurt that he acts like a lovable goofball at times. “Dumb as a lobster, you are Mr. Mailman,” he says at one point, while after a snack and a stroll, he says with childlike joy, “How helpful the slice of bread had been, the walk in the canyon!”
He would be charming. But there’s the book’s violent ending to consider. And as I did, I saw this charm being put to a specific purpose. As I thought about it, Fra Keeler reminded me of Rivka Galchen’s Atmospheric Disturbances, Roberto Bolano’s The Third Reich, and Jean-Philippe Toussaint’s Reticence, not to mention big classics like Crime and Punishment and Lolita. And what emerged as I considered a bit of context was that one vital aspect is Fra Keeler’s construction: the ending recasts the whole tenor of the book, illuminating who that realtor truly was and who the narrator might really have been. Then something clicked: the book had ingeniously play-acted a role I had wanted it to perform.
From this angle, Fra Keeler can be viewed as a critique of the attraction many writers, readers, critics, and scholars have to the clichéd glamor of evil, who fetishize the gorgeous anguish associated with men struggling with mental illness. And once we make this connection between novels that revel in spectacles of madness to the male violence at its roots (see Raskolnikov, Humbert, et al), and after we acknowledge that readers thrill to such spectacles and scholars add them to the canon – should this not prick at the conscience and urge us to examine our tastes?
Sure, it may only be fiction. But our enjoyment of it says a lot. Avoiding this issue seems to do ourselves and these male characters (and their male shadows in the real world), a disservice, waiting as it were for the next male-ghoul to be put on mad-parade in front of us to jab and laugh at as we turn the page — while pretending we’re actually learning more about the glory, jest, and riddle of the world.
To be clear, Fra Keeler does not abuse its male narrator in this way. Van der Vliet Oloomi hints sympathetically that war, that poisoned source of eternal male vainglory, is what might have driven the narrator to violence and madness. Rather, one of the things Fra Keeler does is offer a wondrously clear lens to those who want to examine tastes that have been taught to lurch grotesquely in the direction of male anxiety, mental illness, and violence when seeking so-called good literature. -


Lidija Dimkovska careens from pop culture to refugee laments in poems that traverse global trends: Since my brother hanged himself with the telephone wire/I can talk to him for hours on the phone

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pH Neutral History

Lidija Dimkovska, pH Neutral History, Trans. by Ljubica Arsovska and Peggy Reid, Copper Canyon Press, 2012.

"Dimkovska pins readers to the wall with rapid-fire linguistic energy."—Publishers Weekly

"[Dimkovsaka has the] stunning capacity to transform the ridiculous into something poignant and utterly precise."—Boston Review

In her sixth collection of poetry, Macedonian poet and novelist Lidija Dimkovska scrutinizes life’s customary and trivial details in a quest for greater meaning. She writes from the intersection of boundaries; her poems are long-lined and prosaic, she references religious tenets and native folklore, and blends irony with nostalgia for her youth. The world which she sees and writes of is sharp-edged, vivid, and resonant with profound meaning. “Since my brother hanged himself with the telephone wire/I can talk to him for hours on the phone” opens the poem “National Soul,” continually returning to her reflections on death and its neutralization: life. With the observant and detailed eye of a nomad, Dimkovska’s world reassesses the insignificant and charges it with far-reaching significance. She doesn’t rely on expected poetic conventions: grave sentiment and neatly wrapped metaphors. Dimkovska careens from pop culture to refugee laments in poems that traverse global trends.



From the intersection of boundaries, Macedonian poet and novelist Lidija Dimkovska scrutinizes life's customary and trivial details to expose the consequences—both confusing and edifying—of living in an age of contradictory ethics. These poems are packed with unusual connections and surprising detail, and populated with family characters as well as Bruno Schultz, Laurie Anderson, and George Steiner. Bilingual presentation, with Macedonian en face.


From "Ideal Weight":

Our river can be seen only through a small basement window.

And nobody dies absolutely any more. The middle-class scrapes

the price tags off presents, decorates windows with laser stars, plays shadow theatre

with rubber gloves on. It makes faces at you as you cry:

"I exorcise zombies professionally! Be free again!"



from Projection


But I know that you know how your palms itch when you're alone,

when the electricity goes off,

and the silence whirls in your stomach.

I know that you know how hard it is

to dress in white after wearing black,

to have your arms not merge into the day

but be signs by the road,

and to have nobody, Laurie, nobody travel

down your roads.

Do Not Awaken Them with Hammers (Eastern European Poets)

Lidija Dimkovska, Do Not Awaken Them with Hammers, Ugly Duckling Presse, 2006.

The first English-language edition of the sensational young Macedonian poet Lidija Dimkovska. Translated into English by Ljubica Arsovska and Peggy Reid and published in a facing-page, bilingual edition as part of UDP's Eastern European Poets Series. "The rock of translation is broken into stones, lined up and moved around to form a solid multitextured dwelling that Lidija Dimkovska then smashes apart with the authority of pure existentialist 21st century hard-earned riotous despair. Long live the stone-throwers! They make poetry much greater than the sum of its parts" - Fanny Howe

"Sad, silly and fantastical: in her first poetry collection translated into English (after three previous collections, plus a novel, in her native Macedonian) Dimkovska pins readers to the wall with rapid-fire linguistic energy and the propulsion of her chosen form, the jagged, long-lined column. In this forceful translation, Dimkovska takes on love (there is a cryptic "A." who is often addressed), marriage, fertility, beauty ("[he] refreshes himself with L'Oreal / (because he's worth it) to exhaustion"), religion ("God is a polyglot. God nibbles at himself thus penetrating into / the word God"), Aristotle and, of course, poetry itself. The political realities of being a contemporary woman in Eastern Europe haunt the whole collection, as in "Decent Girl": "I'll wear embroidered blouses from the Ethnographic Museum / of Macedonia, and someone will have to pay for them." Although Dimkovska's distinctive zip does, at times, get lost in the prose-like quality of some of her lines, this collection is mostly exhilarating. "I will confess," Dimkovska writes, "that art is not—but should be— / a delight." As deep and complex as they are hilarious, these poems are powerfully delightful." - Publishers Weekly

Poet and novelist Lidija Dimkovska was born in 1971 in Macedonia and she earned a doctoral degree in Romanian literature in Bucharest. She has published six books of poetry and one novel; her work has been translated into twenty languages. Dimkovska lives and teaches in Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Bernard Comment brings a fairy-tale premise into the modern world, where information, and its loss, can be a matter of life and death

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Bernard Comment, The Shadow of Memory, Trans. by Betsy Wing, Dalkey Archive Press, 2012.

The debut novel of Bernard Comment, acclaimed author and editor, now available in English for the first time, The Shadow of Memory brings a fairy-tale premise into the modern world, where information—and its loss—can be a matter of life and death.

In this eerie, compelling, and playful novel, a young man tormented by his feeble memory meets an elderly man, Robert, endowed with the recall of an elephant. Soon, in exchange for becoming his live-in servant, Robert agrees to allow his young protégé to inherit his prodigious memory upon his death. While this might seem a fair if absurd exchange, Robert’s demands become progressively more macabre, until the narrator is forced to decide what he is truly willing to sacrifice for the ability to remember. The debut novel of Bernard Comment, acclaimed author and editor, now available in English for the first time, The Shadow of Memory brings a fairy-tale premise into the modern world, where information—and its loss—can be a matter of life and death.
 Comment’s novel, originally published in France in 1990 and now appearing in English for the first time, is a house of cards that collapses before it’s complete. To combat his faulty memory, the book’s unnamed narrator takes to filling his computer with the available documented history of the cultural past in order to better situate himself in the present. While doing research, he meets Robert, an intriguing old man with an expansive and insatiable memory, who, seeing in the narrator a gullible dupe, reels him into an impossible and cruel project of his own, offering in exchange to bequeath his memory to the young man. Frustratingly, the nature of the narrator’s dilemma—namely the absurdity of it—is apparent long before he catches on, and despite Comment’s spry prose, the trip to the inevitable tragic end slows to a crawl before finally arriving. Along the way, the Swiss-born Comment (The Panorama) cleverly looks at the ways in which memory can dominate and distort perceptions of the present, but it’s not enough to keep the book afloat. - Publishers Weekly

   "So much reading, in vain" is the cri de cœur with which the narrator of The Shadow of Memory opens the story. He is a young man who is obsessed with the written word and record, and frustrated by his inability to retain what he thinks is the essence of what he reads, desperate in his: "desire for the past, a past no longer eluding me". Then he meets Robert, an old man who seems to offer everything he is missing. Eventually, Robert offers him an opportunity he can't pass up:
A job as secretary, or better: factotum, to revise his memory, his knowledge, and see to its upkeep.
       More than that, he is entranced by the possibility that Robert will: "transmit his memory to me".
       The narrator is involved with a woman, Mattilda, but Robert pulls him away from her. These two figures in his life, each vying for his undivided attention and unwilling and unable to accommodate the other (Mattilda refers to Robert as his: "nutty old man"), represent the two directions the narrator is pulled in. Robert holds the promise of a store of the entire past, while with Mattilda: "You had the impression with her that she only lived in the future". The narrator, meanwhile, acknowledges that all he has is the present, "the perfectly ordinary present; only in the present was I able to speak, find ideas, words."
       He doesn't have enough imagination to see any future -- and even though he likes Mattilda's invented stories of possible futures he finds they are beyond him, in part because: "I was already so far behind with the past".
       Robert has his own issues and tics, many of which bother the narrator, but which he isn't strong enough to do much about. However, the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow -- those treasured memories that might be all his after Robert (who is not in great health anyway) dies -- keeps him focused on the tasks at hand.
       Among Robert's obsessions is classification, as he tries to organize his library, and among the novel's best passages are his fanciful descriptions of how he has tried to and how he wants to organize his library. Among the ideas he has is for: "a system that took into account the pleasure or irritation felt in successive readings". And as to the most special books, his treasures, Robert explains that he wants:
All of these in the most ordinary, cheap editions, paperback if possible, so that no additional gratifying elements could dilute the intensity of the sensations experience. All those tremulous, ecstatic moments marking my existence ...
       Classification proves to be difficult, as does the narrator's pursuit of memory. Not surprisingly, things don't work out quite as the narrator hopes or plans, and even Robert proves not to be the fount of memory he had originally believed him to be.
       The novel switches from straightforward account to a journal that the narrator tries to keep, documenting the slow spiral out of control. No matter what he tries, the narrator remains frustrated: "My thought drags behind in confusion". Robert and Mattilda continue to tug him in different directions. It does not end well.
       The Shadow of Memory has some wonderful passages on memory and books, a theoretical framework on which Comment has structured his fiction. The story is fine, but only intermittently gripping; the book's best moments are those of single-minded pursuit and obsession, the brief digressions on classification and memory, and it's difficult for Comment to sustain the tension for the length of the novel. Still, these are intriguing ideas that Comment (and his ultimately hapless narrator) explore, and the whole premise is intriguing, too.
       A philosophical book-lover's book that doesn't entirely succeed. - M.A.Orthofer


Time is a complex substance, like a paste that slips away and soon disappears, while still remaining in the form of the traces it leaves on the ground, in the air, or in bodies and minds. It is a relentless flow, immediately suppressed and constantly repeated. The history of mankind is, for that matter, defined by this contradiction: to watch time pass by, and to try to count it, or to halt it.

Everyone, in order to shape him or herself during this lifetime, holds on to what he or she wants of the traces that time leaves all around itself. But, just as much, everyone lets him or herself be weighed down or filled with repressed, distasteful memories. (Freud is the proof of this, still current today.)
The practice of writing résumés, or the more recent example of Wikipedia, is as chilling as taking an X-ray, when all that remains is a skeleton. In these documents, the hazy tide of a life is reduced to a few dried-out drops – dates, diplomas, geographical locations, professional history – and you can't find any of that complex, contradictory, muddled pulp that is memory, with its radiant points and its miserable moments, its pride and its shame, its desires and its remorse – not to mention what's entailed by the Portuguese word "saudade," that is, nostalgia for what was, but also for what wasn't and could have been.
For me, this is precisely the realm of fiction: a "saudade," or a nostalgia with no bitterness, including for the foreseeable future, like the final story in Tout passe, entitled "An Outage." In order to bring to light the anthropological transformation which consists, for humanity, of having the access to memory depend on an energy source (electricity), I wanted to project myself several decades into the future, and place a character from our day and age in a world where paper books would no longer exist, having been replaced by screens. But that day there is a power outage, and this leads to a dialogue between the old man and a beautiful young woman from this new world.
At heart, memory has been the obsessive theme of my oeuvre, ever since my first novel, The Shadow of Memory, born from a long-lived suffering. It happens that when I was about twelve, I tripped on acid (LSD) several times, which literally left holes in my brain and my ability to remember. I felt then as if I were living on shifting sands, or rather on a beach, where footprints disappear with the next tide. And for years I lived in mourning for my memory; it was, for example, impossible to memorize anything by heart. So writing, for me, was this stubborn regaining of the past, and of the ability to engrave time somewhere.
I remember the evening when the idea for this novel came to me, like an epiphany. I was driving back along Tuscan country roads from a dinner at the home of an old writer who was equipped with a phenomenal memory (he had all of Dante memorized), I was a bit demoralized, and suddenly this fictional idea came into my mind: an amnesia-stricken young man who inherits the memory of an old scholar. Like that. Suddenly. It's the old dream: that memories wouldn't disappear along with death. What justification for writing is there other than this ultimate dialectization of death?
And so, for me, writing is a vast commemoration of the dead, the real or made up or simply possible dead. And also paying an ontological debt. In one of my favorite songs, "Fourth Time Around," Bob Dylan writes "Don't forget / Everybody must give something back / For something they get." With each book, I've paid debts. And I have still more ahead of me to pay. Because time doesn't stop, except through a work of art. To invent yourself a memory is to invent yourself a life, to appropriate other existences and other futures, to unset all stopwatches, abolish all barriers. "We write because life isn't enough," said Fernando Pessoa. Tombstones, with their falsely definitive dates, are a joke.
An extract from Les assises international du roman 2012, published by Christian Bourgois Editeur. Translated from the French by Peter Vorissis



The Painted Panorama


Bernard Comment, The Painted Panorama, Trans. by Anne-Marie Glasheen, Harry N. Abrams, 2000.



Panoramas-immense paintings, often in the round-were enormously popular during the 19th century, both in Europe and in America. Illustrated with hundreds of colorplates, including seven large double gatefolds, Bernard Comment's incisive and detailed study traces the history of an unusual art form, placing these elaborate 360-degree paintings in a full historical, social, and cultural context.
Drawing on extensive research, Comment, a cultural critic, brings to life both the reality and the significance of painted panoramas: the artists (often collaborative teams whose goal was perfect illusionism), the installations (specially built rotundas and tents), the subjects (cityscapes, vistas, battles, and religious tableaus, among others), and the meanings (panoramas as propaganda, advertising, substitutes for experience, and forerunners of cinema) of these amazing works of art.
210 illustrations, 120 in full color, 7 double gatefolds, 10 3/4 x 8 5/8"

Before there was Titanic the movie or Phantom the musical, one of the great spectacles was the panorama. This art form, popular for a relatively brief period in the 19th century, saw large crowds turn out in cities across Europe and North America to view depictions of battles, great land- and cityscapes, and historic events in, most often, circular purpose-built structures. Many factors, including the cost of the paintings themselves as well as the rise of photography and eventually motion pictures, led to the death of the panorama. French writer Comment, in this excellent history of a mostly forgotten art form, traces the history of the panorama, describes audience reactions, and gives biographical sketches of many of the artists as well as a critical assessment of their work (when possible, as most of the panoramas themselves have been lost). A highlight of the book is the inclusion of the gatefold color illustrations of seven panoramas that give only the slightest hint of what the panorama experience must have been like. A fine complement to Stephan Oettermann's somewhat more academic The Panorama (LJ 1/98), this is an accessible introduction for informed lay readers. - Library Journal


  Panorama
 Bernard Comment, Panorama, Reaktion Books, 2004.



 Read it at Google Books

Invented in 1788, the panorama reached the height of its popularity at the time of the 1900 Universal Exhibition. Vast circular canvases installed in purpose-built rotundas were designed to be viewed from centrally placed platforms and attracted an admiring public. The aim was to produce a perfect illusion. Thus the relationship between viewer and 'reality' underwent a profound mutation, opening up a new logic according to which the world was transformed into a spectacle and images substituted for direct experience.

This lavishly illustrated book examines the wide variety of panoramas in both the Old and New Worlds. Included among views of cities are Robert Barker's View of Edinburgh and Karl Friedrich Schinkel's View of Palermo, as well as depiction of Paris, Moscow, Jerusalem and Lima; among historical themes, The History of the Century and Battle of Moscow proved especially popular. The author expands his subject to encompass the sister formats of diorama and cineorama.
Panoramas were designed to put people in the picture, pretty well literally: the public stood on a central platform inside a rotunda totally encompassed by a canvas painted with a view that was usually a cityscape or a battle scene. In Bernard Comment's view, the pictures expressed the 19th century's fantasies, fears and aspirations. At any rate, they were an immensely popular feature of life - one estimate places the number of spectators between 1870 and the beginning of the 20th century at 100m souls avid for virtual travel before the age of travel. But cinema arrived in 1895 and panoramas became history. Still, a few survived and a few new ones have been added: Comment has counted 27, from (old) Waterloo - the battle depicted in a rotunda on the site of Napoleon's come-uppance - to (new) Jinz-hou. Some of the survivors are in the rotundas built for them, so this particular history lasts more or less from the time of the first 18th-century panorama to Disney World, where cameo cities from around the globe save the natives travelling. There is a relatively new panorama in Volgograd celebrating the victory of Stalingrad, and in 1962, on the 150th anniversary of Borodino, Russia's Dunkirk, the state restored an early 20th-century panorama of the battle painted with Tolstoyan detail and verve some way removed from social realism.
One of the older survivors is the Panorama Mesdag in The Hague, a 360-degree view 390ft around and 45ft high. It is a painted snapshot, as it were, of Scheveningen, the former fishing village on the outskirts of The Hague also painted by Van Gogh, who himself visited Mesdag's rotunda soon after its inauguration in 1880 and is said to have remarked: "The only fault of this canvas is that it doesn't have one."
That couldn't be said of most panoramas. The great Thomas Girtin, too, painted a watercolour panorama of London from the top of a factory on the South Bank encompassing the view from Lambeth to London Bridge as the model for a canvas shown in London in 1802-3 and now lost, though three of his four watercolour studies survive.
But mostly panoramas were pedestrian; both they and their makers had an uneasy relationship with fine art, despite formidable championship from Baudelaire. In the review of the 1859 Salon in which he deplored the standards of landscape painting (including, if you please, the work of Corot and Daubigny), he concluded: "I would rather return to the diorama [an extension of the panorama principle], whose brutal and enormous magic has the power to impose a genuine illusion upon me!... These things, because they are false, are infinitely closer to the truth..."
Could Baudelaire and a hundred million of his fellows be wrong? Comment argues that, apart from the sheer enchantment of the illusion (and this book is wonderfully illustrated), the panorama provided people with a way of repossessing their cities at a glance, metropolises that had expanded beyond comprehension under the impact of the industrial revolution.
He supports this with a battery of references, one of which had this reader turning to the end of Old Goriot, where Rastignac's "gaze fixed almost avidly upon the space that lay between the column of the Place Vendôme and the dome of the Invalides; there lay the splendid world that he had wished to gain". Was Balzac inspired by a painted panorama? If not, he lagged behind Dickens and Delacroix, Ruskin, Kafka, and, not least, Monet, who bequeathed his Nymphéas to the nation on condition that they were shown in specially constructed circular galleries - he got an Orangerie oval instead. - Mike McNay





Peter Tieryas Liu - a travelogue of and requiem for the American dream in all its bizarre manifestations and a surreal, fantastic journey through the streets, alleys, and airports of China: What would you do if you found out your girlfriend laid an egg every time she had sex?

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Peter Tieryas Liu, Watering Heaven, Signal 8 Press, 2012.

tieryas.wordpress.com/
www.tieryasxu.com/



What would you do if you found out your girlfriend laid an egg every time she had sex? Who would you be if you were invited to a party in Beijing but had to make up a brand-new identity for six weeks? Peter Tieryas Liu's Watering Heaven is a travelogue of and requiem for the American dream in all its bizarre manifestations and a surreal, fantastic journey through the streets, alleys, and airports of China.Whether it's a monk who uses acupuncture needles to help him fly or a city filled with rats about to be exterminated so that the mayor can win his reelection bid, be prepared to laugh, swoon, and shudder at the answers Liu offers in this provocative debut collection.
  "Exuberant.Wildly inventive.Grungy with global resonance for the 21st century.This debut collection of fiction rides bareback over the metaphysical divide of Asia and the USA. An astonishing energy prevails. This is definitely a writer to watch." -Xu Xi
"A surreal menagerie of short stories that sometimes veer into the realm of magic realism. There is something both slightly haunting yet inviting in these tales of love and loss that are both sensitive and intelligent. He's a writer to look out for." -Sang Pak

"This debut collection probes the membrane of modern meaninglessness in consistently passionate and original prose. With its inquiry into love's very anatomy, Liu's brave new world comes full-force with a spinning intensity, keeping us on the edge of our postwar, pre-apocalyptic seats. Encore!" -Leza Lowitz
"Expertly attuned to the zeitgeist-the tangle of our social networks, our cubicle culture, the language of science-the brilliant, haunting stories in Watering Heaven are always leading us somewhere deeper yet: that fathomless reservoir of human need and longing." -Tim Horvath
"Edgy, clever and memorably innovative, he masterfully treats his panoply of characters.The untainted directness of language as well as his surreal brilliancy reminds one of the very best of Borges, Calvino, Pynchon.Here is an author who singlehandedly breaks the sun in half with sheer novelty and song." -Leonore Wilson  Goodreads Summary: “What would you do if you found out your girlfriend laid an egg every time she had sex? Who would you be if you were invited to a party in Beijing but had to make up a brand-new identity for six weeks? Peter Tieryas Liu's Watering Heaven is a travelogue of and requiem for the American dream in all its bizarre manifestations and a surreal, fantastic journey through the streets, alleys, and airports of China. Whether it's a monk who uses acupuncture needles to help him fly or a city filled with rats about to be exterminated so that the mayor can win his reelection bid, be prepared to laugh, swoon, and shudder at the answers Liu offers in this provocative debut collection.” There was something that grabbed at my attention when Watering Heaven was requested to me. Perhaps it was the fact that I haven’t read much in terms of Asian fiction, or perhaps because it was described as a travelogue. Whatever it was, it sparked something in me.
Watering Heaven is a collection of nineteen short stories, all with some connection to Asia, be it the setting or the characters themselves. There’s also a lot of Asian folklore including in Watering Heaven, and I loved how these were included into the stories. They complemented each other well, and I thought that they were a fantastic edition into the stories. The stories wove together well too, not always with the characters featured but also with the settings and landmarks. I love it when stories do that, as I feel it really helps them to interlock together well.
The writing in Watering Heaven is exquisite. And I really do mean that. There are so many beautiful quotes in this book. They didn’t feel misplaced within the stories either. Sometimes, a quote can be brilliant, yet stick out like a sore thumb for the wrong reasons. This isn’t the case with Watering Heaven, everything flows together seamlessly. My favourite stories, basically the ones that have stayed with me, were A Beijing Romance, Staccato and Searching for Normalcy. That’s not to say the others were bad, those three were the ones that made the largest impression on myself. A lot of these stories are incredibly thought-provoking, asking weighty questions and taking the characters through experiences that I hope to never have to go through myself.
My one real complaint with Watering Heaven, and this is an extremely petty complaint that I have about nearly every single short story I read: some of the stories were too short. I know that’s the point of short stories, I honestly do. I just get so attached to the characters and their backgrounds that I want to spend more time with them, learn more about them and their relationships with others. I just get so frustrated reading short stories sometimes, it’s like getting a lick of ice cream when you just want to have the entire scoop. Watering Heaven also has some mature themes running through it, so this isn’t one for people who don’t like reading about sex or death. I didn’t personally have a problem with the themes, but I am all too aware that there are people that do.
Overall, Watering Heaven was an interesting and, at times, thought-provoking read. Whilst it’s not something I’d have picked up off my own back, I’m pleased I got to experience the beautiful writing that is contained within these stories. - www.musicbooksandtea.blogspot.com/

After a stretch of reading narratives from WWII China, this week I turned to a collection of contemporary short stories, mainly set in Beijing and Los Angeles.

Watering Heaven (Signal 8 Press, 2012) by Peter Tieryas Liu consists of twenty stories that mostly feature male protagonists who surround themselves with feisty, independent, and intelligent women.
Peter Tieryas Liu writes about themes that we can all relate to: workplace satisfaction, relationships, identity, acceptance, and death. As I read Watering Heaven, I couldn’t help but think of Wong Kar-wai, Hong Kong’s avant garde director extraordinaire.
One of my favorite pieces is titled “The Political Misconception of Getting Fired.” In this story, Byron, the protagonist, becomes reacquainted with his high school crush. June contacts him on Facebook and they make a plan to meet for dinner. But when June speaks of aliens and UFOs, Byron freaks out and fakes a work emergency. As Byron leaves the dinner, he starts to regret his decision to leave. What happens later will change his life forever.
Another one that I’ll remember for a long time is “The Interview”, in which the protagonist is fired from a job for misidentifying a female manager as a male. When he interviews for another job, he’s asked the most intense questions about subjects such as death, marriage, cheating, love, happiness, and work ethics.
I enjoyed all of the stories in this collection and felt like I was right there in Beijing, LA, and the other settings in the book. Tieryas Liu is a young and fresh voice, and I can’t wait to read more from him in the years to come. He has a fabulous book trailer for Watering Heaven. You can click here to see the YouTube clip. - Susan Blumberg-Kason

Peter Tieryas Liu sent me a copy of his book Watering Heaven, a collection of short stories. It’s his first book. Order it on Amazon here or learn more about Peter Tieryas Liu at his website here. He’s got tons of publications in some of the top literary journals in the country, including Zyzzyva, Indiana Review, Evergreen Review, and Kartika.
Let me first begin by saying that short stories is usually not my genre. I say “usually” because I’m more of a novel-guy, although longtime readers have seen me heap tons of praise on writers of longer short stories like Alice Munro and Yiyun Li. Watering Heaven is a book of very short stories, some only three or four pages. I wasn’t sure exactly what to expect, since I was crossing into an unfamiliar space.
This book surpassed expectations. In a short story (as opposed to a novel), a writer must choose each word carefully and bring the arc of the narrative together with efficiency. A good short story must be precise. The stories in this collection are imaginative, clever, quick, and fun to read. Liu writes with an extraordinary command of language and nuance. Many of the stories involved first person Asian American men in relationships with Chinese and Chinese American women, stories that take place in China and in the U.S. I really enjoyed his portrayals of the cultural dimension of these relationships–his portrayals were light and expressive, much as one would expect.
Most of these stories have elements of surreal realities or extraordinary occurrences. The first story involves a woman who lays an egg every time after having sex. Another involves a man with HIV-resistant blood who sets up his own place in an abandoned town. Another story tells about the daughter of a man who studied feces who is now taking pictures of a man who flies through the air using acupuncture. Throughout the stories, however, the author manages to maintain a level of seriousness that illuminates the human condition of his characters. I was impressed with Mr. Liu’s powerful imagination and ability to see things beyond the ordinary. Though I’m still primarily a novel-guy, I think even most novel-people will like this book and get much from it. - www.bigwowo.com/

Today, I have Peter Tieryas Liu on the blog where I got to ask him some questions!
1. If you had to describe your book to a friend, what would you say?

This is my debut collection of twenty stories called Watering Heaven out from Signal 8 Press. The stories were written during my travels throughout the world, particularly in China and Thailand. Some of the stories have elements of magical realism, say as in a woman who gives birth to an egg and a man who is able to fly. Others are grounded in reality but take on strange slants on humanity; a man who takes photographs of urban legends and a filmmaker wants to defend the rights of rats who are about to exterminated. Many of the stories have been published in some of my favorite literary magazines and I’m glad for the chance to get to share all of them at once in the form of this book. The title comes from the William Blake poem, the Tyger, describing the celestial war when the angels were forced out of Heaven. It reflects the theme of transition and change that marks many of the stories and protagonists.

2. What made you decide to become a writer?

Would it sound strange if I told you that a strange voice in the back of my neck originating with a third eye inspired me to write a piece about wingless birds fighting against milk-thirsty chimpanzees when I was seven? Later, I was implanted with a brain cell formulated from nanolasers imprinted with a command that I write about the quirky contrasts of urban life with the ambitions that propel a society forward. Machinations may abound, but my focus has been microscopically planktonite. Literally, biochemical plankton infesting fish causing everyone who eats anything that eats aquatic organisms with gills to blog, scribble, and write every concept and idea on a pen, iPad, keyboard, and smart phone. I try to capture some of the nuances. Say watching a centipede or a pill millipede struggling briskly with his legs to cross the sidewalk. It’s an odd analogy for the balancing act present in modern lives. (To answer your question, I just love telling stories)

3. Favorite TV show? Movie? Book?
Too many to list here. Can I just share what I’ve enjoyed in the past month? I loved watching the season premiere of Walking Dead and have also enjoyed Game of Thrones. Movie-wise, my wife and I have been watching some old Kubrick films and have really enjoyed those. The last movie I saw at the theater was Dark Knight Rises and I loved the ambitious nature of the film. I did also see Hotel Transylvania, which I loved, but I’m biased as I worked on the film. As for books, there’s a wide variety: The Art Spirit by Robert Henri, Grim Series Poem by Kristine Ong Muslim, VII by Kyle Muntz, re-reading parts of the works of Marvin K. Mooney by Christopher Higgs. I also re-read Candide by Voltaire and was shocked at how violent and nihilistic it got, even if it was meant as satire. There’s too many good books and not enough time. I really respect a readers time and try to make sure every story I write satisfies them in one form or another.- ladybugstorytime.blogspot.com/
I received a copy of this book from the author in exchange for an honest review.
This was a well written and thought provoking short story collection. It’s intelligent and strange, with wonderful descriptions and metaphors and revelations and I enjoyed reading it. My favorite story was the first one, Chronology of an Egg, perhaps because I didn’t quite know what to expect when I first opened the book.
’Words should have gravity. If you can’t get arrested for a word, it probably isn’t worth using.’” –Chronology of an Egg
The reason I didn’t rate this collection of stories higher was because towards the middle of the book, I felt a lot of repetition and it was losing it’s charm. It became more predictable as the main character of each story meets up with a strange and fascinating woman. This type of fiction is something that appeals to me, but it’s also easy for me to dislike it. I liked the stories in this collection, but I felt it could have been a shorter collection or hold more surprises in order for me to rate it higher. This is definitely a personal thing for me and I’m always a little hesitant to take requests to read surreal fiction because it is harder for me to rate highly.
I would definitely recommend this short story collection, especially to those that like magical realism, surrealism, and/or strange, yet intelligent stories. It was well done and I would definitely read other works by the author. - Megan Monell

I stuffed too many stories into the first draft of Watering Heaven. There were originally thirty of them and I picked the stories in sets. For my short stories, I find myself frequently latching onto themes and exploring them through three stories. For example, the stories “Searching for Normalcy,” “The Interview,” and “Urban Dreamers” were written as triplets exploring the abnormalities of corporate life. “Chronology of an Egg,” “Gradients,” and “Staccato” were another set that examined hybridized love and the metamorphosis of the American dream. Tenuously speaking, these sets of threes coalesced into the first draft of the book. It was a messy web that ran unevenly throughout. Determining the title, Watering Heaven, based on the William Blake poem, “Tyger,” helped me focus on the theme of a journey and disillusionment, weeding out a few of the stories including the one of a guy with insecurity issues because he has a green dick and two lovers who fall in love over a dying bird. After deleting three others, I had seven sets of three and one solitary story, “An Empty Page,” that was always a bit of a loner. To supplement those, I had three experimental stories that hadn’t been published yet, but that I personally loved. That brought the grand total to twenty-five.
I’ve worked in both games and films, and one of the most amazing things to see is a storyboard of the entire film through rough images on the walls. There’s often a colorkey pass and you see the hues transitioning between different arts and moments in the film. Without hearing the music, without even seeing the specific images, you can tell the mood of specific parts just by the color tone.
I made post-it notes with the titles of each story and their theme (in one or two words) underneath, then placed them in a long row. For example, the story “Beijing Romance” was ‘love,’ while “Unreflected” was ‘identity.’ Once I had them arrayed in that fashion, if any stories were too similar, I tried to separate them. Likewise, I didn’t want the story shifts to be too dramatic, so while splitting up my sets of 3s, I still tried to find interlinking themes to transition the stories. I also tried to position my more ‘experimental’ stories in locations where they wouldn’t be a distraction in case any editor found them to be the weakest links. These stories were ones where I delved into issues that were deeply personal to me as in “The Political Misconception of Getting Fired” about a guy meeting up with his high school crushed who turns out to be obsessed with UFOs; “Rodenticide,” about a failed filmmaker who decides he will die for the rights of rats; and “Resistance,” which is about a man who develops HIV resistance and wants to help a group of prostitutes escape their past.
Many of the stories were written in the long months I spent overseas in Asia, particularly Beijing and Bangkok. So I also listed location beneath these notes in order to give some variety to the locations. Once the order was set, I sent out to several publishers and was thrilled when Signal 8 Press accepted.
My editor, Marshall, was great to work with and in some ways, understood the collection as a cohesive unit better than me. While making extensive editorial suggestions throughout the collection, he also felt we should cut five stories. We had several detailed emails talking about which ones should go. Three of them were relatively easy. The last two he selected were really tough for me. With his permission, I’m including his original email:
“The Whimsy of Creation”: At first I wanted to move it to the end of the book, like the 3rd-to-last position, because I think it’s a powerful story. Thing is, it shouldn’t be paired with “Resistance” for thematic reasons. This is why I think it should go. On the one hand, as good as it is, it seems like a waste, but I also think it’s sort of grimmer and darker than the rest of the book, and inconsistent in tone.
“A Collection from Existence”: Mainly for thematic reasons, as well. I started in on it and then stopped, reread it, and decided it wasn’t adding to the collection as a whole.
It was tough to hear this. Sad to say it, but I would have much easily parted with almost any other story aside from these two. “The Whimsy of Creation” was a story I’d labored on for over a year, a narrative about a man bonding with his uncle while visiting some Asian brothels. “A Collection From Existence” was probably the most unstory-like story I’d ever written, and was intended as such as I wanted it to be a ‘collection’ rather than a story per se (when I originally published this story, I thought to myself, if I never get another story published again, I’m OK with that). It was very painful letting those two go because they were both longer pieces that I felt provided anchorage to the collection. They’d also both received extensive editing at the magazines they’d originally been published in, the Evergreen Review and Quiddity Literary International Journal.
I consulted my board and whined to my wife and tossed and turn before sending the email agreeing to the changes because I knew deep down that Marshall was right; thematically, they both stuck out. But it was still hard for me to admit as much without feeling like a part of myself was being ripped off and thrown away.
Probably one of the most important changes was also Marshall’s suggestion. Originally, I’d placed the story, “Forbidden City Hoops,” as my first story because its original publication in ZYZZYVA sparked off a long run of publications of the stories I wrote in China. It was both a thematic and symbol placement. Marshall suggested I place “Chronology of an Egg” (about a woman who gives birth to eggs when she has sex) as the first story. He was absolutely right. Many of the reviews and friends who’ve read it have told me “Egg” was the story that sucked them in.
There’s an asymmetrical self-similarity in fractals that miraculously maintains itself with scale whether you zoom in or out. The integrity and flow has to work on the individual page as well as within the range of stories, and I found in my attempt to put it together, visualizing the story using physical post-it notes, as well as getting a second perspective from an editor, helped in making the collection what it is. If I were to get another stab at it, the only thing I might change is that there’s a concentration of short short towards the back that I’d spread out a little more. At the time, having focused on the themes and locations, I didn’t include lengths of the stories as well. The breakout, like the stories, needed a third category.
Peter Tieryas Liu

Modern and Contemporary Swiss Poetry: An Anthology - Urs Allemann, Arno Camenisch, Blaise Cendrars, Jacques Chessex, Adelheid Duvanel, Claire Genoux, Philippe Jaccottet, Gerhard Meier, Klaus Merz, Giorgio Orelli, Giovanni Orelli, Anne Perrier...

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Modern and Contemporary Swiss Poetry: An Anthology, Ed. by Luzius Keller, Dalkey Achive Press, 2012.

Featuring the work of some of the greatest poets of the twentieth century as well as their contemporary counterparts, this anthology is unique in bringing together a broad selection of Switzerland's greatest authors in all of the country's major languages. Featuring Urs Allemann, Arno Camenisch, Blaise Cendrars, Jacques Chessex, Adelheid Duvanel, Claire Genoux, Philippe Jaccottet, Gerhard Meier, Klaus Merz, Giorgio Orelli, Giovanni Orelli, and Anne Perrier, among many others—most of whose work has never before been available in English translation—this overview of Swiss poetry stands as the ideal introduction to an undervalued and idiosyncratic force in international literature, at the forefront of many of the most influential literary movements, be they traditional or experimental.

 

Excerpt

From the Introduction by Luzius Keller:

Switzerland is no borderland, but it is a land of borders: national borders, cantonal borders, community borders, linguistic borders—some barely noticeable, others very real impediments to the social coexistence of the regions and their inhabitants. For the poets as well. Certainly, Fabio Pusterla has translated Philippe Jaccottet and Corinna Bille; Giorgio Orelli, Andri Peer; Andri Peer, Mauric Chappaz; José-Flore Tappy, Erika Burkart; Donata Berra, Klaus Merz . . . Certainly, Elisabeth Meyland and Nilaus Meienberg listen to Blaise Cendrars; Andri Peer to Albin Zollinger; Frédéric Wandelère or Vanni Bianconi to everything that goes on around them . . . Certainly, the blackbird sings (and dies) in Gerhard Meier and in
Giorgio Orelli, and Fabio Pusterla and Leta Semadeni give voice to the sorrow of slaughtered cattle. And yet—in spite of all the efforts of cultural policy, of collective appearances in anthologies and other publications, at literature conferences, at readings or round-table discussions—one still cannot speak of a specifically Swiss poetry. Fortunately, we must admit—since where the poet is given a measuring-stick, he runs the risk of losing his own measure, his own voice. The measuring-out of one's own space and its borders is addressed in the poems of Bernadette Lerjen-Sarbach, in the dialect of the Upper Valais, a language which lies, for not a few Swiss-German ears, beyond the frontier of the comprehensible. Poetry, however, knows no borders. She opens herself to every ear.

Takashi Hiraide - A mix of narrative, autobiography, minute scientific observations, poetics, rhetorical experiments, hyper-realistic images, and playful linguistic subversions—all scored with the precision of a mathematical-musical structure

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Takashi Hiraide,For the Fighting Spirit of the Walnut, Trans. by Sawako Nakayasu. New Directions, 2008.

Read it at GoogleBooks 

Excerpt 

The radiant subway. The wall that clears up, endless. A thundering prayer of steel that fastens together the days, a brush of cloud hanging upon it, O beginning, it is there—your nest. Thus the keynotes of Hiraide's utterly original book-length poem unfold—a mix of narrative, autobiography, minute scientific observations, poetics, rhetorical experiments, hyper-realistic images, and playful linguistic subversions—all scored with the precision of a mathematical-musical structure. 

 
A walnut is a train is a poem is a heart is a shadow. Takashi Hiraide’s For the Fighting Spirit of the Walnut is avant-garde poetry that nevertheless relies on the most ageless of poetic devices: metonymy. But rather than create sets of parallel relations, his use of metonymy propels a seemingly endless string of shape-shifting objects and experiences. The book is divided into 111 short poetic prose sections whose splintering effect is enacted via a unique combination of speed and minutiae.
Hiraide wrote most of the work while commuting, and, like train cars, its sections can be shuffled around and read in almost any order. This adds further to the associational feel, as objects, images, ideas, and memories flash in and out of view. Here’s the whole of section 91: “The young rustling breeze blowing through the trees of a borrowed landscape, beside the glass window, insists it is a migratory anticyclone. The cheerful hustler. In this spring of brute strength, you’ve tired yourself out confirming the balance between the fading halo and the boiling light. I, too, am to quickly understand, from that hoarse voice of yours, that something boiling over inside me has expended the balance of noon.” What initially reads like free association turns out to be a near-microscopic record of emotion and phenomena.
To crack open a walnut is ultimately to destroy it; to unlock a poem’s secrets partially steals its life. Hiraide’s writing obstructs this intrusion, or at least seeks to defer it for as long as possible. There’s no narrative arc to the work, no resolution, no closure—to the contrary, eraser is a favorite word: “Entering the room, a pulse is taken right when the heart is crushed upon a color-printed newspaper. And so it is today, too, a line of poetry goes without shooting you, and is nothing more than a soundless watery segment floating up for the first time, finally, enfolded in the gathering dusk of a long detour.” Sawako Nakayasu’s deft translation appears in a striking bilingual version: the English starts from the front and works its way forward, while the original Japanese starts from the back. The languages meet on either side of inverted images of a lightning strike. The mirrored texts thus mimic a walnut’s fleshy swirl, as well as productively frustrate attempts to impose a definitive order on Hiraide’s unruly poetry.
I don’t particularly like walnuts—they taste woody; their texture is borderline mealy; and they ruin anything they’re added to, especially ice cream. I’m not sure how much Hiraide enjoys them either, but I bet he admires their Deleuzian folds and resemblance to a cerebral cortex. On a related note, although I like the idea of poetry, I don’t always like poetry itself. Hiraide also seems ambivalent, given the book’s assault on various conventional poetic structures. In Nakayasu’s introduction, she quotes Hiraide as saying: “There came a point when I could no longer stand to speak about poetics with those who were unwilling to consider poetry from an external distance.” A sense of resistance as a resistance to sense is fundamental to Hiraide’s approach, and is part of the walnut’s “fighting spirit.” In another book, Hiraide compares poetry to baseball. For the Fighting Spirit of the Walnut similarly doubles as a book on poetics, and specifically of the fragment borne by a poetic line where the literal lives in pieces.Alan Gilbert
 
When a fan of the neglected American genius Guy Davenport wrote to tell him that she admired his ability to express himself, his response was: "Yick!" Davenport's reaction — somewhere between bemusement and horror — upon learning that anyone could so misunderstand his art, and, indeed, art in general, seems apposite in considering the work of Takashi Hiraide whose "For the Fighting Spirit of the Walnut" has more in common with the cool integrity of the best work of poets such as Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot and Guillaume Apollinaire — modernists, one and all — than it does with versifiers who appear to believe that writing is a way for them to work through the emotions that wash over them when, say, the sun sets behind bare trees, the seasons change, or a dog dies. Readers willing to leave all that warm fuzziness behind will enjoy the linguistic and conceptual fireworks, the wit, and the mystery that make Hiraide's Walnut a poetic page-turner.
Like much of the best work done in this poetic tradition, "Walnut" is a collection of fragments. The shortest of the 111 numbered sections is three words; all but one of the poems are compact enough that they can fit two to a page. Some surrender their meaning without much of a struggle; none are blunt enough to be boring.
There are bits, for example, that seem to come from the poet's life, such as No. 14: "Today, with a triple hangover, I slowly pedaled and pedaled my wobbly bicycle, like / a mist, past a back alley that murmurs condolences." The play on the Japanese word for hangover, "futsukayoi" — literally: "second day drunk" — is obscured in English, but even those with only barroom Japanese will suspect that it's lurking there in "triple."
Other pieces of "Walnut" reflect on writing and its inadequacies: "Continuous thoughts of packaging ice. No matter what I write it melts, even the / address. If and when it arrives, that person will be gone." This is chilling enough that we can't quite share the author's despair over his art, but as satisfying as this bit and the others that constitute Hiraide's "Walnut" are, as is usually the case with modernist works, the real fun begins when the reader starts to think about how best to mentally slide the fragments around to make them form a coherent whole.
A book-length poem cannot be taken in all at once, but rather must be explored in the same way one comes to terms with a piece of music: over time. Just as one won't grasp a challenging piece of music on first hearing or from its first few notes, neither will one extract the full riches from "Walnut" on one's initial pass through it or from its first few parts.
As with all poetry worth reading once, "Walnut" must be read more than once. Even on that first pass through, though, it will be apparent that the fragments are not random, that they are linked. Images recur ("the radiant subway"), as do notions (the inner, the outer, protective shells, tunneling). Several pieces refer back, like a mirror, to the work in which they occur ("A train whose one hundred and eleven cars each simultaneously break into the lead / past the thin hazy air of the midnight sun").
There is, one comes to see, coherence lurking under the surface incoherence — not concealed, but rather defined by the juxtapositions Hiraide has created. We close the book after our first reading, our second, and look forward to the pleasure we know awaits us when, once again, we crack Hiraide's "Walnut." - David Cozy


"Spirits wrapped in a skin of green. Each one lushly growing, a hanging drop of a thunderstorm!" Takashi Hiraide's collection of prose poetry For the Fighting Spirit of the Walnut is a multileveled and labyrinthine exploration of how things small in scale have the potential to transcend their physical, temporal and existential boundaries. Expressing encouragement for this motion, Hiraide inspires confidence in the subjects of his work by illustrating ways that great accomplishments can be achieved through seemingly inconsequential actions: "Come see how the dust rises when you say it again, right here, hey you, say it again." In its directness and frankness with its audience, his work functions with an understanding of how the individual pieces making up its existence form a whole.
For the Fighting Spirit of the Walnut, originally published in 1982 to critical acclaim, is only the second of Hiraide's works to be translated into English—following Postcards for Donald Evans (Tibor De Nagy, 2003). Selections of the poet's work have also been published in such publications as the translation journal Factorial as well as in the long-out-of-print Anthology of Contemporary Japanese Poetry (Norton, 1993). Although still largely unknown in English-speaking countries, Hiraide is a prolific writer and the recipient of many literary prizes, with over a dozen works of genre-defying poetry and nonfiction in print in Japan. Hiraide's translator Sawako Nakayasu calls his work "ineluctably contemporary," iterating his position as one of a group of poets born afer the war who do not reflect on late imperial Japan, and writes that in For the Fighting Spirit of the Walnut, "lyric, phenomenological, faux-scientific, rhetorical, abstract, descriptive and observation writing are blended with a subtle humor." Indeed, this is a work in which many types of writing coexist; as one poem reads, "tied together, the bells which report their whereabouts dance, and between these dancing bells, look, the swirling has started after all."
Hiraide thematically introduces several points of departure throughout the collection, points which later reappear in tandem, intersecting or diverging. There is the city poet's narrative—an amphibious Paris Spleen in which the flaneur traverses Hiraide's "radiant subway" where "small white explosions occur here and there." These "small white explosions" are "the sounds of our joints popping, the sound of an all-too-convenient despair fading away." The poet writes at another moment that, "verse finds strength in being segmented." Just as our own joints enable us to move freely, it is through the interconnectedness of the individual prose poems that the work as a whole finds its strength and flexibility. Another theme examines the lives of things such as walnuts, plums and small animals from the moment of their conception till death, or rebirth by means of "a courage that exceeds the imagination, a despair that compels the imagination."
This edition is presented bilingually, and has been beautifully translated into English by Nakayasu, the esteemed poet and the editor of Factorial. A further connection is added, then, in English translation, as Nakayasu not only separates and ties the individual threads of Hiraide's work back together, but it is also through the process of translation that the two poetic strands—the text written by Nakayasu and Hiraide—are intertwined. Thus the original work is further strengthened through the process of translation.
To illustrate this connection, the Japanese text, rather provocatively, begins on the opposite side of the binding from its English translation, and the translation mirrors the original work until the two texts meet in the center. As a result, Nakayasu's translation does not stand beside the original as though anticipating or even inviting scrutiny. Instead, like a walnut, the original work and the translation form two halves: Hiraide and Nakayasu's texts have come together in this edition to form one transcendent new work.
In explaining the layers of meaning in the book's title, Nakayasu writes that the walnut suffers, "not only in poetry, but also in translation." The word walnut in Japanese is kurumi, and shi, which could alternately mean either "poetry" or "death," is inserted into the walnut, making the word kurushimi—or "suffering": the walnut suffers in poetry. It is sometimes thought that poetry suffers as a result of translation, but here the translation can be understood as an act of compassion. And even this compassion is neither an invention of Nakayasu's, nor a by-product of translation, but simply an accurate translation of a work she calls an "utterly compassionate book." This compassion is an essential component to all successful translations, and through Nakayasu's translation of Hiraide's work, the role of the translator is renegotiated and redefined.
In her translator's note Nakayasu writes that For the Fighting Spirit of the Walnut represents a turning point in Hiraide's writing "…in which he begins his lifelong explorations of prose as the Idea of poetry, extended syntax and a poetics of the grammatical line." A variation of these same explorations are most apparent in Nakayasu's own 2004 poetry collection, Nothing Fictional but the Accuracy or Arrangement (She), in which Nakayasu uses the personal pronoun "she" to connect individual prose pieces into one narrative structured around an extended exploration of poetics.
In For the Fighting Spirit of the Walnut, the extended syntax is represented visually as the meat inside a walnut, a system of subway tunnels, or arms outstretched; this extension is compassionate, as one poem reads, "admitting to a beautiful shadow outside itself…," the metaphor of the reach is the guiding impulse behind the text. Furthermore, in the context of Hiraide's prose, this shadow is proof of the work's existence. This shadow can be understood as translator or the translation itself. This shadow, a sort of inverted reflection, is often referred to with the feminine pronoun "she." The lines "she who will one day be forced to approve of my existence" thus strike a resonant chord with Nakayasu's own poetic project. With the publication of For the Fighting Spirit of the Walnut, the explorations of two highly experimental poets have met and the result is an act of compassion and an extension of the Japanese text to an English-speaking readership. - Alecs Mickunas

An Open Letter to Takashi Hiraide Inspired after Reading the Poet’s For the Fighting Spirit of the Walnut

Dear Takashi Hiraide,
(First: please forgive all the numerous asides. I seem to want to address you directly— or as you would have it, “Hey, say it again, one more time. Come see how the dust rises when you say it again, right here, hey you, say it again”—while avoiding any real confrontation at the same time. Second: I should provide you, Hiraide, with some justification of what I am doing here, as this piece rests somewhere between critical review and epistolary essay. I refuse the conventional form in order to better understand your work. And if you can write and address an entire book of “postcards” to an artist—Donald Evans—whom you never met, surely I can write a letter of appreciation to a poet who will only respond with immaculate silence?)
Topiary 1 Day
Topiary 1, Day. Image courtesy Ross Martens.
When reading your work (so little of which has been translated into English thus far, while the very little kanji, hiragana, and katakana that I know are not enough for me to read you in the original; perhaps one day) I am reminded of something the Greek poet Manolis Anagnostakes once wrote: “I have no confidence in my own critical abilities.” Such a sentiment always seems to accompany me, to shadow me, when confronted with your texts (and I would prefer not to call it “poetry”; that would be far too reductive and easy. Your projects remind me of something Marianne Moore once said of her poems: that the only reason her work was classified as poetry was because there was no other genre that would apply). Your work mystifies, at least as much as it reveals—like that of William Blake, the English visionary, with whom you have a clear and sincere connection; you delight in revelation, in lifting reality’s curtain to show us the profane in the mundane (I can only wonder what I might learn from your untranslated essay collection, William Blake’s Bat).
Consider the strangeness of the following fragment from your most recent work to be translated (masterfully, I might add, by Sawako Nakayasu) into English, For the Fighting Spirit of the Walnut. What I find revelatory is your violent yoking of the everyday with the impossible to define.
Just then, I noticed a single rusty rail bursting out of my chest, falling to the asphalt in front of me. I dropped to my knees in time with the landing, and it sped up, stretched even further, and was pulled into the underground stairs before me, which seemed to be cradled quietly in the belly of a lonely, faint black stone architecture. I crawled forward while drawing the track back into my chest, until I finally arrived at the entrance, and peeked in. Far beyond the cavity made of bones, near two intersecting beams of light, something with a dim shadow. And then, something surging forth from who knows when.
The question asked here is a simple one—steeped in phenomenological tenets—but it can never be answered: Where does the self begin and the world end? You, of course, know well enough to not posit an answer, but simply to reveal the importance of asking the right questions.
Like Dante, a poet equally confident in language’s revelatory powers, you have your own Inferno: the Japanese subway system. (And have you read Alice Notley’s The Descent of Alette? It also transforms a subway system, this time New York’s, into a hellish selva oscura.) Apparently it was during your daily commute to work on the train that you found time to write the prose fragments that became For the Fighting Spirit of the Walnut—that’s not quite an example of Michel de Certeau’s notion of la perruque, but it’s almost there (the idea of stealing/diverting time/energy from work in order to construct the wonderfully subversive, the intensely personal, all under the watchful eye of the boss). But what the fragment above—number 59 out of 111, a number to which you would return to when writing your elegiac One Hundred and Eleven Tankas to Mourn My Father—illustrates is the capacity for the common to transform into the sublime. As you yourself have said, there is nothing truly surreal in For the Fighting Spirit of the Walnut. According to Eric Selland, another of your translators into English, “these images [are] not surrealistic at all—they [are] extremely minute, almost scientific observations of [Hiraide's] daily commute on the train between Shinjuku and Iidabashi where at the time he was working in book design for Kawade Shobo Publishing.” All the observations in it are actually acute, almost clinical representations of objects on an incredibly small scale, or seen at breakneck speeds. I often remember, as a child, gazing at underground tunnel lights in the subway as the train rushed in/out of Manhattan, and find that you experienced something similar:
The Radiant subway again. Today, too, in this still-radiant subway, small white explosions occur here and there. They are the sounds of joints popping, the sound of an all-too-convenient despair fading away.
Such clinical and exact representations of objects brings to mind another collection of yours, Portrait of a Young Osteopath, a text that has yet to be fully translated into English, and of which I only know through the few translations provided by Selland. But let me illustrate what I mean about your sharp and insightful gaze by quoting this section from Osteopath:
Between the huge rocks where the water’s foam frothed upward to become irregular granules of fire and then fall, possessed by the shadow of a jelly fish just dead, one pair of gloves whirled round and round. The ten fingers, some broken off and others twisted, strained to reach out in every direction. But according to observation, only the stars of partial destruction existed on the tips of the various fingers. There I fixed my gaze still harder.
What that scene enacts is a pseudo-scientific inquiry into objects seen and observed; there is almost too much going on here to ingest on the first go. First, consider the radical shifts in scale and detail: the huge rocks give way to the foam’s froth, which give way to the incorporeal existence of the dead jelly-fish’s shadow—the shadow being a central image in For the Fighting Spirit. Even a hint of the cosmic, “the stars of partial destruction,” haunts this scene. Your poems, Hiraide, traverse spaces big and small to find the most compelling of details; and we haven’t even arrived yet at the surreal appearance of the gloves, possibly representing the fragmented identity of the narrator (the person who speaks the words, “I fixed my gaze still harder”).
This procedure of pseudo-scientific inquiry does two things: first, it allows poetry and the imagination to make “objective” claims that would otherwise only be made by science, and, second, it undermines science’s grip on the empirical and the rational. The melding of these seemingly incompatible disciplines continues in For the Fighting Spirit:
The strange insect called scarabaeus skillfully constructs round pellets from the dung of hoofed animals such as sheep, cows, and horses, and takes them to an appropriate place to be slowly consumed. For its larvae, special pellets are made by selecting only the dung of sheep, which has the most nutritional value and is easiest to digest. First the mother carefully selects the ingredients, then crushes them finely, carrying it to an underground nest. There, beginning here operation in earnest, she creates a beautiful pear-shaped pellet, and through the small hole she has left open until the very end, pushes an egg into the center. When the larva is finally hatched from the egg, it finds itself in the middle of this enormous lump of dung, and peacefully eating its surroundings, little by little grows larger.
An enclosure, the dung heap, gives rise to life, one of nature’s unlikely miracles; and out of the non-poetic—the language of science—comes poetry. Here, the actions of the poet mirror the actions of the beetle.

Why the Walnut?

We’re still left with the unavoidable question: why the walnut? As Alan Gilbert wrote in a review of this collection in The Believer, “A walnut is a train is a poem is a heart is a shadow.” As Sawako Nakayasu explains in her introduction to your collection: “Kurumi, the Japanese word for walnut, is homophonous with kurumi, meaning ‘wrapping’ or ‘enclosure.’” Different kinds of enclosures proliferate in this book, a radically diverse listing of wrappings and shelters. Consider Apollinaire’s head, a humble reminder that the body itself can be the most fragile of enclosures:
(Even as I roll about here, I have never for a moment forgotten about the loving, large head of Guillaume Albert Vladimir Alexandre Apollinairis de Kostrowitzky, injured by a shell and wrapped up in bandages.)
I can’t help but think of Hamlet’s words, “I could be bounded in a nutshell, and count myself a king of infinite space, were it not that I have bad dreams.” Your work is intensely interested in different spaces, both real and fictitious. (Consider your collection Postcards to Donald Evans. As with Evans, the artist who devoted himself to painting stamps for imaginary countries, so too do you seek to explore what can only be called an imaginary psychogeography. The subway becomes one such place, a real topos but one imbued with the vitality of the imaginative.) This also applies to how you approach genre. Your work is often categorized as being hostile to certain genre conventions, and rightfully so. Again, from the introduction by Nakayasu: “Hiraide himself jokingly refers to it all as sabotage: reflecting upon several decades of intense literary production, he notes that it has been twenty-some years since this ‘poet’ has published a book of poetry.”
Topiary 1 Night
Topiary 1, Night. Image courtesy Ross Martens.
As a poet can imagine the infinitely tight interior of a walnut, and give life to that impossible space through poetry, so too can one imagine a different space within any literary genre. You seek to abandon the conventional notions of what it means to inhabit spaces or genre conventions, and this leads to thoughtful and wonderful deconstructions of almost every form available to literature—travelogue, nature writing, poetry, criticism, etc.
And what is the walnut if not another enclosure, a metonymic marker for all other shelters of some kind (whether they be subway car, shadow, Apollinaire’s head, genre, language, or other?). Hamlet, in his nutshell, had only the imaginative capacity for bad dreams (one can’t blame the guy). You, on the other hand, have much brighter and lighter images to convey; this does not make them any less serious since they illustrate the severity of everyday living—the idea, for instance, that even the most prosaic of everyday activities, a subway ride, can be the staging ground for a radical poetics.
Despite the compassion and empathy that one finds in For the Fighting Spirit of the Walnut, there is also an extreme amount of both despair and pragmatic realism. The shadow that you return to over and over again brings this to mind. The world, despite its fighting spirits, can still be a dark place. For the walnut is not simply that which is present and real, but it can also be the absence of reality itself. Your texts, Hiraide, often bring to mind a feeling of mono no aware, that traditional aesthetic motif found in many Japanese works of art regarding the ephemeral nature of things (at least that is how this Westerner describes such a concept; but I also wonder if this at all resonates with Eliot’s shanti shanti shanty, “the peace which passeth all understanding”? Though to be honest, I have never been able to fully accept Eliot’s Christianized interpretation of this Eastern notion).
I first encountered the notion of mono no aware while reading The Tale of Genji, a text filled, much like The Fighting Spirit, with many moments of staggering poetic beauty. And that, to me, is what your always-shifting walnut represents: the transient way of things. Much like Lacan’s petit objet, it is the inexpressible object of desire; a hole at the center of subjectivity (and whether that subjectivity arises from person, thing or genre remains to be seen; but we rarely ask, what of the life of objects?). The walnut is an empty signifier just waiting to be filled, and once it is, it just as quickly vanishes, turning into something else. This brings to mind Žižek’s reading of the Kinder Egg (which I’ll paraphrase as: I love you, but I love even more that which is inside you, and therefore I must destroy you. Every Kinder Egg, like every walnut, exists to be smashed and destroyed). To name the walnut, in other words, would be to destroy it and its contents. Again we return to the presence of shadows in your texts; Emily Dickinson had her blank(s) and you have your shadow(s). It is probably for the best that you leave us there, in the luminous shadows, waiting for what comes next. (I’ve always had a difficult time saying good-bye.)
Sincerely Yours,
George Fragopoulos


108

In a decidedly vacant stone plaza, you are tapped on the shoulder by the convulsions of a section of light, and turn back, to your delight. However, to think that the countless hidden fibers of the atmosphere were already attacking you at once and tying you up, shadow and all. Inside the convulsive laughter, fight. Because the fighting spirit is that of the enemy, flooding over the plaza.
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